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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout years of uprising and Israeli military actions, 
siege of West Bank cities and President Arafat’s de 
facto house arrest, it was hard to imagine the situation 
getting worse for Palestinians. It has. On all fronts – 
Palestinian/Palestinian, Palestinian/Israeli and Palestinian/ 
international – prevailing dynamics are leading to a 
dangerous breakdown. Subjected to the cumulative effects 
of a military occupation in its 40th year and now what is 
effectively an international sanctions regime, the Hamas-led 
Palestinian Authority (PA) government cannot pay salaries 
or deliver basic services. Diplomacy is frozen, with scant 
prospect of thaw – and none at all of breakthrough. And 
Hamas’s electoral victory and the reactions it provoked 
among Fatah loyalists have intensified chaos and brought 
the nation near civil war. There is an urgent need for all 
relevant players to pragmatically reassess their positions, 
with the immediate objectives of:  
 avoiding inter-Palestinian violence and the PA’s 
collapse; 
 encouraging Hamas to adopt more pragmatic 
policies rather than merely punishing it for not 
doing so; 
 achieving a mutual and sustained Israeli-Palestinian 
ceasefire to prevent a resumption of full-scale 
hostilities; and 
 preventing activity that jeopardises the possibility 
of a two-state solution. 
Of all the dangers threatening the Palestinians, the most 
acute may well be internal strife. Facing one of the most 
hostile external environments in its history, the national 
movement also confronts one of its most acute domestic 
crises. Even as Hamas and Fatah leaders repeatedly profess 
their determination to avoid violent conflict, they act in 
ways that promote it. Fatah, unable to digest its electoral 
loss, is behaving as if still in power. It treats the new 
government as a usurper, blatantly subverting its ability to 
govern, relying on its partisans’ overwhelming presence 
throughout the civil service and, especially, the security 
forces. Hamas, unprepared for its triumph, is behaving 
as if it remains in opposition. It invokes steadfastness as 
a substitute for policy and has proved incapable so far of 
adjusting to its new status, while introducing provocative 
measures of its own.  
In this increasingly bloody power struggle, both camps 
(as well as the myriad camps within camps) are mobilising 
armed militias, stockpiling weapons, resorting to killings 
and spreading bedlam. The latest move was political. 
Mahmoud Abbas, PA President, Chairman of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) Executive Committee and 
Fatah Deputy Chairman, on 25 May 2006 threatened 
that if Hamas did not accept within ten days a proposal 
signed by a number of Israel’s most prominent Palestinian 
detainees – the Prisoners’ Initiative – which implicitly 
endorses a negotiated two-state solution, he would 
submit it to a popular referendum. Making good on his 
ultimatum after a short extension, he issued a presidential 
decree on 10 June calling for a referendum on 26 July.  
The result has been an increasingly bitter, and perilously 
violent, relationship, bringing the Palestinians to the brink 
of internecine conflict. The National Dialogue that was 
launched in late May to forge a political consensus appears 
to be as much about partisan posturing as about strategic 
compromise. While Abbas understandably is averse 
to interminable negotiations, his determination to hold 
a referendum opposed by Hamas carries a serious risk of 
further polarisation and violence – the very outcome that, 
by seeking to bring the Islamists into the political arena, 
he had tried to avoid. Today, the situation is but one tragic 
step – the assassination of a senior Fatah or Hamas leader, 
for example – from all-out chaos.  
Faced with the intensifying inter-Palestinian struggle, the 
calculus of the Quartet – the U.S., EU, Russia and the UN, 
who have been in charge of the disappearing peace process 
– and other outside actors has been simple: pressure the 
government, count on popular dissatisfaction with its 
(non-) performance and find ways to strengthen Abbas and 
ensure the Hamas experience in power comes to a rapid 
and unsuccessful end. The approach comes in different 
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variants, from the more confrontational (seeking to 
subvert the Hamas-led government through political 
and economic isolation), to the more subtle (hoping 
to circumvent the government through Abbas’s 
empowerment). Yet in both cases outside actors, by openly 
bolstering one faction against the other, exacerbate internal 
strife.  
Of late, limited signs of pragmatism have come from 
Washington regarding the need to prevent collapse within 
the occupied territories. However, the U.S. still appears 
reluctant to endorse a European proposal to fund priority 
social sectors while bypassing the government or at least 
wishes to postpone implementation of such a mechanism 
until after a referendum is held and the political context 
altered. The tightness of the grip aside, all, including Israel 
and even Arab states, appear convinced that squeezing the 
government unless it meets the Quartet’s three demands 
(recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and 
acceptance of past agreements) is the best way to end its 
tenure and accelerate the restoration of its more pragmatic 
predecessors. 
There are important elements of Hamas’s ideology and 
charter, including its refusal to recognise Israel and the 
call for its destruction, that are incompatible with the 
international community’s principles for a resolution of 
this conflict as well as the views of most Palestinians; 
pressure certainly needs to be brought upon it to change 
these. Without this necessary evolution, it cannot expect 
international recognition, nor can the government it leads 
expect genuine international support. But the approaches 
currently being applied or contemplated – to deprive it of 
resources, isolate or bypass it, force a referendum, or even 
stage early elections – suffer from the same fundamental 
flaws: the absence of a day-after strategy and an almost 
total disregard for Hamas’s very recent democratic mandate 
as well as the longer-term consequences of short-term 
success.  
Feeling cheated of its right to govern, Hamas would be 
unlikely to go quietly. Having reached the conclusion that 
its experiment in the mainstream has failed and political 
integration is no longer a viable option, and with its back 
against the wall, Hamas almost certainly would revert to 
internal violence or violence targeting Israel, causing 
maximum chaos, possibly bringing down the PA and 
allowing the Islamists to re-emerge as a resistance 
movement. The recent mutual escalation of violence with 
Israel shows how perilous this situation quickly can 
become. Nor should one expect poverty and despair to 
encourage the Palestinians toward greater moderation; 
those are the very conditions that helped propel Hamas to 
power in the first place, and it is difficult to imagine how 
they could assist Fatah in the near future. Regionally 
as well, the engineered failure of the first elected Sunni 
Islamist government could have unwelcome repercussions, 
buttressing jihadi Islamists at the expense of their more 
political counterparts.  
Starved of resources, confronting an increasingly hostile 
population and unable to realise its agenda, Hamas may 
well fail. But with widespread violence, chaos and a 
collapse in Palestinian institutions, it quickly would become 
hard to chalk up its failure as anybody’s success. Instead, 
what is required today is a more sophisticated, nuanced 
approach, pursuing the priority objectives described above 
with the specific policies summarised below. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
To the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and 
Palestinian National Resistance Movement (Fatah):  
1. Reach and implement agreement on the composition 
and role of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), including the integration of Hamas and 
recognition of the PLO’s responsibility for political 
negotiations with Israel.  
2. Form, with the participation of other Palestinian 
political movements and independents as appropriate, 
a national coalition government whose program 
includes endorsement of the 2002 Arab League 
Beirut Initiative and/or the 2006 Prisoners’ Initiative; 
designation of the PLO as responsible for political 
negotiations with Israel; ratification by national 
institutions and/or a national referendum of any 
agreement reached with Israel; and recognition of 
existing Palestinian commitments. 
3. Reactivate the National Security Council under 
the Palestinian president and including the prime 
minister, interior minister and heads of security 
agencies, to ensure the coordination of all security 
agencies and phased integration or demobilisation 
of all militias.  
To the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas):  
4. Reinstate the truce and extend it for the duration 
of the current government’s lifespan and declare 
a permanent moratorium on attacks against civilian 
targets, to enable Egypt and other mediators to 
achieve a reciprocal and comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian cessation of hostilities. 
To the Government of Israel:  
5. Cease offensive operations, particularly assassinations 
and incursions, which cannot be justified by 
imminent military necessity, refraining in particular 
from unprovoked acts of escalation and operations 
that harm civilians and damage civilian installations, 
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and support third-party efforts to achieve a 
reciprocal and comprehensive cessation of Israeli-
Palestinian hostilities. 
6. Release all Palestinians in Israeli detention who have 
not been charged with an offence and respond to 
Palestinian initiatives to maintain quiet with timely 
and substantive prisoner releases. 
7. Channel all withheld tax revenues to the Temporary 
International Mechanism proposed by the EU and 
maintain utility supplies and banking services to the 
Palestinian population. 
To the Members of the Diplomatic Quartet (U.S., 
EU, Russian Federation, UN): 
8. Subject to the PA abiding by existing Palestinian 
commitments and Hamas reinstating a truce, assign a 
UN-appointed mediator as its representative for 
contacts with the PLO, PA, Hamas, and other 
Palestinian organisations to obtain commitments 
from the PA government on the following matters: 
(a) support for a reciprocal and comprehensive 
Israeli-Palestinian cessation of hostilities; 
(b) recognition of applicable UN resolutions 
and the 2002 Arab League Beirut Initiative 
as the terms of reference for an Israeli-
Palestinian political settlement; and 
(c) approval of contacts between Israeli and 
Palestinian counterparts to improve delivery 
of services and mutual security, and on other 
matters of common interest. 
9. Ensure Israel fulfils its humanitarian obligations 
under international law towards the civilian 
population of the occupied Palestinian territories, 
specifically by:  
(a) providing unrestricted access to humanitarian 
agencies operating in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip that have been certified as such 
by the UN mediator; and 
(b) halting restrictions on the free movement of 
persons, goods, and services within, between, 
to and from the occupied territories that cannot 
be justified by legitimate security interests. 
10. Issue a declaration that, while any Israeli withdrawal 
from occupied territory is welcome, it will not 
recognise boundaries situated within occupied 
territory established through unilateral measures 
nor the legitimacy of any settlements established 
in contravention of international law. 
11. Present at an appropriate time a more detailed 
vision of a viable final status agreement.  
To the European Union and its Member States: 
12. Subject to agreement between UN mediator and 
the Palestinian government as described above: 
(a) suspend the prohibition on contacts with 
the PA government and Hamas leadership 
to expedite discussions on core EU concerns 
relating to the government’s political program, 
donor relations, the demobilisation and 
integration of armed factions and terms for 
the removal of Hamas from the EU blacklist 
of terrorist organisations; and  
(b) restore 2005 levels and forms of donor 
support to the PA, including budgetary 
support. 
13. In the absence of agreement between the UN 
mediator and the Palestinian government as 
described above, and subject to the PA government 
abiding by existing agreements and Hamas 
reinstating a truce: 
(a) expand the proposed Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM) in order to fund basic 
services in the occupied territories, including 
PA personnel, recurrent, and where necessary 
other costs, without distinction between 
civilian and security sectors, and wherever 
practicable through direct disbursements to 
personnel, suppliers, and contractors; and 
(b) modify the proposed Temporary International 
Mechanism so that UN agencies and the 
World Bank rather than the PA presidency 
serve as intermediaries between donors and 
the PA administration, and proceed with 
implementation without additional delay.  
To the Government of the United States: 
14. Refrain from threats against Palestinian political 
organisations and individual politicians that obstruct 
inter-Palestinian dialogue and the formation of a 
PA coalition government. 
15. Revise the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
directives with respect to Hamas to state specifically 
that the standing exemption from penalty for dealing 
with a proscribed organisation provided to select 
international organisations, including the United 
Nations and the World Bank, will apply to third 
parties, such as banks and other institutions and 
entities, implementing programs for or handling 
funds received on behalf of those international 
organisations.  
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To the Chairman of the Arab League and member 
states: 
16. Engage with the PA government and Hamas 
leadership to seek endorsement of the Arab League 
Beirut Initiative. 
Jerusalem/Amman/Brussels, 13 June 2006
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The new Palestinian Authority (PA) government’s 
assumption of power on 29 March 2006 completed the 
most significant transition of power since the Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement (Fatah) along with other 
guerrilla groups established their dominance of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the wake of the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War.  
With the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) today in 
control of the PA government and parliament, and Fatah 
retaining power over the PA’s presidency as well as the 
PLO, the transition has not produced a comprehensive 
change of leadership. Rather, the situation is one of dual 
power, somewhat akin to what France experiences during 
periods when competing parties hold sway over different 
executive institutions. Given the circumstances in which 
this occurred – most prominently Israeli military occupation, 
but also Palestinian political and demographic 
fragmentation as well as domestic chaos – in some ways 
it is remarkable it took place at all, let alone in a peaceful, 
democratic and transparent manner. Nevertheless the PA’s 
reconfiguration has confronted the political system, the 
region, and the wider international community with a series 
of challenges that in many respects are more complex than 
those the election was meant to resolve.  
Fatah, in seeking to consolidate its legitimacy through 
elections, has instead lost hegemony over a system it 
continues to regard as its own. Hamas, which anticipated 
sharing power with Fatah and acquiring international 
recognition through participation in Palestinian institutions,1 
is by virtue of its victory confronted with greater and more 
stringent demands than before, along with the responsibility 
of governing alone and the overwhelming task of mobilising 
 
 
1 For further discussion of Hamas’s approach to political 
integration see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°49, Enter 
Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration, 18 January 
2006; Crisis Group Middle East Report N°21, Dealing With 
Hamas, 26 January 2004; Graham Usher, “Hamas Risen”, 
Middle East Report 238 (Spring 2006), pp. 2-11. 
resources.2 Growing tensions between Fatah and Hamas, 
between them and extra-institutional armed groups, as 
well as between the PA and a disenchanted public, can 
further destabilise an already volatile environment.  
Israel, which rejected first Yasir Arafat and then Mahmoud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen) as interlocutors, must now contend 
with a counterpart that openly professes a disinterest 
in negotiations, is at best ambiguous about its strategic 
objectives, and continues to publicly uphold the right of 
armed resistance to military occupation. In principle, Hamas 
may prove a convenient foil and partner for Israel’s 
strategy of unilateral disengagement from much of the 
West Bank. But escalating Israeli measures to isolate 
and undermine the PA while consolidating control over 
East Jerusalem and other strategic West Bank territory 
could trigger a resumption of full-scale violence. A series 
of attacks on 9 June that killed a senior PA security official 
and a number of Palestinian civilians has come perilously 
close to doing so. In other words, Israel may be able to 
thwart Hamas’s attempt at governing, but in the process 
risks sacrificing its goal of undertaking a peaceful 
unilateral disengagement. Moreover, and in the longer 
run, a growing Israeli-Palestinian rupture is unlikely to 
produce either the mutual security or credible political 
process required for long-term stability.  
For the international community as well, challenges and 
choices abound. Arab governments appear torn between 
fear that Hamas’s success would inspire and embolden 
like-minded Islamist groups, particularly those associated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, and concern that Hamas’s 
manufactured collapse would further radicalise the region 
and strengthen the jihadi strand of Islamism. While most 
of the rest of the world has treated Hamas’s ascendancy 
as a purely domestic matter, the most significant actors – 
the United States and European Union – have not.3 In 
 
 
2 See, for example, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Hamas: 
The Perils of Power”, The New York Review of Books 53:4 (9 
March 2006. 
3 Most states within the region and elsewhere, including Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, China, Japan, India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, and Brazil, have maintained relations 
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contrast to Iraq, where Washington and Brussels actively 
encouraged the formation of a national unity government 
led by Islamists, or Lebanon, where they have largely 
averted their gaze from Hizbollah’s participation in 
government, the entire relationship with the PA, as well 
as other forms of assistance to the Palestinian people, have 
either been severed or placed under review due to Hamas’s 
executive role.  
The U.S. (and, to a lesser degree, European) strategy 
appears to be one of containment, frustrating Hamas’s 
government while avoiding a humanitarian crisis, and 
simultaneously preparing the ground for a popular backlash 
and/or a reversal of the electoral outcome.4 The purpose 
appears to be to send a clear message – to Hamas, the 
Palestinians, and the region as a whole – that the Islamist 
organisation’s ideology and practice have no place in the 
political arena and will not be accorded one. Short of the 
Islamists’ unlikely ideological conversion, in other words, 
the goal is to ensure they do not succeed. But few seem 
to have assessed the long-term consequences of a strategy 
that convinces the Islamists they are being set up for a 
failure they almost certainly will not accept quietly.  
On all three fronts – the Palestinian/Palestinian, Palestinian/ 
Israeli and Palestinian/international community – prevailing 
dynamics are leading to dangerous breakdowns. Each 
needs to be reassessed and considered in light of what 
ought to be the principal priorities: to avoid a collapse of 
the PA, eruption of greater inter-Palestinian violence and 
resumption of full-scale Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.  
 
 
with the PA and declined to revise these on account of Hamas’s 
electoral victory.  
4 “The goal is not to collapse the Hamas government right away. 
Hamas would not be blamed, we have no confidence in Fatah or 
Abbas at this point, and so don’t see a substitute. It will take 
time, and we are prepared to wait”. Crisis Group interview, U.S. 
official, Washington, March 2006.  
II. THE INTER-PALESTINIAN 
STRUGGLE  
Facing one of the most hostile external environments in its 
history, the Palestinian national movement also confronts 
one of its most acute internal crises. Fatah, unable to fully 
accept its electoral loss, has continued to act as if it remains 
in power, treating the new government as usurpers, 
temporarily in possession of positions and institutions 
that are rightfully its own. Hamas, unprepared for its 
parliamentary triumph and even less to govern alone,5 has 
behaved as if it were still in opposition, relying on political 
posturing and denunciations of subversive plots as 
substitutes for hard decision-making.6 The result has been 
an increasingly bitter and perilously violent relationship, 
bringing the Palestinians to the brink of civil war. While 
both sides profess a determination to avoid this, and neither 
appears to have an interest in provoking it,7 the worst may 
 
 
5 “We didn’t expect to be in government. We thought we’d be a 
strong opposition. We were stunned”. Crisis Group interview, 
Riyad Mustafa, Hamas parliamentarian, Ramallah, February 2006. 
Similar views were expressed by other Islamist PLC members. 
Crisis Group interviews, Salah Bardawil, Hamas PLC member 
and spokesman for its parliamentary faction, Khan Yunis, May 
2006; Mustafa Abu Sway, Jerusalem, February 2006. Mark Perry 
and Alastair Crooke, “How to Lose the War on Terror 1: Talking 
with the ‘Terrorists’”, Asia Times, 31 March 2006, argue that the 
Islamists “purposely played down their expectations of a clear 
parliamentary victory over fears that the U.S. and Israel would 
press Palestinian President Abu Mazen to cancel the elections 
until Fatah could gain more strength”. Indeed, Hamas leader 
Muhammad Nazzal, in a post-election interview with Crisis 
Group held in Cairo in February 2006, praised its report, Enter 
Hamas, on the grounds that it helped lull America, Israel, and 
Fatah into proceeding with elections. Echoing this view, an 
Islamist leader explained: “We did not enter the elections 
expecting to win. But after we were nominated as candidates and 
began campaigning among the people, it became clear to us that 
we were heading for victory and would achieve a majority”. 
Crisis Group interview, Mahmoud Ramahi, PLC Secretary 
General, Ramallah, May 2006. That said, the tenor of debate and 
discussion within Hamas prior to 25 January 2006 centred around 
whether or not the movement should participate in government 
and assume ministerial posts if these were offered – an entirely 
superfluous debate if victory was indeed expected, and an 
indication that the magnitude of the victory came as a surprise. 
Indeed, several Hamas members interviewed prior to the 
elections offered specific predictions of their performance. The 
highest gave Hamas 60 seats, less than the 67 required for a 
parliamentary majority.  
6 See, for example, the Friday sermons of PM Ismail Haniya, 
and public speeches of Hamas politburo leader Khalid Mashal, 
available in Arabic at http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/ 
index.shtml.  
7 Leaders on both sides expressed confidence their rivals were 
not reckless enough to risk a conflict. Crisis Group interviews, 
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yet materialise. The National Dialogue that was launched 
in late May to forge a political consensus and resolve the 
crisis appears to be as much about pressing partisan 
advantage as about securing strategic compromise. The 
situation is but a tragic step – the assassination of a senior 
Fatah or Hamas leader, for example – from all-out chaos.  
A. HAMAS IN GOVERNMENT  
In the immediate aftermath of Hamas’s victory, some 
Palestinian and outside analysts speculated that the 
movement, confronted with the exigencies of governing 
and eager to achieve greater international recognition, might 
accelerate its political transition and formally adopt the 
more pragmatic views suggested by numerous leadership 
statements in recent years.8 Such statements have, to some 
extent, continued. Thus, according to Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniya, speaking to Crisis Group in February 2006: 
The real problem is that we are not a state but the 
government of an authority existing in territory that 
does not meet the criteria of a state. I say clearly that 
if Israel wants to end this situation it must agree to 
a fully sovereign Palestinian state. If this does not 
happen the conflict will continue. The solution is a 
sovereign Palestinian state encompassing the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, with its capital in East 
Jerusalem. This does not obligate me to recognise 
Israel. The reality is that Israel exists and is a state 
recognised by many, and I have to deal with this. 
There is no law compelling me to recognise it; the 
subject of recognition is not on the agenda. The 
solution is in the hands of the Israelis. We demand 
that it announce its commitment to a Palestinian 
state with its capital in Jerusalem, and clearly 
announce and fully respect a schedule for 
implementing this. We are under no obligation to 
offer initiatives and we do not provide political 
positions free of charge.9  
Likewise, in the words of Riad Mustafa, a Hamas 
parliamentarian:  
 
 
Shaikh Hamid Baitawi, Hamas PLC member, Ramallah, May 
2006; senior PA officials, Ramallah, May 2006. 
8 See further Crisis Group Reports, Enter Hamas; The Challenges 
of Political Integration; and Dealing With Hamas, all op. cit.  
9 Crisis Group interview, Ismail Haniya, Cairo, February 2006. 
See further Khalid Mashal, “We will not sell our people or 
principles for foreign aid”, The Guardian, 31 January 2006; 
Musa Abu Marzuq, “What Hamas is seeking”, Washington Post, 
31 January 2006; Ismail Haniya, “A just peace or no peace”, 
The Guardian, 31 March 2006; Danny Rubinstein, “Haniya 
tells Haaretz: Withdrawal to 1967 borders will lead to peace”, 
Haaretz, 23 May 2006.  
I say unambiguously: Hamas does not and never will 
recognise Israel. Recognition is an act conferred by 
states, not movements or governments, and Palestine 
is not a state. Nevertheless, the government’s program 
calls for the end of the occupation, not the destruction 
of Israel, and Hamas has proposed ending the 
occupation and a long-term truce (hudna) to bring 
peace to this region. That is Hamas’s own position. 
The government has also recognised President 
Abbas’s right to conduct political negotiations with 
Israel. If he were to produce a peace agreement, 
and if this agreement was endorsed by our national 
institutions and a popular referendum, then – even 
if it includes Palestinian recognition of Israel – we 
would of course accept their verdict. Because 
respecting the will of the people and their democratic 
choice is also one of our principles.10  
However, the transition from opposition to government 
demanded far more clarity, and it was not forthcoming. 
Hamas and the new government failed to take the initiative 
by articulating clear and forward-leaning political positions 
that could convincingly return the ball to their opponents’ 
court, sow dissent between the U.S. and EU, or produce a 
common script with other Palestinian forces. Instead, the 
new government and Hamas officials launched ambiguous 
trial balloons, offering one day what they withdrew the next. 
Hamas politburo leader Khalid Mashal “seems unable to 
make a statement these days without reference to the 
movement’s ‘realism’”,11 but rather than spelling out what 
this means seems primarily interested in balancing these 
statements with warnings that the Islamists will not 
capitulate to foreign pressure.  
In early April, PA Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahhar 
wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calling 
for “our people to enjoy freedom, independence, and a 
dignified life with our neighbours in this holy part of the 
world”, “achieving peace and stability in our region on the 
basis of a just and comprehensive peace” and accusing 
Israel of “destruction of any hope of achieving a resolution 
and peace on the basis of a two-state settlement”.12 
Responding to fevered speculation that one of Hamas’s 
most prominent hardliners had on behalf of the government 
formally accepted the two-state settlement, however, Zahhar 
denounced this interpretation; it seems he was only stating 
for the record the view that Israel was destroying this option, 
without himself endorsing it. Such incidents and others, 
 
 
10 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
11 Crisis Group interview, George Giacaman, Director, 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin), 
Ramallah, February 2006. 
12 Letter from PA Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahhar to UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, 4 April 2006. Copy provided 
to Crisis Group.  
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presumably intended to demonstrate the Islamists’ 
pragmatism and potential for flexibility, reinforced rather 
than ameliorated the image, dominant in much of the 
West, of a dogmatic movement camouflaging formal 
rejectionism with informal and non-binding statements.  
Overall, the Islamists evinced surprisingly little appetite for 
change and far less of the political savvy they had displayed 
both in opposition and during the campaign. For instance, 
while the movement and government have separate 
spokespersons, and while candidates ran as members of the 
Change and Reform Bloc, the Islamists failed to draw the 
clear distinctions between Hamas and the government that 
might have allowed greater flexibility without compromising 
on core principles.13 Their inability to form either a coalition 
government or a cabinet led by independents was another 
indication in this regard,14 as was the monopolisation 
of institutional posts. The secretariat of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC), for example, is customarily 
shared with opposition and Christian parliamentarians but 
the current one is staffed exclusively by officers beholden 
to Hamas, even though there was no lack of opposition or 
Christian parliamentarians.15  
Once it was formed, the government could have endorsed 
the Arab League’s 2002 Beirut Initiative – accepted 
by every Arab government, Syria and Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq included – which conditions normal relations with 
Israel on full withdrawal from occupied territory and a 
negotiated solution to the refugee problem; acquiesced in 
the applicability of past PA commitments; accepted the 
PLO’s 1988 Algiers Program (proclaiming statehood 
 
 
13 “We told Hamas: Fatah itself has not lived up to the Quartet’s 
three conditions, but the PA under its stewardship did. Why 
can’t you do the same?”. Crisis Group interview, independent 
Palestinian observer, Washington, May 2006. Others have 
pointed out that Arafat recognised Israel in his capacity as PLO 
Chairman, and that Fatah has to this day not adopted a similar 
decision. 
14 The question of Hamas’s willingness to form a coalition 
government has been hotly disputed. Hamas leaders insist 
they spent a month trying to accommodate Fatah and that 
independents backed out under U.S. pressure (the U.S. reportedly 
made clear that any member of the government would be barred 
from entry into the country or from contacts with American 
officials). “We spent a month with all the factions to form a 
coalition with Fatah and find a common program but they 
insisted that there was no solution unless we accepted their plan 
in full, which had just been rejected by the people”. Crisis Group 
interview, Salah Bardawil, Khan Yunis, May 2006. Rival 
factions blame Hamas’s reluctance to compromise; one potential 
independent cabinet member states negotiations failed because 
of Islamist “intransigence”. Crisis Group interview, April 2006.  
15 PLC Deputy Speaker Hasan Khreisheh is not an Islamist 
but his candidacy for parliament was supported by Hamas. 
In the previous parliament he served a similar function as an 
opposition member. 
within the occupied territories to be the national movement’s 
strategic goal); or, more recently, approved the 11 May 
Prisoners’ Initiative (jointly signed by leading Fatah and 
Hamas members)16 – any of which would have signalled 
acceptance of, or at least willingness to countenance, 
the two-state solution and modified the political context. 
Independent Palestinian activists as well as major Arab 
states pressed them to do so; so far, they have balked. 
Urged by Crisis Group in particular to accept the Beirut 
Initiative, senior Hamas leaders demurred. “If Israel 
accepts it or if the Quartet makes clear that it will actively 
seek to implement it once we say yes, then we will 
seriously consider it”.17  
Likewise, in lieu of a strategy to cope with the economic 
stranglehold, Hamas leaders have resorted to equivocation 
and rhetoric, speaking of “steadfastness”, surviving on 
“olive oil and thyme”,18 and of pressure by Arab peoples 
on their regimes which would force them to provide aid.19 
Some Fatah members, even while rejecting the Quartet’s 
approach of pre-conditionality and denouncing it for bias,20 
bitterly faulted Hamas for its inability to seize the 
initiative.21  
 
 
16 The latter document calls for the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the 1967 borders without explicit reference to recognition 
of Israel but with reference to international legitimacy; affirms 
the right to resist the occupation by all means within those 
boundaries; and calls for the refugees’ right of return to be 
guaranteed. For a more detailed discussion, see Section II D 
below. 
17 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 
18 Prime Minister Haniya’s reference to the traditional Palestinian 
condiment of olive oil and thyme (zayt wa za’tar), while similar 
to statements made by Arafat and other Palestinian leaders in 
past crises to indicate the popular capacity for steadfastness, has 
been subjected to increasing public ridicule as the economy 
deteriorates further. Some have also begun to cynically inquire 
if it has become a staple on the menu of Hamas leaders and 
officials. Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian residents, West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, May 2006. 
19 Crisis Group interview with Hamas official, March 2006. 
20 “Quartet Go Home! It’s a miserable body that has provided 
cover for the worst American policies. The 30 January Quartet 
statement is simply terrible, even worse than U.S. statements”. 
Crisis Group interview with Nasir Qidwa, former PA Foreign 
Minister and Fatah Revolutionary Council member, Ramallah, 
February 2006. Others have chided the Quartet and its members 
for double standards, noting that Palestinian attacks on Israeli 
targets routinely draw vigorous condemnation while more 
frequent killings of Palestinians often pass without 
acknowledgement. Indeed, the strongest statement offered by 
Washington in response to the 9 June killing of six members 
of a Palestinian family in the Gaza Strip – for which it expressed 
regret – was, “We call on the Palestinian authority to prevent 
all acts of terrorism”. Haaretz, 11 June 2006. 
21 Responding to such criticism, Hamas leaders question why 
the burden should be on them to endorse the Beirut Initiative, 
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Interpretations differ as to why the movement has failed 
to formalise the greater flexibility shown by individual 
leaders now that it has the opportunity to exercise real 
power and now that the potential costs of intransigence – 
an inability to deliver on campaign promises, growing 
discontent among unpaid government employees and the 
possibility of domestic violence – have become appreciably 
higher. For many, some Palestinians included, it reflects 
the strength of Hamas’s Islamist ideology and beliefs, 
and in particular the prohibition against recognising the 
legitimacy of Israel’s existence on what is defined as 
sacred Muslim territory.22  
Another explanation relates to the difficulties experienced 
by a movement that is accustomed to changing only 
gradually and on the basis of extensive internal consultation, 
to adapt rapidly to unexpected circumstances and resolve 
its organisational differences in real time and in the 
limelight. Given the short period Hamas has been in office, 
and in the context of heavy international and domestic 
pressure, the movement may simply not have had the 
necessary political space and time required to conduct and 
conclude its internal debates.  
That such debates exist is not in serious doubt. Indeed; 
there is growing evidence of tensions within Hamas that 
cut across various and at times overlapping lines – inside/ 
outside; West Bank/Gaza; younger/older generations; and 
perhaps political/military as well. For example, some 
members of the PLC and government – by virtue of their 
institutional position and need to deliver on campaign 
promises – have appeared more receptive to international 
demands and more intent on avoiding a clash with Abbas. 
According to Ghassan Khatib, a political analyst and 
former PA minister, the internal leadership’s agenda 
increasingly is determined by the exigencies of government 
and the imperative of addressing their constituents’ socio-
economic priorities, while the exile leadership focuses on 
 
 
when Israel has rejected it, arguing that the past ten years have 
seen Palestinians accept one compromise after another with no 
returns. They also raised substantive objections to the initiative, 
in particular its provisions on the Palestinian refugee question, 
which call for a negotiated solution rather than unconditional 
recognition of their right of return. Crisis Group interview with 
Hamas leaders, March 2006. 
22 “This is not a matter of tactics; it goes to the very root of 
Hamas’s Islamist creed. They simply cannot deviate from their 
religious conviction that all of mandatory Palestine is waqf 
[Islamic mortmain], and that none can be relinquished”. Crisis 
Group interview, U.S. official, Washington May 2006. “It is an 
ideological principle of the Muslim Brotherhood. They will never 
recognise Israel. They are ready to become agents of the U.S. and 
CIA, but not to give legitimacy to Israel. They will recognise it 
de facto but never de jure. This makes the political path very 
difficult”. Crisis Group interview, senior Fatah official and 
Palestinian presidential adviser, Ramallah, March 2006. 
maintaining Iranian funding and Syrian political support. 
“The challenges of governing and meeting basic needs 
necessarily diminish the importance of ideology. It can’t 
be avoided”.23  
Hamas officials are predictably tight-lipped about any 
internal tensions. Commenting on this, a leader in the 
occupied territories stated that “we have four committees 
that participate in decision-making: West Bank, Gaza Strip, 
prisoners, and exile. If any three of these endorse a 
position, it becomes the decision of the movement”.24 But 
disagreements increasingly have flared into the open. In 
April, for example, Deputy Prime Minister Nasir-al-Din 
Sha’ir publicly criticised exiled Politburo chief Khalid 
Mashal for an outspoken attack on Fatah leaders, whom 
Mashal had accused of seeking to mount a “coup” in 
collusion with the U.S. and Israel.25 While Sha’ir is an 
independent Islamist rather than Hamas member, he would 
have been unlikely to make such a statement without at 
least tacit government support. He may also have been 
sending a signal to his cabinet colleagues that the interests 
of the national government need to supersede the partisan 
ones of the Islamist movement. In the event, he was not 
reprimanded.  
More recently, in assessing the 11 May Prisoners’ Initiative, 
Hamas leaders and officials responded in a muddled and 
disorderly fashion – shown from the outset in their failure 
to either endorse or reject a document co-signed by one of 
its most prominent prisoners. These differences became 
more pronounced in response to Abbas’s 25 May ultimatum 
for Hamas to endorse the Initiative within ten days or face 
a referendum in 40. PLC speaker Aziz Dwaik appeared to 
accept a referendum on the grounds that “returning to 
the people is one of the most important principles in 
democracy”, while PLC member Mushir Masri denounced 
it as a “coup against the democratic choice of the Palestinian 
people”.26 Personifying these contradictions and the 
movement’s dilemma, exile leader Muhammad Nazzal 
characterised it as “blackmail” and “a tool of pressure on 
Hamas”, before concluding that “no one can be against a 
referendum because it will show the will of the people”.27  
All in all, such disagreements have made it hard for the 
Islamists rapidly to come up with a unified, let alone a 
 
 
23 Crisis Group interview, Ghassan Khatib, former PA Minister 
of Labour, Planning, and Health (Acting), Ramallah, May 2006. 
24 Crisis Group interview, Ramahi, May 2006. 
25 Palestine News Network, “Political office leader Khalid 
Mashal speech: No way we will bend to U.S., Israeli & Fatah 
pressure to be subservient to the zionists – Fatah leaders in 
uproar”, 22 April 2006, at http://www.pnn.ps/english/archive 
2006/apr/week4/220406/report1.htm. 
26 Joel Greenberg, “Hamas faces challenge on Israel’s right 
to exist”, Chicago Tribune, 25 May 2006. 
27 Reuters, 26 May 2006. 
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forward-leaning position. While Hamas’s brand of 
democratic centralism and its very deliberative method of 
resolving differences served it well in opposition, they are 
severely undermining its credibility and effectiveness in 
government. 
It also can be argued that Hamas’s disappointing lack of 
pragmatism reflects the reactions of a movement under 
siege, pressured by all sides – Fatah included – to acquiesce 
to non-negotiable (and, in their eyes, humiliating) demands; 
indeed, some independent Palestinian observers believe 
that the confrontational tactics adopted by the Quartet and 
Fatah have contributed to Hamas’s uncompromising 
stance. “We should have given them the time and space 
to evolve. By pressing them immediately and imposing 
unrealistic demands, we made it more difficult for them to 
show flexibility and strengthened the hand of their more 
militant leaders”.28 Senior Hamas officials made the point 
that they stood to lose far more in the public eye by bowing 
to foreign diktats and making ideological U-turns than by 
sticking steadfastly to past positions. According to a senior 
Hamas leader: 
The Palestinian public would not understand or 
forgive us if we changed positions overnight, after 
campaigning on a different platform, in response to 
outside pressure. They did not elect us to pursue 
the policies of those we defeated and which 
produced nothing after ten years. They elected us 
to stand for what we believe and to stand firm.29  
For Riad Mustafa, a Hamas parliamentarian, “If we are 
forced to choose between our beliefs and political power 
we will sacrifice authority to maintain our beliefs”.30 This 
posture was made all the easier since the Quartet demands 
were deemed excessive by large, probably majority 
segments of the public.31 In the words of a Palestinian 
analyst: 
Many Palestinians see this as another instance of 
double standards. They are being asked to recognise 
the state of Israel while Israel continues to occupy 
 
 
28 Crisis Group interview, independent Palestinian observer, 
Washington, May 2006. 
29 Crisis Group interview, senior Hamas official, March 2006. 
30 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
31 In a public opinion poll conducted in late April 2006, for 
example, 64 per cent opposed the proposition that Hamas should 
recognise Israel in exchange for international funding of the PA. 
“Poll: The Palestinian Government and International Funding”, 
Birzeit University Development Studies Centre, 30 April 2006, 
at www.jmcc.org. Responding to an identical question for a poll 
conducted by Birzeit University’s Development Studies Program 
in June, 61 per cent opposed recognition in exchange for funding. 
“Public Opinion Poll #27: Living Conditions, National Dialogue 
and the Referendum, Evaluation of Institutions”, at 
http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/poll27/analysis.html.  
Palestinian land and before Israel has recognised 
a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. They are 
being asked to renounce violence while every day 
they experience the effect of Israeli violence. And 
they are being asked to accept past agreements 
while Israel has attached so many reservations to 
the Roadmap as to make its acceptance a nullity.32  
Whatever the reasons for Hamas’s approach, the end 
result has been diplomatic and economic paralysis, 
strengthening the conviction of those inside and out who 
favour a policy of pressure to cause the government to fall. 
Advocates of an engagement policy have been inhibited, 
unable to point to unequivocal movement on the PA 
government’s part to buttress their case that a new approach 
was warranted.33 In the words of a European diplomat, 
“with its contradictory noises, Hamas made it easy for 
the Quartet to stick together”.34 Pointing to statements 
made by Hamas leaders and PA cabinet members that 
condoned rather than condemned a 17 April suicide 
bombing in Tel Aviv by Islamic Jihad, another Western 
diplomat reached an identical conclusion.35 
Rigidity is one concern; inexperience another. While the 
PA government has been hamstrung financially, it has also 
been hampered by Hamas’s performance. The mantra 
among Fatah leaders and other critics is that “Hamas 
doesn’t know how to govern”.36 In response, the Islamists 
insist they inherited a shambles and are working effectively 
to fix it.37 More importantly, they insist they have not yet 
begun to govern because the combination of Israeli policies, 
international boycott and Fatah obstruction (via its loyalist 
civil service and hold over the PA’s financial institutions) 
has deprived them of the resources and institutions required 
to rule.38  
 
 
32 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, Washington, 
April 2006. Prime Minister Haniya did not mince his words on 
this issue: “Do policymakers in Washington and Europe ever 
feel ashamed of their scandalous double standards? Before and 
since the Palestinian elections in January, they have continually 
insisted that Hamas comply with certain demands….But we 
have not heard a single demand of the Israeli parties that took 
part in this week’s elections, though some advocate the complete 
removal of the Palestinians from their lands....Though we are 
the victims, we offer our hands in peace, but only a peace that is 
based on justice”. Ismail Haniya, “A just peace or no peace”, 
The Guardian, 31 March 2006. 
33 Crisis Group interview, European diplomats, May 2006. 
34 Crisis Group interview, EU diplomat, Jerusalem, May 2006. 
35 Crisis Group telephone interview, May 2006. 
36 Crisis Group interviews, Fatah leaders and secular Palestinian 
activists, West Bank and Gaza Strip, January-May 2006. 
37 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas leaders and PA government 
officials, Cairo, West Bank and Gaza Strip, February-May 
2006. 
38 Crisis Group interview, Riad Mustafa, May 2006. 
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Criticism of the civil service is particularly harsh, as Hamas 
officials dismiss suggestions that a neutral bureaucracy 
is being shunted aside by an Islamist government. Rather, 
they claim the civil service is a partisan force appointed 
and directed by Fatah that is actively working to block the 
government from fulfilling its duties. “There are 5,300 
Directors-General in the PA, all of them Fatah. Because 
of the financial crisis we have been unable to make any 
appointments. How can a general lead an army loyal to 
the other side?”39  
A Fatah activist concurs that “Hamas is unable to bring 
its own people into the PA. So long as the financial crisis 
persists it would be too unseemly for them to make the 
new appointments they are entitled to”.40 And the 
head of an international agency confirms that both the 
presidency and the civil service are seeking to impede 
the ministers’ work.41  
All that said, it appears beyond dispute that the Islamists 
were unprepared for the difficulties they currently face. 
By most accounts, they underestimated the extent of the 
challenge, initially assuming that their electoral achievement 
would automatically produce international recognition, 
while minimising threats emanating from the Quartet and 
others as either unlikely to materialise or easily overcome. 
On the eve of his 29 March investiture as finance minister, 
for example, Omar Abd-al-Raziq suggested any 
differences with the EU would be resolved based on a 
shared commitment to transparency and accountability. 
If not, he foresaw little difficulty in obtaining the 
necessary resources from Arab and Islamic states, PA 
government corporations, or – should all else fail – 
Palestinian banks.42 Hamas officials interviewed by 
Crisis Group also displayed a surprising lack of detailed 
knowledge concerning the PA’s dependency on the 
outside world and its relationship with Israel.43  
This has severely limited the government’s ability to 
maintain a functioning administration let alone implement 
its program. Ghassan Khatib, a leader of the Palestinian 
People’s Party who held three ministerial posts in Fatah-
dominated cabinets, notes the Hamas-dominated PLC has 
ratified only two initiatives: the first depriving deputy 
ministers and other senior civil servants of their financial 
authority and a number of other powers, the second a 
wholesale abrogation of decrees issued by Abbas in the 
interregnum between the old and new parliaments.44 Within 
 
 
39 Crisis Group interview, Riad Mustafa, May 2006. 
40 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
41 Crisis Group interview, May 2006. 
42 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, March 2006. 
43 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas officials, March 2006. 
44 According to Article 43 of the Palestinian Basic Law (interim 
constitution) the presidency has the right to issue decrees when 
ministries, the situation is perceived by some as no better. 
“We thought Fatah was factional but they are nothing 
compared to Hamas. They are treating the civil service as 
the opposition”.45 Justified or not,46 such suspicion has its 
costs; while some ministries have maintained their chains 
of command, in others the ministers’ loyalist advisers 
serve as the interface, with even routine activity such as 
correspondence requiring ministerial approval.47  
Low morale has led to absenteeism, which is crippling 
several ministries. In one, for example, a senior civil 
servant estimates it has reached 50 per cent: 
I only come here out of a sense of obligation. I have 
three assistants who now rotate working days. They 
have transport costs that exceed $100 a month and 
are not getting paid, and there is no work to compel 
them to come here. The work of a ministry consists 
of projects, activities, and relations, but now there 
is no money for any of these so the ministry is 
paralysed. We no longer have money for office 
supplies, or even for the transportation we need for 
interministerial and other meetings because since 
early May gas stations no longer accept PA fuel 
coupons. People no longer come here for services 
because they know we can’t provide them. There’s 
an awful lot of card-playing within the PA these 
days. The only functioning ministries are health 
and education, but after schools close next week 
the latter will stop functioning as well.48 
 
 
the PLC is not in session but these only retain the power of law 
if approved by the first subsequent session convened by the PLC.  
45 “Hamas ministers could easily have taken a professional as 
opposed to political approach to senior civil servants. In 
the event a Fatah civil servant seeks to sabotage the proper 
functioning of a ministry, the law entitles the minister to take 
disciplinary action”. Crisis Group interview, Ghassan Khatib, 
May 2006. 
46 Hamas has acted to present its management of state 
institutions as non-partisan. Thus, whereas throughout the PA, 
including in offices staffed by senior Islamist officials, the only 
pictures on the wall are those of Abbas and Arafat, with no 
evident attempt to replace them with pictures of Hamas 
dignitaries, Preventive Security commanders in Khan Younis 
burnish their camps with numerous pictures of Mohammad 
Dahlan, their former commander, and fly Fatah flags from the 
ramparts. 
47 Crisis Group interview, senior PA civil servant, Ramallah, 
May 2006. 
48 Crisis group interview, senior PA civil servant, Ramallah, 
May 2006. Such absenteeism levels are not the norm, however. 
At the ministry of labour, for instance, a senior official reports 
96.3 per cent attendance, “the highest of any ministry. We’ve 
instructed our employees to report for duty at the ministry branch 
office closest to their place of residence to reduce their 
transportation costs”. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 
2006. Likewise, Minister of Planning Samir Abu Aisha, who 
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A ministry of culture employee in the West Bank paints an 
equally bleak picture. The minister, based in Gaza City, 
reportedly has assumed all decision-making powers, cutting 
senior as well as junior staff out of the loop:  
Communications from the minister are virtually 
non-existent, limited to the occasional missive about 
the importance of showing up for work. I don’t 
work for him, but for the PA, which is under an 
obligation to pay me a salary even if it doesn’t 
give me assignments related to culture. So far 
absenteeism is low because people have been 
expecting some resolution of the financial crisis and 
have a strong sense of duty. Another month of this 
and people will begin to give up hope, especially 
considering the many families with two working 
parents who will have children home all summer 
for lack of money.49  
Hamas’s excuses also are beginning to wear thin. Upon 
assuming office, PM Haniya, Finance Minister Abd-al-
Raziq, and other officials gave detailed figures, ranging 
up to hundreds of millions of dollars, for the savings 
the new government expected to make by eliminating 
corruption, mismanagement, and waste purportedly tolerated 
by the finance ministry in previous years. They also accused 
their predecessors of running odious debts of up to $4 
billion. Charging he was being accused of “high 
treason”, former finance minister and current Third Way 
parliamentarian Salam Fayyad on 4 May issued a detailed, 
lengthy rebuttal demonstrating that the civil service was 
run to the highest standards of transparency and the debt 
burden was well within guidelines adopted by the EU for 
its own member states, and that the projected savings were 
therefore largely imaginary: 
In my assessment there can only be two 
explanations for the government’s claim that it was 
surprised to receive empty coffers. The first is that 
the government and its advisers did not actually 
expect to receive empty coffers. The second is that 
the government deliberately sought to give the 
impression that it was surprised to find the treasury 
empty, even though it knew for sure that the treasury 
could not have been anything but empty….[O]ne 
has to ask how credible and realistic a government 
program can be when it is based on the slogan of 
change and reform but the government is not fully 
aware of the full dimensions of what it wants to 
 
 
previously had been a private consultant frequently employed 
by the Ministry over the years, has “developed good relations 
with what is now his senior staff that have continued”. Crisis 
Group interview, Ghassan Khatib, May 2006 
49 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. A foreign 
ministry official is similarly critical, reaching similar conclusions. 
Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
change and reform….If opposition is based on 
criticising others, governance cannot be and cannot 
stand on such a basis.50 
Since Fayyad published his statement, “Hamas has talked 
a lot less about corruption and savings within the civilian 
budget”.51  
Discontent, while still palpably directed at the outside 
world, has begun to spill over to the government itself. On 
30 May, a demonstration organised outside the council of 
ministers by Until When?, a new Fatah-backed movement, 
attracted hundreds of participants with its demand that the 
PA government “produce solutions or resign”.52 Describing 
itself as independent, and supported by the largest public 
sector union, it denounced the government for “continuing 
to hold its employees’ livelihoods and people hostage to 
its determination to reject everything”.53 It threatened 
to escalate its activities with work stoppages, walkouts, 
strikes and further demonstrations if the government 
“continued to act like an opposition party and refused to 
assume the responsibilities of governance. They don’t 
seem to understand that the PA can’t be run like an Islamic 
charity”.54  
More ominously, the government has also faced armed 
protests, involving violence against PA buildings and 
officials, such as on 1 June, when large numbers of security 
personnel attacked the PLC in Gaza City demanding 
unpaid wages. The action appeared to be precipitated by 
an announcement one day earlier that the PA has collected 
enough revenues and donations to pay the 40,000 lowest-
earning PA employees one month’s salary, and the 
remaining 125,000 an advance of approximately $300. 
According to one banner, the promised amounts “are not 
enough to pay debts, buy milk and diapers”.55 A PA 
employee referred to the 3rd of June as the “93rd of March” 
– a reference to the last day salaries were paid. (A more 
cynical protestor at the 30 May demonstration carried a 
 
 
50 Salam Fayyad, “O experts, have mercy on the truth”, 4 May 
2006. The article was run as a two-page spread in the three 
main Palestinian dailies.  
51 Crisis Group interview, Ghassan Khatib, May 2006. 
52 “We are asking the government to take responsibility: to pay 
salaries, provide security, enhance the rule of law and talk to 
Israel. It’s easy to say no to everything in opposition, but now 
that they are in power they have to take positions on the issues. 
If they cannot assume this responsibility they should resign”. 
Crisis Group interview, Until When? leader, Ramallah, May 
2006. Media reports suggested the demonstration was about 
1,000 strong. See Nidal al-Mughabi, “Palestinian PM Promises 
Salaries in a Few Days”, Reuters, 30 May 2006. 
53 Crisis Group interview, Until When? leader, May 2006. 
54 Crisis Group interview, Until When? leader, May 2006. 
55 Reuters, 1 June 2006. 
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sign proclaiming “Long Live the Government, Down with 
the People!”)56 
However, it would be premature to speak of any significant 
change in public opinion or of anything like majority 
support for unseating the government. Threats of mass 
action – for example, a May Day march planned by Fatah-
run unions – have failed to materialise; many civil 
servants spoke of a commitment to their work and a sense 
of solidarity in the face an external siege. Asked about 
criticism and opinion polls reflecting a downturn in public 
support since March, a Hamas parliamentarian smiled 
and noted the same pollsters concluded Fatah would win 
the January elections.57 “The Palestinian people know who 
we are; they know our track record in tending to people’s 
needs and are familiar with our program, and that is why 
they voted for us and not others. They also understand 
very clearly that if there is one reason that does not explain 
the current crisis, it is the personal conduct of our 
officials”.58 Broadly agreeing, a Fatah activist stated: 
So far people are not really turning against the 
government. Although I’m convinced most cast a 
protest vote against Fatah rather than for Hamas, 
and did not expect or want Hamas to win an 
absolute majority, they are unprepared to demand 
a change of government after only a few short 
months, a period in which most believe it has not 
been given a chance to demonstrate its ability 
to govern because of the boycott. There is also an 
ethical aspect, a refusal to turn against those they 
voted for because the enemies of the Palestinian 
people are using humanitarian aid as a political 
weapon; there is a sense of shame about making 
political concessions for a bag of rice.  
But Hamas’s problem is that it doesn’t understand 
it won because of the protest vote, and that in 
a democratic, pluralist system you only achieve 
temporary custodianship of the government until 
the next election. They are acting as if the people 
have given them an unconditional oath of allegiance 
(bay’a) and endorsed every item of their program.59 
Echoing these sentiments, a prominent minister in the 
last government cautioned against “underestimating the 
ability of the Palestinian people to endure pain”.60 
 
 
56 In the wake of the government’s announcement of partial 
payments, a number of bank branches were attacked by 
frustrated PA employees in the days leading up to disbursement, 
leading to threats that they would be closed if the security forces 
could not guarantee their safety.  
57 Crisis Group interview, Riad Mustafa, May 2006. 
58 Crisis Group interview, Mustafa, May 2006. 
59 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
60 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, June 2006. 
B. FATAH IN OPPOSITION  
Almost immediately following the elections, members 
of Fatah were busy thinking of how they could hamper 
Hamas’s ability to govern and find a way back to power. 
Within hours of the declared results, they were examining 
whether President Abbas could legally dissolve parliament 
and call for new elections, declare a state of emergency 
and temporarily suspend parliament, challenge the election 
results in court, or take other measures to prevent Hamas’s 
assumption of office.61 Some went so far as to speak 
openly of military confrontation, arguing that it was best 
for it to occur before Hamas had time to take over the PA 
security apparatus.62 In the event, Abbas came out with 
an unambiguous statement that Hamas had won the 
elections fair and square and would, therefore, be tasked 
with forming the new government. But the acrimony 
remained.  
Fatah leaders argued strongly against participation in a 
national unity government, fearing this would strengthen 
the Islamists’ legitimacy and hold on power, condemning 
Fatah to years in a subordinate role and in the process 
irretrievably transforming the character of the Palestinian 
national movement. One official explained: “We saw what 
happened to the Labour party in Israel when it joined 
Likud in government: Likud prospered; Labour faltered 
and lost its soul”.63 The predominant notion was that 
Hamas’s rule would last at most several months; once it 
became evident the Islamists could not govern or that a 
constitutional crisis with President Abbas had brought 
the nation to a standstill, steps would be taken to change 
course and recover the national movement for Fatah.  
Even so, and beyond that relatively unified position, several 
trends exist within Fatah, “ranging from appeasement of 
Hamas on the grounds that we aren’t yet in a position to 
contest it, to full confrontation on the basis that over time 
it will only get stronger and Fatah weaker”.64 The former 
is best represented by the expression, “I am Fatah vis-à-vis 
 
 
61 Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, January 2006. There is, in 
fact, nothing in the Basic Law that would allow Abbas to dissolve 
parliament and call for new elections. As Nathan Brown, an 
expert on the matter, writes: “The Palestinian constitutional 
document (the “Basic Law”) is definitive: the next parliamentary 
elections are due in 2010. Some Palestinians have also claimed 
that unwritten international practice allows a president to dissolve 
an assembly in case of a constitutional stalemate. This right is 
wholly imaginary”. He concludes, “Fatah can seize power only 
by shredding the law”. “Living with Palestinian Democracy”, 
Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment, June 2006. 
62 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential advisers, 
Ramallah, January 2006. 
63 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, February 2006. 
64 Crisis Group interview, PA presidential adviser, May 2006. 
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Hamas, and Palestinian vis-à-vis the outside world”,65 
heard among the rank-and-file, but it appears to enjoy 
little influence at the leadership level. As a presidential 
adviser described it:  
There are two schools. The first calls for a quick 
confrontation with Hamas, and isn’t selective about 
how to achieve this. The second, to which I belong, 
says the elections were clean; we have to respect 
the choice of the people, go into opposition, and 
help Hamas succeed. But I want them to fail. And 
I want them to fail because of themselves, not 
because of conspiracies involving the U.S., EU, 
and Olmert that don’t give them an opportunity to 
govern, but because they failed to govern despite 
the opportunity to do so.66 
Hard-liners have a clear edge, and they are driven by 
different rationales. For some, accustomed to decades of 
hegemony over the political system, it is a question 
of power, pure and simple: allowing their main rivals to 
exercise it is inconceivable and too great a threat to their 
own positions. Others appear genuinely distressed at the 
threat of an Islamist takeover that, gradually, would change 
the fabric of Palestinian society. “I did not fight Israel’s 
occupation for decades only to see my children brought 
up in an Islamic state”, lamented a former PA official, who 
dismissed as tactical manoeuvring the Islamists’ decision 
to downplay the religious aspect of their social agenda.67 
A third group insists on the grave harm that would befall 
the national movement were Hamas treated leniently by 
the international community without having to undergo 
its own ideological transformation or if Fatah were to 
compromise on its platform in order to accommodate 
the Islamists’:  
The principal Palestinian asset today is our 
international legitimacy – our acceptance of 
UN resolutions, of the two-state solution, of 
past agreements signed with Israel. If we are to 
compromise on that, we will be set back years and 
squander what we accomplished. The door will be 
open for all kinds of actions detrimental to our cause. 
Unrelenting pressure needs to be exercised on 
Hamas so that it accept these positions, or fail.68  
Such reasoning quickly dovetailed with – and in some 
cases reinforced – U.S. and EU ideas about freezing 
funding until Hamas changed its formal positions. Not 
a few Fatah officials meeting with Quartet members 
 
 
65 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Ramallah, March 2006. 
66 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Ramallah, March 2006. 
67 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, January 2006. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Washington, March 2006. 
emphasised that it should not relax its three conditions, 
lest funding bail Hamas out, and argued that pressure 
should be used to confront Hamas with a stark choice: 
agree to the conditions, or, more likely, fail to govern.69 
Many decided from the outset that the National Dialogue 
should be an effort to expose Hamas, not to entice it; these 
same people seized upon the referendum idea as another 
tool in their confrontation with the Islamists and, as 
discussed below, would rather postpone any international 
aid mechanism until after the referendum has been held 
– thereby ensuring people vote remembering their last 
unpaid pay check.  
Abbas’s position in this debate is both crucial and not 
entirely well-defined. Encouraged to execute an assertive, 
aggressive strategy, he was in an awkward position, and 
it showed. By temperament and conviction, he is averse 
to confrontation; although deputy head of Fatah, he is also 
PLO Chairman and PA President, and sees himself as 
the leader of all Palestinians, loathe to be perceived as a 
partisan politician. Years of disappointment with U.S. 
policy has made him suspicious of any strategy that – like 
the one advocated by some who surround him – depends 
on Washington’s complicity and active support and could 
yet again leave him hanging out to dry. Finally, he also 
is said to perceive his struggle with Hamas essentially as 
not for political power, but rather for the survival of the 
national project as embodied in his vision of an independent 
state achieved on the basis of a negotiated settlement.70  
Unlike some of his aides and other Fatah leaders, in 
other words, Abbas appears agnostic with respect to the 
alternatives of compelling the government to modify its 
positions or causing it to collapse. So long as the PA 
government supports his agenda, and its program does 
not impede his ability to pursue his priorities, he is said 
to be less concerned about its political composition.71 
Thus, he reportedly is receptive to the idea of a national 
unity government constituted on the basis of the Prisoners’ 
Initiative.72  
At the same time, Abbas is adamant in his belief that 
Hamas’s outlook, if unchanged, is a genuine threat to the 
national movement, whose sole option in his view is a 
negotiated settlement with Israel; he also remains jealous 
of his prerogatives as PA and PLO leader. What is more, 
 
 
69 According to EU officials, PA presidential advisers argued 
that the three conditions should not be diluted, and that the 
Quartet should not waver if confronted with partial movement 
towards them by the Islamists. Crisis Group interviews, Brussels, 
March 2006.  
70 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Washington, DC, May 2006. 
71 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Washington, DC, May 2006. 
72 Ibid. 
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Fatah leaders are said to have warned him that if he failed 
to safeguard their interests from Islamist encroachment, 
he would face an internal revolt.73  
The outcome has been a series of at times shifting policies 
and pronouncements. Abbas authorised Hamas to form a 
government that did not endorse his basic principles, yet 
also asserted his hold on key bastions: the presidency, of 
course, insisting on its institutional supremacy; the PLO, 
in which Hamas does not yet participate;74 and the security 
forces, the chief source of formal power within the PA, 
whose officer corps is almost exclusively composed of 
Fatah and voted for it by a large majority.75 In the wake 
of the election, and in some cases after the formation of 
the new government, the presidency asserted control over 
several institutions, which promptly ended their previous 
practice of financial support for the PA budget, further 
reducing the government’s sources of revenue. These 
included the Palestinian Monetary Authority, which 
controls the banking system;76 the Palestinian Investment 
Fund, which holds the PA’s assets and had been a major 
contributor to the 2005 budget;77 and the Palestinian 
Broadcasting Company, which controls the official 
broadcast media.  
While emphasising that the Palestinian political system 
is democratic, Abbas also periodically has warned that he 
might dismiss the government.78 In the latest dramatic 
move, he announced on 25 May that if the National 
 
 
73 Crisis Group interview, Abd-al-Hakim Awad, Fatah 
spokesperson and youth wing (Shabiba) leader, Gaza City, 
January 2006.  
74 The March 2005 Cairo agreement endorsed by the PA and 
thirteen Palestinian political organisations contemplated Hamas’s 
and Islamic Jihad’s integration into the PLO, but the mechanisms 
specified to this end have yet to be activated. Given Hamas’s 
showing in the PLC elections, Fatah clearly does not wish to 
see it inch toward control of that institution as well. Crisis Group 
interview with PLO official, Washington, March 2006.  
75 Crisis Group interviews, Ismail Haniya; Palestinian security 
officials, Gaza City, February 2006. 
76 “The PMA is not cooperating with the government. It is 
refusing to issue new loans”. Crisis Group interview, Ahmad 
Bahar, deputy PLC speaker, Gaza City, May 2006. A senior 
Palestinian banker also said that the PMA was enforcing OFAC 
measures against PA employees in order to preserve its OFAC 
exemption. “Every PA employee has become suspicious for the 
PMA”. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
77 In 2005 the PA budget was supplemented with $173 million of PIF 
funds. The World Bank estimated that with access to Palestinian 
Investment Fund funds, the PA government could boost its monthly 
income by between $15 million and $25 million. World Bank, “The 
Impending Palestinian Fiscal Crisis: Potential Remedies”, 7 
May 2006, p. 8, at www.worldbank.org.  
78 Visiting Turkey on 24 April 2006, for example, Abbas stated 
that “the Constitution grants me very clearly the authority to 
dismiss the government but I don’t want to use these authorities”. 
Al-Ayyam, 25 April 2005. 
Dialogue failed to achieve Islamist acceptance of the 
Prisoners’ Initiative, he would place the document before 
the people in a referendum, thereby making an end-run 
around Hamas. Abbas and other Fatah officials have 
strongly denounced the funding boycott in public; in 
private, they are said to be broadly supportive of a tough 
international policy toward the government. Finally, Abbas 
has emphasised that as PLO Chairman he remains in charge 
of political matters and, in particular, of Palestinian relations 
with Israel, lauding the hitherto dormant organisation as 
“the leader of this people” and “the supreme political 
reference for its institutions”.79  
The sum of these conflicting instincts, pressures and 
priorities is an Abbas strategy that, today, aims to 
demonstrate his approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
commands broad popular support, is the one most likely 
to produce results and can break the international funding 
boycott in ways Hamas’s cannot.80 Thus, while rejecting 
the notion of leading a shadow government to manage PA 
affairs – which would amount to usurping the Islamists’ 
power – the president and his aides have suggested that 
emergency donor funds be handed to him and then 
passed on to the government.81 If, after he has given 
the government a temporary and partial respite, Hamas 
nonetheless maintains its current stance, he could credibly 
claim that he can do no more and has no choice but to 
dismiss the government to prevent an institutional collapse 
and humanitarian catastrophe.82  
Abbas’s support for the Prisoners’ Initiative and surprise 
referendum announcement – further discussed below 
– have supplemented this strategy with a clear political 
component. Yet, the objective is similar: to compel Hamas 
to take a stance in the one area where the president feels he 
has a distinct advantage – the political program – and to do 
so in a way that does not associate him with international 
actors, but rather with a majority of his people.83  
While the logic behind this approach might not be inherently 
confrontational, the results – given the polarised 
 
 
79 Mahmoud Abbas, address to the inaugural session of the new 
PLC, attended by Crisis Group, 18 February 2006. 
80 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Ramallah, March 2006. 
81 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Jerusalem, March 2006. It does however involve restricting the 
government’s financial autonomy and ability to tap into other 
sources of funds. Hence the decision to place government 
corporations such as the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF) under 
direct presidential authority. In this way, the president sought 
to maximise his leverage while leaving the responsibility of 
government firmly on Hamas’s shoulders.  
82 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
Jerusalem, March 2006. 
83 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
May 2006. 
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environment and the combined actions of Hamas, Fatah 
and the international community – clearly are, as Hamas 
increasingly has perceived the president’s actions as 
designed to obstruct its ability to govern and, together 
with outside powers, rob it of its electoral victory. This 
has been particularly noticeable in the security sector.  
Already when, as prime minister, Abbas confronted 
President Arafat, that sector had been the object of 
an incessant institutional tug of war facilitated by the 
proliferation of security forces with differing loyalties and 
chains of command. In a role reversal, Abbas now has 
sought to assert presidential prerogatives all the while 
formally acknowledging the government’s own.84 Whereas 
the previous minister of interior, Nasr Yusif, had been 
granted operational command of all security forces save 
the Presidential Guard, his successor, Said Siam, was 
restricted to the duties outlined in the Basic Law: command 
over the Preventive Security Force (PSF), police, and civil 
defence.85 That control, too, was compromised when, on 
6 April, one week after the new government took office, 
Abbas appointed a Fatah loyalist, Rashid Abu Shbak – 
who, as deputy commander of the PSF during the 1990s, 
helped spearhead the anti-Islamist crackdown86 – as director 
general of internal security in the ministry of interior, 
thereby placing him in operational command of those 
forces that remained within the purview of the ministry.  
Responding a day earlier to EU threats to withdraw its 
personnel from the Rafah border crossing between Gaza 
and Egypt if they were compelled to cooperate with forces 
under governmental authority, Abbas issued a decree 
placing the General Administration for Crossings and 
Borders under exclusive presidential authority87 and 
announced that the crossing would be secured by the 
Presidential Guard. Hamas initially rejected the move, then 
acceded to it in order to keep the crossing open. Plans 
were announced in late April to increase the Presidential 
Guard from 2,500 to 3,000-3,500, with press reports a 
 
 
84 In late February, for example, Abbas stated: “We’ll grant 
Hamas authority over national security because we need to 
have one body controlling the situation to ensure security. I 
don’t intend to deprive Hamas of what I demanded in the past 
from Yasir Arafat”. AlJazeera, 28 February 2006.  
85 This important change did not in fact violate existing 
constitutional provisions. Rather it entailed a revocation of 
authority Abbas had devolved to the previous interior minister 
and re-assertion of presidential prerogative.  
86 The Preventive Security Force is primarily composed of 
Fatah loyalists from the occupied territories who were active in 
its militias during the 1987-1993 Uprising. Abu Shbak was 
initially the deputy to PSF Gaza Strip Commander Dahlan, and 
in 2005 was promoted by Abbas as its overall commander. 
87 “Abbas Takes Charge of Border Security”, AlJazeera.net, 6 
April 2006, at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CCE11D4 
B-0366-4010-BEB8-EEC62D5F7AE4.htm.  
month later suggesting it may expand further, to 10,000.88 
Hamas leaders increasingly saw these steps, together with 
other statements by Abbas and his allies, as attempts to 
constrict their authority and martial the president’s forces 
as a prelude to ousting them from office.  
More critically, from Hamas’s perspective they threatened 
to transform the government into what both Fatah and 
Hamas activists called “a general without an army”.89 
Abbas’s intentions aside, the concern appeared at least 
somewhat validated by developments on the ground. On 
the day after the elections, a Fatah security leader vowed 
that his men would never obey the orders of a Hamas 
minister.90 Another leading Fatah official in Gaza stated: 
“Fatah will comply with a Hamas-led PA with as much 
respect as Hamas complied with a Fatah-led PA”.91  
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades gunmen affiliated with Fatah 
exploited the period between the election and Hamas’s 
assumption of office, roaming the streets of Gaza in police 
cars full of weapons. Their targets ranged from government 
institutions and personnel to international missions and 
foreigners,92 businesses, and Hamas cadres. The trend has 
continued: by June many residents in some of the more 
volatile areas of the Gaza Strip were living under a self-
imposed dusk-to-dawn curfew. Though motivation for 
such attacks may often have been personal interest or 
factional gain as much as organisational advantage, their 
effect has been to stymie the government’s efforts to restore 
order. In effect, the traditionally permeable wall between 
the security forces and Fatah militias has virtually eroded. 
“The same police who drove us to the border were the ones 
who were shooting in the air to chase us out”, observed a 
 
 
88 See Al-Ayyam, 25 April 2006; Ze’ev Schiff, “PA chief Abbas 
Aims to Expand Presidential Guard to 10,000 Men”, Haaretz, 
29 May 2006.  
89 Crisis Group interview, Abd-al-Hakim Awad, Fatah 
spokesperson, Gaza City, January 2006.  
90 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 26 January 2006.  
91 Crisis Group interview, Ahmad Hillis (Abu Mahir), Fatah 
General Secretary in the Gaza Strip, Gaza City, February 2006. 
Similarly Fatah spokesperson Awad commented: “The military 
wing will not give up its weapons to the PA because Hamas did 
everything in its power to frustrate the PA and refused to 
cooperate. Did it not resist when the PA tried to confiscate 
the rocket launchers? Hamas is calling what is halal [permitted] 
haram [forbidden], and haram, halal”. Crisis Group interview, 
Gaza, January 2006.  
92 Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades gunmen seized on the Danish 
cartoon controversy in February 2006 to poach the Islamist card 
from Hamas, demonstrate that foreigners were unsafe under 
Islamist rule and compel Hamas to defend foreign targets from 
protestors defending the integrity of their religion and prophet. 
For its part, Hamas sought to downplay the crisis and issued a 
statement demanding the protection of Christians.  
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departing European aid administrator after gunmen raided 
the European Commission building in Gaza City.93  
C. A MARCH OF FOLLY?  
Even as Hamas and Fatah leaders repeatedly profess their 
determination to avoid violent conflict, they are acting in 
ways that promote it. Rather than cooperating to wrest 
sovereignty over the occupied territories from Israel, they 
are locked in competition over administrative authorities 
under Israeli rule. The dominant pattern has been one of 
Fatah and the presidency seeking to limit the power of 
the Hamas government. In turn, convinced that Abbas is 
plotting with outside powers to undermine them, Islamist 
officials have begun pointing to him as the problem,94 in 
stark contrast to the cordial and even warm relations that 
prevailed before the elections.95 Even prior to Mashal’s 
April accusation that Fatah elements were in league with 
outside powers, a senior Hamas leader had suggested that 
by encouraging the donor community to adhere to its 
three conditions, Fatah officials were guilty of treason.96 
Others highlighted the president’s increasingly deliberate 
assertions of power and control over the security branches 
and revenue sources.97 
Fatah likewise has viewed Hamas’s moves with distrust, 
fearing the Islamists seek to consolidate their rule in order 
to perpetuate it.98 On 20 April, in response to Abu Shbak’s 
appointment, Interior Minister Siam announced formation 
of the Security Forces Support Unit, also known as the 
Executive Force. Charged with enforcing public safety 
and protecting property but widely seen as an attempt by 
Hamas to establish a loyalist PA force, it was to report 
 
 
93 Crisis Group interview, European Commission administrator, 
Gaza-Israel border crossing, February 2006.  
94 A Palestinian journalist in regular contact with Islamist leaders 
believes Hamas is determined to unseat Abbas; having previously 
viewed the continuation of his presidency as a necessary condition 
for their consolidation of power, they now see it as the primary 
obstacle. Based on its own interviews with Hamas leaders 
and officials as of late May, Crisis Group does not share 
this conclusion, though there is little doubt that distrust has 
significantly risen. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006.  
95 Abbas’s insistence that the elections be held, despite strong 
pressure from other Fatah leaders, earned him a significant 
degree of trust among Hamas leaders. See Crisis Group Report, 
Enter Hamas, op. cit. 
96 Crisis Group interview, March 2006.  
97 “Abbas’s decrees are the problem”. Crisis Group interview, 
Ahmed Bahar, PLC Deputy Speaker, Gaza City, May 2006. 
98 “Anyone who thinks Hamas will organise legislative elections 
once their term ends and vacate the government if they lose 
doesn’t understand them”. Crisis Group interview, Fatah activist, 
Ramallah, May 2006. The sentiment was repeated by a number 
of other Palestinians, including independents, interviewed by 
Crisis Group. 
directly to Siam. Making matters worse from Abbas’s 
standpoint, Siam appointed Jamal Abu Samhadana, 
commander of the Popular Resistance Committees, as its 
head and announced it would be composed of 3,000 new 
recruits from various armed groups,99 including Hamas’s 
own Qassam Brigades.  
Dismissing claims he had exceeded his constitutional 
authority, the minister insisted the unit was not a new 
security force requiring presidential approval but rather an 
auxiliary unit that he was authorised to establish. According 
to government spokesperson Ghazi Hamad, “the decision 
was taken in accordance with the basic law, which gives 
the interior minister the right to take measures in order 
to maintain security and public law and order”.100 
A militia more than a movement and operating almost 
exclusively in the Gaza Strip, the Popular Resistance 
Committees consist primarily of disenchanted former 
Fatah and Hamas members. While independent of these 
organisations, and the only group that rejected the March 
2005 Palestinian tahdi’a,101 elements within the 
Committees are believed to have carried out attacks on 
behalf of both Fatah and Hamas that required plausible 
deniability. Abu Samhadana, a prominent Fatah activist 
during the 1987-1993 uprising and a leader of the powerful 
clan bearing the same name in the southern Gaza Strip’s 
Rafah region, had been a PA security officer during the 
1990s. He left the PA and Fatah to establish the Committees 
at the outset of the current uprising, in order to conduct 
a military campaign unencumbered by political 
considerations. Since the current tahdi’a commenced in 
2005, his men, along with Islamic Jihad, have been the 
main source of rocket and other attacks along the Gaza-
Israel border.102  
The decision to create the unit, and in particular to select 
Abu Samhadana as its head, can be read in two very 
different ways. On the one hand, it marks a first step in 
the subordination of the Popular Resistance Committees 
to a government committed to the tahdia. As a Palestinian 
 
 
99 There are plans to expand the force to 5,000 men by the end 
of June. Crisis Group interview, PA interior ministry official, 
Gaza City, June 2006. 
100 BBC News, 21 April 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
world/middle_east/4932724.stm. On 8 June 2006, an Israeli air 
strike killed Abu Samhadana and three other members of the 
Popular Resistance Committees. See further on this below. 
101 The Popular Resistance Committees were not invited to 
participate in the Cairo negotiations that produced the tahdi’a. 
102 Whereas Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a party to the tahdi’a at 
least frames its attacks in the context of reprisals against Israeli 
assassinations and other military actions, the Popular Resistance 
Committees initially made a point of demonstrating that they 
retained the right to act without the justification of specific Israeli 
provocations. 
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resident of the Gaza Strip who does not profess support 
for Hamas put it:  
It’s exactly what is needed. It’s the integration of 
the militias everyone has been demanding. You 
bring one of the most unruly factions on board, and 
they’re being put to good use. Abu Samhadana 
also happens to be the most powerful man in the 
southern Gaza Strip, with a reputation for being 
very clean and a very committed patriot. I will sleep 
more soundly at night knowing that local security 
is now his responsibility rather than of the thugs 
who’ve made chaos their vocation.103 
But there is another side, and it is the one Abbas – along 
with many others, including both Palestinians and foreign 
actors – focused on. In addition to the Committees’ 
rejection and consistent violations of the tahdi’a, Abu 
Samhadana was also accused of involvement in the killing 
of three American security officials in the Gaza Strip in 
October 2003.104 Heightening Abbas’s concerns, Abu 
Samhadana characterised the new unit as “the nucleus 
of a Palestinian army”, while emphasising that armed 
resistance would remain a priority.105 If it was indeed an 
auxiliary force, some concluded, it was a party militia 
established to bolster Hamas’s power rather than an interior 
ministry unit meant to assist existing PA security forces to 
enforce law and order.106 In theory these objectives need 
not necessarily conflict. But the manner in which the 
government prepared and announced its decision, and the 
manner in which the force subsequently has been deployed 
and utilised, only exacerbated suspicion. 
Reacting to what he saw as a direct challenge to his 
authority and a highly provocative act that further 
 
 
103 Crisis Group interview, May 2006. According to a Palestinian 
analyst in the Gaza Strip, “Hamas’s biggest problem is the 
Qassam Brigades – not their designated fighters, but those who 
declared themselves members of this force. They present Hamas 
with the same problem the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades have posed 
for Fatah. And now Hamas is trying to deal with this problem in 
the same way, except they lack a security force to incorporate 
these people, so they established one to give them something to 
do. What we are seeing with Hamas is kind of Fatah history 
repeating itself”. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, 
Gaza City, June 2006. 
104 The allegations, which Abu Samhadana denied, were 
dismissed by interior ministry officials. Crisis Group interviews, 
Gaza, May 2006. 
105 “This [unit] will be the nucleus of the future Palestinian 
army. The resistance must continue. We have only one enemy...I 
will continue to carry the rifle and pull the trigger whenever 
required to defend my people. We are also a force against 
corruption. We are against thieves, corrupt officials and law 
breakers”. Haaretz, 23 April 2006.  
106 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian residents, Ramallah, May 
2006. 
undermined his credibility vis-à-vis Israel and particularly 
the U.S., Abbas promptly issued a decree banning the 
force, which the security forces vowed to uphold.107 In the 
words of Preventive Security Force Deputy Commander 
Sulaiman Mutlaq, “Siam did not consult us on establishing 
the new force. He wants to replace Preventive Security. 
According to the president the force is illegal, and so we 
won’t work with it”.108 The PA cabinet responded by 
declaring Abbas’s decree illegal.  
The entire sequence of events, a microcosm of the fight to 
carve out territory in the security – and therefore political 
– arena, quickly escalated. As Siam deployed the new unit, 
Abbas called for the counter-deployment of thousands of 
security forces under presidential command, leading to 
clashes and the death of an employee of the Jordanian 
embassy during a shootout outside the PLC’s Gaza 
headquarters on 21 May.109 
Separate from the above, but in the view of many not 
unrelated, May also witnessed an ominous series of 
assassination attempts against senior security officers. These 
included one on 20 May against military intelligence 
commander Tariq Abu Rajab – who was badly wounded 
and lost an aide – another the following day against Abbas’s 
interior minister appointee, Abu Shbak, and a fatal attack 
on local Preventive Security commander Nabil Hudhud on 
24 May. These were claimed by a previously unknown 
group, the al-Qaeda Organisation in Palestine. While some 
have speculated that al-Qaeda has gained access to the 
occupied territories, specifically by infiltrating Hamas, the 
prevalent view is that the attacks were too sophisticated 
to be conducted by a small handful of new arrivals.110  
 
 
107 According to Tayib Abd-al-Rahim, secretary general of the 
PA presidency, “President Abbas considers the decisions of 
Interior Minister Said Siam illegal and anti-constitutional”. 
A letter from Abbas to Haniya stated: “All officers, soldiers and 
security personnel are asked not to abide by these decisions and to 
consider them nonexistent”. The New York Times, 21 April 2006. 
108 Crisis Group interview, Gaza City, May 2006.  
109 In early June, furthermore, the Al-Aqsa Martryrs’ Brigades 
affiliated with Fatah symbolically deployed a force similar to 
that established by Siam in the northern West Bank town of 
Jenin. This time the interior ministry denounced it as illegal, 
while the presidency offered no comment. 
110 The attack on Abu Rajab, for example, involved the 
detonation of a hand grenade in his personal elevator within 
Military Intelligence headquarters. The claims of responsibility 
are considered convenient to all concerned. They spare Fatah 
the consequences of explicitly accusing Hamas, while subtly 
suggesting Islamist rule has made the Gaza Strip more amenable 
to al-Qaeda. At the same time, they allow Hamas to deflect 
suspicions from its own ranks and remind its detractors that there 
are less savoury alternatives waiting in the wings should they be 
forced from office. Among local analysts, activists, and journalists 
prepared to speculate on these attacks, the prevalent view 
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The same period also saw a number of assassinations 
of local Hamas military commanders. According to a 
Palestinian in the Gaza Strip who has followed these 
developments closely: 
Even ten months ago supporters of both factions 
used to mix together. Not anymore. Trenches have 
been dug, and divisions within the society have 
deepened. I expect that clashes will continue, 
as well as assassinations. These will target the 
operational people from both sides. Each wants 
to weaken the other by eliminating operatives. 
The backbone on the Fatah side in this respect is 
Preventive Security, for Hamas it is the Qassam 
Brigades. If Fatah is confident in the West Bank, 
here they are scared. The only one who is acting 
confidently is [former security chief and Fatah 
power centre] Muhammad Dahlan, who is seen 
by the Islamists as their most challenging enemy 
because he is the only one applying his policy on 
the ground.111  
Observers also have noted that both Fatah and Hamas 
have been stockpiling weapons and ammunition:  
Arms dealers and an Israeli military source said 
black market bullets were now selling for $1 each 
– a steep price in areas where up to half the people 
live on less than $2 per day. In the West Bank, 
Hamas has been buying M-16 rifles. Dealers said 
heavy demand and a lack of supply have sent prices 
soaring to as much as $13,000 each, up from $5,400 
a year ago.112  
For some time, rival groups armed with heavy weaponry, 
typically claiming to be acting on behalf of legal 
authority, have squared off in the streets of Gaza. As for 
the restoration of security, the alleged purpose of the 
security forces, “we’ve yet to see a sign of it”;113 instead, 
ordinary Palestinians live in palpable fear of violence and 
chaos or, worse, escalating factional warfare.114 By early 
 
 
is that Hamas, perhaps acting through the Popular Resistance 
Committees, is ultimately responsible. Those reaching this 
conclusion emphasise that concrete evidence remains lacking 
but point out that all those targeted are close allies of Hamas 
nemesis and former PA security chief Muhammad Dahlan. 
Suggestions that the attacks reflect an inter-Fatah settling of 
scores found virtually no support. 
111 Crisis Group interview, Gaza City, June 2006. 
112 Adam Entous and Haitham Tamimi, “Hamas, Abbas 
Rivalry Spurs Palestinian Arms Race”, Reuters, 8 June 2006. 
113 Crisis Group interview, Gaza City, May 2006.  
114 While Hamas pins the blame squarely on Fatah in the context 
of the latter’s determination to unseat the government, Fatah 
activists ascribe responsibility to the Islamists, either on account 
of their project to consolidate power or as a deliberate attempt to 
divert attention from the economic crisis. “People in Abasan 
May, armed clashes were occurring on an almost daily 
basis, routinely producing casualties, with the most intense 
and prolonged confrontations – generally confined to the 
Gaza Strip – developing in Abasan east of Khan Yunis.115  
Throughout the occupied territories, the rival movements 
also organised mass demonstrations marked by 
denunciations not of Israel but each other. When Mashal, 
in a thinly-veiled 21 April reference to Abbas and his 
associates, denounced “the security coup” as a “conspiracy” 
that “would only work with the support of the Zionists 
and the Americans”,116 Fatah for the first time turned out 
crowds to rival those mobilised by Hamas after Friday 
prayers; the protestors, many of them civil servants and 
uniformed security personnel, condemned the exiled 
Islamist leader and demanded he apologise.  
By early June, the brief lull that accompanied the beginning 
of the National Dialogue late the previous month appeared 
to be coming to an end. The Security Forces Support Unit, 
briefly withdrawn from the streets on 26 May, was again 
deployed several days later, producing further clashes 
that were accompanied by sometimes violent protests at 
PA installations.117 Should a full-scale confrontation 
ultimately develop, it is difficult to predict how it might 
conclude. Fatah has considerably more men under arms, 
and, with likely international assistance, its forces could 
well grow larger and become better equipped, but those 
affiliated with Hamas are believed to be more committed. 
As a U.S. official put it, “I’ve seen pictures of Hamas’s 
armed militia. They seem disciplined, well trained, 
motivated. It’s hardly how I would describe the official 
PA security forces”.118  
Fatah’s performance also is hampered by the chaos that 
continues to rein in its ranks.119 What is more, however 
 
 
are no longer demanding jobs or salaries, just the right for their 
children to leave their homes without getting shot”. Crisis 
Group interview, senior PA official, Ramallah, May 2006. 
115 In May, a total of ten Palestinians were killed, and many 
more wounded as a result of these clashes. Seven more were 
killed during the first ten days of June. 
116 Palestine News Network, “Political office leader Khalid 
Mashal speech: No way we will bend to U.S., Israeli & Fatah 
pressure to be subservient to the zionists – Fatah leaders in 
uproar”, 22 April 2006, at http://www.pnn.ps/english/archive 
2006/apr/week4/220406/report1.htm.  
117 In early June the interior ministry again pledged to remove 
the force from the streets, but according to press reports this 
was not implemented. Ibrahim Barzak, “Despite deal, Hamas 
still on streets”, Associated Press, 8 June 2006. 
118 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006. 
119 “Fatah, particularly since the election defeat, has been 
reduced to a name. Unlike Hamas we don’t have a maestro 
keeping us together. They have Islam to conduct and coordinate 
their movement. We had Arafat but he is dead and buried”. 
Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°54, 13 June 2006 Page 16 
 
 
 
much support Hamas may have lost in the public eye, there 
is little evidence it has shifted to the nationalist movement, 
which suffers from its record in office, its internal power 
struggles, and the conduct of some of its security forces 
and senior officials. Nor do its lower ranks appear united 
around the need to confront Hamas forcefully. “They say 
Abbas and Fatah should be working with Hamas, not 
seeking to undermine it, and that Palestinians have the 
right to choose their government. Israel chose Sharon 
twice, the Americans chose Bush twice, so Palestinians 
have the right to choose Hamas”.120  
In contemplating a confrontation, Hamas, too, must worry 
about potentially declining popular support. Even while 
claiming mass backing for its program and dismissing 
polls indicating decreasing levels of approval,121 its leaders 
must consider how their expanded constituency, many 
and perhaps most of whom were protest voters, as well 
as the broader population for which it is now responsible, 
would respond over time should no resolution to the PA 
crisis be found and conflict rise. The worsening domestic 
security situation and the increase in inter-factional 
fighting visibly undermine Islamist election promises, 
while eroding their reputation for discipline. Disorder, 
including both inter-Palestinian strife and its corollary, 
Israeli-Palestinian violence, risks eroding Hamas’s 
position; if chaos leads to more attacks against Israel, and 
if Israel responds with military strikes, people may feel 
that as the party of government it – like Fatah previously 
 
 
Crisis Group interview, Fatah activist, Ramallah, May 2006. 
Indeed, the nostalgia for Arafat appears to be growing 
significantly, based on the conviction that the current impasse 
would have been inconceivable under his stewardship. “Arafat 
would never have allowed these elections, would never have 
allowed Hamas to win them and would never have allowed it 
to govern alone. Abbas gave us all three, and look where we are 
now”. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian resident, Jerusalem, 
June 2006. 
120 Crisis Group interview, Khan Yunis, May 2006. 
121 Hamas officials in public appearances and interviews with 
Crisis Group, for example, routinely refer to obtaining the votes 
of “60 per cent of voters” in the PLC elections. They in fact won 
closer to 40 per cent of the vote (though a majority of seats). 
More to the point, a number of public opinion polls have shown 
a marked decline in support for Hamas and the PA government 
it leads, particularly in the wake of the publication of the 
Prisoners’ Initiative. A series of polls conducted by Near East 
Consultants, for example, showed trust levels in Abbas and 
Haniya had shifted from 51:49 to 55:45 in Abbas’s favour 
between 19 May and 2 June, and that between Fatah and Hamas 
from 34:42 to 43:34 in Fatah’s favour. “NEC Survey #2: Results 
on Palestinian National Dialogue And Referendum”, 3 June 
2006, at www.neareastconsulting.com. A poll conducted by 
Birzeit University during the same period showed support for 
Hamas since April had declined from 50 to 37 per cent, while 
Fatah held steady at 37 per cent. “Public Opinion Poll #27”, 
op. cit. 
– should impose discipline. In the words of a university 
lecturer in the Gaza Strip, “America used to give Arafat 
money for peace. Today we have neither peace nor 
money”.122  
Regardless of the outcome of a putative clash, it is unlikely 
the PA would survive such a battle, if only because the 
loser – assuming there was only one – presumably would 
resort to the “Samson Option” and bring the house down 
to deprive its rival of the fruits of victory. Nor would either 
Hamas or Fatah emerge with its legitimacy intact. The 
Palestinian people remain overwhelmingly opposed to 
internal strife, and the taboo on internecine fighting, 
particularly under conditions of occupation, is both genuine 
and deeply rooted. Even the military victor, assuming 
there was one, thus would suffer in public eyes. This, 
perhaps more than anything else, is acting as a break on 
this Palestinian march of folly.  
D. THE PRISONERS’S INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM 
With national leaders seemingly incapable and increasingly 
disinterested in defusing growing tensions, with Egyptian 
mediation failing where it had succeeded in the past and 
with the spectre of civil war acquiring growing prominence, 
a potential lifeline emerged from Israel’s prisons. On 11 
May five of the most prominent Palestinian prisoners 
in Israeli jails – who, by virtue of their status, possess 
extraordinary moral and political suasion among their 
people – released a National Conciliation Document,123 
which they asked the leadership “to consider as one whole 
package with the hope to see this document achieve 
unanimous endorsement and contribute to achieving a 
Palestinian national conciliation document”.  
Its signatories included Marwan Barghouthi, Fatah’s West 
Bank secretary general, who is perhaps the most popular 
Palestinian leader alive and who headed the movement’s 
parliamentary slate in the January elections and is thus also 
a PLC member; Shaikh Abd-al-Khaliq Natshe, a Hamas 
leader and Qassam Brigades commander from the Hebron 
district; and Abd-al-Rahim Malluh, the deputy secretary 
general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and member of the PLO Executive Committee, 
who has been a prominent figure in the national movement 
for decades and is becoming something of an elder 
statesman. All three were arrested in 2002 and subsequently 
sentenced to lengthy prison terms.124 None of the five was 
 
 
122 Crisis Group interview, Khan Yunis, May 2006.  
123 For excerpts from the full text, see Appendix B below. 
124 The other signatories were Shaikh Bassam Sadi of Islamic 
Jihad and Mustafa Badarna of the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).  
Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°54, 13 June 2006 Page 17 
 
 
 
acting as authorised representative of his organisational 
leadership, but each holds a senior rank within his 
movement.  
The Prisoners’ Initiative consists of eighteen points, 
including commitment to the establishment of an 
independent state on all the territories occupied in 1967 
and adherence to the right of return for refugees. The 
document also upholds the right to resistance “by all 
means”, albeit concentrated within the occupied territories 
(i.e., not in pre-1967 Israel), while at the same time calling 
for popular, political, and diplomatic activity including 
negotiations. In referring to the basis of this program, 
it cites the “Palestinian national consensus program”, 
“international legitimacy”, “international resolutions fair 
to our people”, and “Arab legitimacy” (all likely code words 
for the PLO’s 1988 Algiers Program), UN resolutions, 
and the Arab League’s Beirut Initiative, though it never 
explicitly mentions recognising Israel. 
Much of it relates to Palestinian politics and the proper 
allocation of power. Thus, it both confirms the PLO as 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people 
and urges the integration of Hamas and Islamic Jihad into 
its ranks by the end of 2006. It makes clear that political 
negotiations fall under the authority of the PLO and PA 
president, while stressing the need for cooperation and 
coordination between the PA presidency and government, 
the formation of a coalition government including Fatah 
and Hamas, rejection of internecine warfare and respect 
for regular democratic elections.  
There is more than one way to analyse the National 
Conciliation Document. Ostensibly, it is a compromise, 
substantively more militant than anything Abbas has 
pronounced (e.g., its call for resistance and absence of 
explicit reference to recognising Israel), yet not as hard-
line as some of Hamas’s traditional positions (e.g., its 
explicit reference to negotiations and to international and 
Arab legitimacy) and most closely reflecting Fatah’s 
vision and rhetoric.  
Abbas, despite his reservations, lost no time in embracing 
it. Initially perceived by many as mere background noise,125 
the president – in what some of his partisans call his “first 
real political initiative since taking office”126 – thrust it 
into the centre of debate in the context of the National 
Dialogue. Convened on 25 May at the initiative of PLC 
speaker Aziz Dwaik, with Abbas as co-sponsor,127 the 
Dialogue brought together representatives of political 
movements, parliamentary factions, government and 
presidency, civil society, the private sector, and others. 
 
 
125 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
June 2006. 
126 Crisis Group interview, May 2006. 
127 Crisis Group interview, Khatib, May 2006. 
Speaking on the first day of the plenary session, Abbas 
dropped a bombshell that appeared to catch Hamas – and 
not a few of his own partisans – completely off guard: if 
Hamas did not formally accept the document by 6 June, 
he would conduct a referendum on it 40 days later.128  
Hours before the 6 June deadline was to expire, and 
responding to demands from prison leaders for further 
negotiations that proved difficult to ignore, Abbas extended 
the deadline to 10 June.129 His hand appeared further 
weakened by statements from prison leaders, including 
Hamas’s Natshe and others who supported the document, 
that they rejected its use in a referendum. On 8 June, 
furthermore, Hamas and Islamic Jihad formally rejected 
the idea of a referendum, while the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine expressed reservations. 
Nevertheless having obtained the support of the PLO 
Executive Committee the previous week, Abbas on 10 
June issued a presidential decree setting 26 July as the 
referendum date. 
Hamas rejected Abbas’s move as unconstitutional and 
said it would boycott the referendum;130 the Islamists called 
the PLC into emergency session for 12 June, to consider 
among other measures adoption of a law giving the 
legislature sole authority to determine the substance 
of any referendum and reducing the presidency’s role to 
announcing the date. On 11 June Natshe and Sadi, the 
Islamist signatories of the Prisoners’ Initiative, withdrew 
their signatures in protest at Abbas’s “unacceptable abuse” 
of the initiative.131 Abbas declared that he would rescind 
his decree if negotiations with Hamas were successfully 
concluded before the referendum date. However, a 
presidential adviser considered such agreement unlikely, 
asserting instead: 
50.01 per cent is enough for a mandate. After 
winning, we will start negotiations for a national 
unity or technocratic government, because there’s 
no possibility of coexistence with this one. Hamas 
 
 
128 The idea for the referendum is said to have originated with 
Yasir Abed-Rabbo, a close presidential adviser and initiator of 
the Geneva Peace Initiative. Crisis Group interviews, May-June 
2006. 
129 Reports that Arab leaders had interceded with Abbas 
appeared substantiated when Yemeni president Ali Abdullah 
Salih invited rival Palestinian movements to continue the 
dialogue at leadership level in Sana’a. 
130 According to Nathan J. Brown, “I don’t think there is much 
of any legal basis for the decree, which becomes clear if you 
read all the preambular language (which hints at various legal 
bases but names nothing that is at all convincing). The decree 
actually reads very similarly to some of the more questionable 
ones that Arafat issued – making vague allusions to general 
authorities but citing nothing specific”. Email communication, 
11 June 2006. 
131 Haaretz, 11 June 2006. 
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has rejected all proposals to climb down from the 
tree, and we’ve reached the point of no return. We 
want a political crisis to replace a civil war crisis. 
Negotiations will continue until the day of the 
referendum but Hamas will not change their 
positions.132 
This is a high-risk gambit and, from the usually cautious 
Abbas, an improbable one. Not only does the Initiative 
appear closer to Hamas’s positions than Abbas’s, and to 
generate divisions within Fatah itself,133 but its substance 
is a complete non-starter as far as the U.S. and Israel are 
concerned. As Olmert stated shortly before Abbas issued 
his referendum decree, “[it] is an internal game between 
one [Palestinian] faction and the other. [The Prisoners’ 
Initiative] is meaningless in terms of the broad picture of 
chances towards some kind of dialogue between us and the 
Palestinians”.134 In other words, were Hamas to endorse 
it, and were it to become the government’s platform, it 
would cause the president real diplomatic embarrassment 
and constrain his negotiating ability. Moreover, his 
initiative instantly transformed that of the prisoners from 
a potential bridge between Fatah and Hamas into another 
instrument in their power struggle.  
Although initial opinion polls indicated overwhelming 
support for the Initiative and continued majority support 
for a two-state settlement,135 the risk remains that Hamas 
might succeed in framing the question as either a referendum 
on the legitimacy of its electoral victory or a popularity 
contest with Fatah, in which case the result would be 
unpredictable. Indeed, the most recent opinion poll suggests 
a serious decline in support for both the Initiative and 
the referendum in the days since Abbas made his 
 
 
132 The adviser discounted the prospect of negotiations for 
a national unity government succeeding, even after the 
referendum, adding: “If Hamas rejects, and crisis persists, 
Abbas will declare a state of emergency and appoint an 
emergency government. Leave the legal game to us”. Crisis 
Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, Ramallah, 
June 2006. The adviser also suggested that some PA cabinet 
members advocated acceptance of the Prisoners’ Initiative, 
endorsement of a referendum, and filibustering on 
implementation, but that PM Haniya, insisting it not be accepted 
and for the matter to be referred to the movement’s leadership, 
ultimately prevailed.  
133 These stemmed primarily from internal political rivalries 
and concerns it would strengthen Barghouti’s position rather 
than substantive objections. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian 
analyst, Ramallah, May 2006. 
134 The Independent, 10 June 2006. In the interview, Olmert 
confirmed that “I still am” dismissive of the Initiative. 
135 See, for example, “NEC Survey #1 results on Palestinian 
National Dialogue And Referendum”, 28 May 2006, at 
www.neareastconsulting.com, which registered 71 per cent 
support for a two-state settlement and 89 per cent support for the 
Prisoners’ Initiative. 
announcement.136 As an Abbas adviser noted, if he loses, 
“it’s game over”, and “he will have to immediately 
resign”.137 For their part, the Islamists, uncommitted as 
they are to either a referendum or its outcome, are under 
no obligation to perform similarly, even if Abbas scores 
a convincing victory.  
As Abbas saw it, however, there appeared to be few 
alternatives. Initial suggestions of new elections called 
as the result of the economic and political crisis had 
rapidly faded; there is no constitutional basis for such a 
move and, besides, Hamas could well have benefited from 
a siege mentality, leaving Abbas and Fatah to be 
perceived as collaborators in a U.S. and Israeli-inspired 
effort to unseat the government. Likewise, any hope he 
had of concluding a far-reaching political agreement with 
Israel, thereby challenging Hamas on the basis of his 
diplomatic achievements, was equally dim.138 While Prime 
Minister Olmert stated his readiness to discuss immediate 
issues, implementation of the first phase of the roadmap, 
or even coordination of his West Bank withdrawal, he 
has signalled that final status issues are off limits.139 The 
president thus contemplated the possibility of many more 
months of the same slow-motion saga, allowing Hamas 
to consolidate its position, forcing the people to suffer 
increased hardship and exposing him to criticism for 
reinforcing the West’s position.140  
The referendum is a desperate but potentially rewarding 
move, a circuitous way of re-litigating the electoral results 
to shift the focus to Abbas’s perceived strong suit 
(his political program) rather than his weakest (Fatah’s 
performance in government); to expose Hamas’s vision 
as out of step with the majority; and to turn the issue 
 
 
136 Support for the Prisoners’ Initiative was down to 65 per cent 
from an initial high of 89 percent; support for the referendum 
was down to 59 per cent (17 per cent lower than the previous 
week). “NEC Survey #3: The Palestinian National Dialogue 
and Call for a Referendum”, 11 June 2006, at www.neareast 
consulting.com. 
137 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential advisers and 
Fatah activists, May 2006. Other advisers predicted that a simple 
majority would not give Abbas the mandate he needs, and that if 
Hamas succeeded in limiting turnout to 50 per cent or support 
for the motion to less than 60 per cent he would have a political 
problem. Crisis Group interviews, Jerusalem and Ramallah, May-
June 2006. 
138 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
May 2006. 
139 Referring to Abbas, Olmert asked: “This guy is actually 
unable to actually even exercise his authority. What shall I 
negotiate with him about?” The Independent, 10 June 2006. 
140 Crisis Group interview with presidential advisers, May-
June 2006. Persevering on the prior path was seen as equally 
dangerous in terms of provoking a confrontation with Hamas, 
but without any potential benefit. Crisis Group interview, 
presidential adviser, Jerusalem, May 2006. 
Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°54, 13 June 2006 Page 19 
 
 
 
from a struggle between Palestinians and foreign powers 
to a debate among Palestinians. The last two points were 
deemed most critical: the fact that the document originated 
with a cross-party group of prisoners, was consistent with 
the views of an overwhelming majority of the public and 
did not coincide with the international community’s (or 
Abbas’s) made it much harder for Hamas to depict the 
move as an extension of a foreign plot to unseat it.  
The conventional wisdom is that it’s easier to get 
rid of Hamas than change them. But let’s weaken 
them first. Getting rid of them is too transparent. 
That’s why the option of presenting an Abbas 
Initiative was considered and rejected. That’s why 
we adopted the Prisoners’ Initiative and not the 
Quartet conditions. The Initiative is a great tool for 
Palestinian political legitimacy, and the whole 
objective is to shift the balance of power. The idea 
is to corner Hamas. If they say “yes”, they lose, and 
if they say “no” and it’s a referendum they lose as 
well.141  
Speaking in early June, one adviser conceded Abbas’s 
purpose was to form “a new government within 45 days, 
either a coalition with Hamas or a new one without it”. 
Convinced that both options would break the existing 
logjam, Abbas was described as having no clear preference 
in this regard.142 
Abbas’s aides have had to respond to two charges, one 
domestic, the other foreign. The first was that in both 
its timing (at the outset of the Dialogue) and style (an 
ultimatum and threat of a referendum) the move was an 
attempt to torpedo any chance of an accord. Defending it, 
they argue that the National Dialogue inevitably would 
have dragged on interminably while the crisis on the streets 
escalated. The Palestinians, starved of funds, marginalised 
from the diplomatic game, and on the verge of internal 
chaos, could not afford to wait.143 
A second, quite different objection emanated from the U.S. 
Officials who scrutinised the document questioned its 
usefulness, pointing to the stance it took on such sensitive 
issues as violence, refugees and territory. In response, the 
president’s aides sought to deflect attention away from 
the substance. “This is not a foreign policy instrument; it 
is a domestic policy tool. You should see it for what it is: 
 
 
141 “An Abbas victory in the referendum could lead to the 
dismissal of the government and a process leading to early 
elections”. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential 
adviser, May 2006. 
142 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
June 2006. 
143 Crisis Group interviews with presidential advisers, May-
June 2006. 
an attempt to corner Hamas and strengthen Abbas”.144 
Judging from Washington’s low-key reaction to both the 
document and the referendum, U.S. officials appear 
to have been convinced. Still, the U.S. would face an 
awkward dilemma if a coalition government were formed 
on the basis of the Prisoners’ Initiative. Because the 
document espouses positions at loggerheads with 
Washington’s stance, it would be hard for the U.S. to 
accept its adoption as compliance with the Quartet’s 
conditions, but equally delicate for it to denounce a 
program blessed by Abbas and the entire Palestinian 
political spectrum.  
Caught unawares, and suspicious of the document, Hamas 
leaders reacted very unlike the newly decisive Abbas. 
Praising its authors and their efforts while withholding 
judgement and calling for further study, they have yet to 
accept or reject it unambiguously. Instead, they appear to 
have done precisely as Abbas hoped: ignored the content 
and focused on the politics. The bigger risk, as many Fatah 
officials conceded, was for Hamas to turn the tables on 
Abbas by endorsing the document. That would have put 
Abbas in a highly uncomfortable situation, forced to 
adopt positions with which he disagreed, constrained in 
negotiations with Israel, and compelled to argue that 
Hamas had met the bar for receiving international funding.  
However, given the growing acrimony between the rival 
movements, Hamas’s leaders saw the initiative solely as 
an illegitimate attempt to undo the electoral results, wrong 
foot them, and portray them as intransigent. Accordingly, 
they fought back. While expressing support for “90 per 
cent” or even “98 per cent” of the Prisoners’ Initiative and 
for its utilisation as the basis for the National Dialogue,145 
 
 
144 Crisis Group interviews, May-June 2006. A Fatah activist 
also dismissed the need for detailed examination of the 
document’s meaning, insisting: “It does not demand the 
analytical skill required to understand Das Kapital. It’s about 
only two issues: the PLO and the two-state settlement. Are you 
for, or are you against?” Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 
May 2006. 
145 Crisis Group interviews, Shaik Hamid Baitawi, PLC member; 
Mahmoud Ramahi, PLC Secretary General; Riad Mustafa, PLC 
member, Ramallah, May 2006. Hamas leaders expressed various 
objections regarding the text itself. Some argued that, through 
its reference to international and Arab legitimacy, it implicitly 
recognised Israel; others that the language pertaining to the PLO’s 
expansion was overly vague and left open the possibility that both 
Abbas and an unreformed and unrepresentative organisation 
would negotiate on behalf of all Palestinians, leaving them as 
passive observers. It also was said that some issues, such as the 
future of the PLO, could not be resolved within the occupied 
territories and required the participation of senior leaders and 
movements based in exile. Finally, they noted that Natshe was 
unable to consult with the movement’s leadership or even other 
Hamas prisoners during the drafting process and that some of 
the latter had protested their exclusion. Crisis Group interviews, 
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they have vociferously rejected the referendum. “Why 
have a dialogue at all if one party makes clear at the very 
outset that it will accept only a single outcome?”, asked 
PLC member Riad Mustafa.146 Rejecting “diktats and 
ultimatums”, his colleague Shaikh Hamid Baitawi observed 
that “we never had a referendum on Oslo, Wye River, or 
other documents that constituted agreements that affected 
our national destiny, so why this one? And why now?”147 
Islamists also consistently argued that Hamas had just 
won an election in January, there was no provision in the 
Basic Law for a referendum, and Abbas’s transparent 
objective was to undermine Hamas.  
So far, despite some inroads (including criticism of the 
referendum by other factions148 and some prisoners), 
Hamas has failed to mount an effective campaign to 
regain the initiative. In conversations, Hamas officials 
suggest several ways in which they will challenge the 
president. They will argue he has no constitutional 
authority to call for a referendum, and no power to do 
so without appropriate legislation passed by the Hamas-
controlled PLC, leaving the independent electoral 
commission in a difficult bind.149 They can also seek 
to muddy the waters by staging their own referendum, 
borrowing from but not replicating the prisoners’ 
document. As one of their parliamentarians observed, “if 
a referendum is indeed held, its form and content cannot 
be unilaterally imposed by Abbas. If no agreement is 
reached, the people should be given a choice between 
two proposals”.150  
In the worst case scenario, they intimate, even a successful 
referendum would change nothing. The legislature would 
remain in Hamas’s hands, and lacking the constitutional 
tools to impose a government without its approval, Abbas 
would be a spent force, who had played a prime card.  
All these options have drawbacks. By challenging the 
referendum’s legitimacy or usefulness, seeking to 
 
 
Muhammad Abu Tir, Hamas parliamentarian; Mahmoud 
Ramahi; Nasir al-Din Sha’ir, PA deputy prime minister, 
Jerusalem and Ramallah, May 2006. 
146 Crisis Group interview, May 2006. 
147 Crisis Group interview, May 2006. 
148 This is not hard to understand: smaller factions stand to 
gain much more from a negotiated agreement than from a 
referendum that will strengthen only Fatah or Hamas and are 
interested in the PLO’s reshaping more than in the adoption 
of a political program.  
149 Jihad Harb, a Palestinian researcher on constitutional affairs, 
claims that it would be a real anomaly for Abbas to seek to hold 
a referendum without a referendum law. He assesses that the 
independent Central Electoral Commission, in order to preserve 
its credibility, will await a verdict from the PA’s courts. Crisis 
Group telephone interview, June 2006. 
150 Crisis Group interview, Mustafa, May 2006. 
complicate it, or ignoring its results, Hamas may appear 
both oblivious to and fearful of the people’s verdict. But 
that leaves Hamas with potent tactics in the event its back 
is to the wall and its hold on power threatened: resort 
to violence domestically or targeting Israel, causing 
maximum chaos, possibly bringing down the PA and 
allowing the Islamists to reemerge as a resistance 
movement. “Hamas’s popularity does not emanate from 
or depend upon the institutions it currently controls. It can 
survive without them. Not so Fatah”.151 Although attacks 
directly attributable to Hamas “would be seen as too 
transparent a ploy to change the subject”,152 the organisation 
has other possibilities, such as quietly encouraging other 
groups. Even if Hamas initially were viewed as responsible, 
“after three weeks of intensive inter-Palestinian strife 
or, worse, of major Israeli reprisals, who among the 
Palestinians will remember?”153 Either way, violence 
would be the result.  
Israel’s 9 June 2006 assassination of Abu Samhadana and 
killing of civilians on a Gaza beach154 later that day appears 
to have played into Hamas’s hands: while giving it the 
opportunity to deflect attention from the power struggle 
with Abbas and raising questions about the justification 
for a referendum in this context, the Islamists can hardly 
be said to have deliberately provoked conflict with Israel 
in order to do so. Hamas’s announcement that it was 
renouncing the ceasefire it had largely maintained for 
sixteen months underscores the dangers inherent in the 
current situation. 
And this, of course, is the central point. Missing from all 
strategies to dislodge Hamas, Palestinian or foreign, is a 
realistic assessment of the consequences of success. Finance 
Minister and independent Islamist Abd-al-Raziq observes: 
“If the government were toppled you’d still have a strong 
Hamas, the PLC, and the occupation, but the whole 
political system would collapse”.155 There would, in other 
words, be little for Fatah to repossess should the PA fall, 
either under the weight of its own failures, or at the 
instigation of an Islamist Samson, or in the crossfire of 
an inter-Palestinian or Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
For the Islamist movement, political integration and 
participation remains an experiment, and one that can be 
 
 
151 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, June 2006. 
152 Crisis Group interview, Fatah official, June 2006. 
153 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, June 2006. 
154 Eyewitness and press accounts point to Israeli naval artillery 
as the most probable cause, athough Israel has stated that it 
is investigating the incident and has raised the possibility that 
the seven Palestinian civilians were killed by a Palestinian 
mine. See further Chris McGreal, “Death on the beach: Seven 
Palestinians killed as Israeli shells hit family picnic”, The 
Guardian, 10 June 2006. 
155 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, April 2006. 
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reversed if it fails. If its leaders conclude that their attempt 
at institutional power was sabotaged, Hamas should be 
expected to return to the tried and true formula of militancy, 
violent confrontation, and grassroots social work. “On 
what basis does anyone expect that Hamas will acquiesce 
in a referendum result any more than Fatah acquiesced 
in the electoral outcome?”156 Hamas PLC member Shaikh 
Hamid Batawi was anything but coy in this regard: “The 
alternative to our government is a resumption of suicide 
attacks”.157  
A referendum, in short, is not a bad idea per se, but only 
as a last resort, and far preferably on the basis of a Fatah/ 
Hamas agreement. Instead, the proposal appears in the 
minds of many to have come at the expense of efforts to 
achieve consensus. While Abbas is understandably averse 
to interminable negotiation, his ultimatum could thus 
produce a result he more than most appears intent on 
avoiding: an uncontrollable battle from which all 
Palestinians would emerge losers. 
From a Palestinian perspective, the most promising 
outcome also appears the least plausible: a successful 
National Dialogue concluding with a common agenda and 
giving rise to a unity government. While some Hamas 
leaders continue to predict a successful conclusion to 
the dialogue and openly laud the prospect of a coalition 
government, others dismiss the exercise as camouflage 
for Fatah’s agenda of bringing down the government.158 
Likewise, Fatah leaders tend towards scepticism about 
Hamas’s intentions. One suggested the dialogue would 
fail not because of any differences over the resolution of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but because the Islamists 
find the prospect of a coalition government unpalatable. 
“They will not accept Abbas’s demands, and will also 
ensure there is no referendum. They will first hold it up 
forever in the PLC, then seek to scuttle it through chaos. 
If that fails, they will denounce a loss at the polls as proof 
of electoral fraud. It’s going to get very messy”.159  
There is little evidence pointing to a soft landing, even as 
negotiations are expected to continue during the period 
preceding the referendum. That so few loyalists from either 
movement expect a positive outcome and that their 
pessimism is exceeded by other Palestinians160 says it all.  
 
 
156 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, June 2006. 
157 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
158 Crisis Group interview, Hamas parliamentarian, May 2006. 
159 Crisis Group interview, senior PA official and Fatah leader, 
May 2006.  
160 “Look at our options. In the best of circumstances, the 
National Dialogue succeeds, and we go back to the misery we 
enjoyed before the elections. If it fails, things will get even 
worse than they are today”. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian 
resident, Ramallah, May 2006. One week into the National 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY AND THE 
PALESTINIAN CRISIS 
For the international community, sorting out priorities 
and devising an appropriate strategy in this unfamiliar 
environment has been no easy task. Shocked by Hamas’s 
victory, the Quartet on 30 January “congratulated the 
Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free, 
fair and secure”, expressed the “view of the Quartet that 
all members of a future Palestinian government must be 
committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and 
acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, 
including the Roadmap”, and “concluded that it was 
inevitable that future assistance to any new government 
would be reviewed by donors against that government’s 
commitment” to these “principles”.161  
Meeting again the day after the Haniya cabinet took office 
on 29 March, the Quartet “noted with grave concern that 
the new Government has not committed to the principles 
spelled out on 30 January”, “concurred that there inevitably 
will be an effect on direct assistance to that Government 
and its ministries”, yet also “encouraged continued 
humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of the 
Palestinian people”.162 The past few months have seen 
the Quartet and other members of the donor community 
struggle to reconcile these two at least somewhat 
incompatible objectives. Yet missing from it all appears 
to be a serious assessment of the longer-term local and 
regional consequences of a policy that has all the advantages 
of apparent moral clarity and all the drawbacks of evident 
strategic confusion. 
A. PA BUDGETARY COSTS, DONOR 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONOR ATTITUDES 
In their effort to influence Palestinian events, international 
actors – chiefly the U.S., the EU, Arab states and Israel – 
have focused on their financial and economic leverage. 
Perhaps no entity is as dependent on the outside world 
 
 
Dialogue, confidence in its chance to succeed had fallen from 
65 percent to 53 percent. NEC poll, 3 June 2006.  
161 “Statement by Middle East Quartet”, 30 January 2006. See 
further http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vCurrent!Open 
View. For a detailed examination of the Roadmap initiative see 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°14, A Middle East Roadmap 
to Where?, 2 May 2003. 
162 “Quartet Statement on New Palestinian Government”, 30 
March 2006. See further http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/ 
vCurrent!OpenView.  
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as the Palestinian Authority,163 entirely reliant for its 
survival on Israeli policies and international funding. 
The decision taken in the wake of the new government’s 
establishment to freeze donor contributions until and unless 
it abided by the Quartet’s three conditions thus was bound 
to have major repercussions. A survey of PA expenditures 
and donor contributions starkly illustrates why. 
According to former World Bank President and Quartet 
Special Envoy for Disengagement James Wolfensohn, 
the PA has “recurring monthly operating costs of 
approximately $165 million, amounting to between $1.8 
and $2.0 billion a year”.164 Before the current fiscal crisis, 
only about 21 per cent of this amount (roughly $35 million 
monthly) was raised directly by the PA in the form of 
taxes and income.165 Of the remaining $130 million, $50 
million to $60 million consisted of taxes, tariffs and other 
fees collected by Israel on the PA’s behalf and transferred 
to it on a monthly basis.166 The monthly shortfall of some 
$70 million to $80 million – 42 per cent to 48 per cent 
of the total required – had to be made up from other 
sources.167 
The PA, therefore, needs to raise nearly $1 billion per year 
to fund its basic operating costs. During the past five years, 
even before the current curb on funding, that target has 
not been met. Rather, fundraising conducted on the PA’s 
behalf by the international Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee 
yielded annual sums in the range of $350 million to $500 
million, roughly half from Arab states, and half from the 
EU and its member states.168 This left a significant gap 
that the PA filled by “running down assets, selling them 
or borrowing against them”.169  
 
 
163 Crisis Group interview, World Bank official, Washington, 
April 2006. 
164 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, March 2006.  
165 Crisis Group interview, James Wolfensohn, Jerusalem, 
March 2006. 
166 Ibid. The arrangement, designed to preserve the customs 
union enforced by Israel over the occupied territories after 1967 
and regulate economic relations between the parties, is spelled 
out in the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations Between the 
Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing 
the Palestinian People (Paris Protocol), incorporated into the 
1994 Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Agreement as Annex IV. 
The full text can be consulted at www.israel-mfa.gov.il.  
167 Crisis Group interview, Wolfensohn, March 2006.  
168 For the most part, the U.S. has refused to provide the PA 
with direct budgetary support. The only exceptions were a $36 
million contribution to the Holst Fund in 1994 and $20 million 
earmarked for infrastructure projects in 2003.  
169 Crisis Group interview, James Wolfensohn, March 2006. In 
its 2005 budget, the Finance Ministry secured $173 million in 
“exceptional” Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) profits, and $254 
million in commercial borrowing. “The Impending Palestinian 
Amounts raised by the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for the 
most part were disbursed through one of two instruments. 
The World Bank’s Reform Trust Fund released donor 
deposits to the ministry of finance’s Single Treasury 
Account, subject to the PA’s success in meeting reform 
criteria. These funds were not identified with any line 
items in the budget. The Trust Fund thus “supported the 
PA general budget and was not earmarked”.170 The other 
was the Emergency Services Support Projects (ESSP-I 
and ESSP-II), established in 2002, which again transferred 
funds to the Single Treasury Account, although these 
payments were signed off against “non-salary social sector 
recurrent expenditures and were earmarked to specific PA 
expenditures”.171 Remaining funds were disbursed directly 
to the PA to fund individual projects and programs. All 
these disbursements were frozen in early 2006.  
The interruption in donor support thus had an immediate 
and devastating effect on the PA, the economy, and the 
population’s welfare, perhaps best illustrated by the impact 
on salaries. Some 60 per cent of the PA budget is for 
salaries; with at least 172,000 employees, and assuming 
these have an average of six dependents each, PA 
employment sustains one million Palestinians, roughly 29 
per cent of the total West Bank and Gaza Strip population 
of nearly 3.5 million.172 Almost half these employees 
belong to the security forces; 173 armed and unpaid, they 
constitute a formidable potential for anger and unrest.  
The PA budget also keeps the education and health sectors 
afloat: the ministry of education is responsible for 75 per 
cent of schools in the West Bank and Gaza, educating 70 
per cent of school children (the remainder being equally 
divided between the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency, 
UNRWA and private schools);174 the ministry of health 
accounts for 62 per cent of primary health clinics and 57 
per cent of hospital beds and is the address for 47 per cent 
of the population’s regular health care services (the 
 
 
Fiscal Crisis: Potential Remedies”, World Bank, 7 May 2006, p. 
3 at www.worldbank.org.  
170 Crisis Group interview, European development specialist, 
Jerusalem, May 2006.  
171 Crisis Group interview, European development specialist, 
Jerusalem, May 2006.  
172 World Bank, op. cit., pp. 3-4, at www.worldbank.org. This 
takes into account what Wolfensohn characterised as “substantial 
wage increases” provided by the previous government in mid-
2005. 
173 According to Wolfensohn, at the tail end of a surge in 
recruiting that preceded Hamas’s assumption of power, there 
are some 70,000 security personnel, accounting for more than 
40 per cent of the PA’s employees. Crisis Group interview, 
Wolfensohn, Jerusalem, March 2006. 
174 The PA plays a significantly larger role in education in the 
West Bank than in the Gaza Strip where many pupils attend 
UNRWA schools. 
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remainder is obtained from UNRWA, the private sector 
and NGOs).175 In other words, the notion (floated in 
particular by some Americans) that PA functions could be 
taken up by a strengthened NGO sector appears fanciful, 
certainly in the immediate future. 
Along with budget support came humanitarian/emergency 
assistance and developmental aid (in the form of capital 
or technical assistance). Although in theory the former 
category (roughly $500 million) has not been adversely 
affected by recent decisions, and countries like the U.S. 
have sought to redirect aid in the form of humanitarian 
assistance, reality is more complex. NGOs engaged 
in humanitarian relief work face significant obstacles 
stemming from extraordinarily restrictive U.S. Treasury 
Department regulations; U.S. organisations, for example, 
require pre-approval for their donations, which must be 
in-kind rather than cash.  
Such restrictions affect developmental assistance – $450 
million in 2005 – even more severely, for it often involves 
direct contacts with the PA.176 Some U.S. NGOs have 
had entire projects suspended. CARE, the international 
aid agency, which had hitherto provided 30 per cent of 
the health ministry’s medicines under a USAID-funded 
emergency medical assistance program, halted regular 
supplies after USAID withheld approval.177 Modifications 
in the attitude of foreign actors also inevitably affect PA-
generated resources. The reduction in economic activity 
produced by an intensified siege and donor boycott reduces 
the volume of tax receipts, while increased levels of 
unemployment and poverty create a greater burden on 
shrinking resources. 
As the European Union severed its political and financial 
links with the government and ministries, the U.S. 
Treasury’s decision to prohibit transactions with the PA, 
its employees and institutions in which it has an interest 
exerted formidable pressure on Arab states and private 
banks to suspend financial ties and created a tertiary 
boycott.178 Thus, an individual considering making a 
 
 
175 “Fact Sheet on PA Social Service Ministries”, n.d., Office of 
the Quartet Special Envoy on Disengagement. As of December 
2005, 8,050 civilians were receiving PA pensions worth $3.2 
million a month (averaging $398 per pensioner per month), and 
1,750 security personnel were receiving $2 million (averaging 
$1,143 per veteran per month).  
176 “West Bank and Gaza Update”, The World Bank Group, 
April 2006, p. 4. Many UN agencies do however use the PA 
as an implementing partner.  
177 Crisis Group interview, CARE aid worker, Jerusalem, June 
2006. USAID approved two one-off medical consignments for 
direct delivery to public hospitals, following UN reports that 
lives had been put at risk  
178 “A contractor informed me that he was today called by a 
USAID official asking if he is in contact with Hamas officials, 
direct personal contribution to a Palestinian hospital was 
informed by legal advisers that “it would be illegal for 
U.S. citizens to provide a charitable contribution directly 
to a Palestinian public hospital unless a specific exemption 
was first obtained”.179  
Indeed, according to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC), “U.S. persons are prohibited from 
engaging in transactions with the Palestinian Authority 
unless authorised, and may not transfer, pay, withdraw, 
export or otherwise deal in any assets in which the 
Palestinian Authority has an interest unless authorised”.180 
Similarly, pursuant to OFAC regulations, on 26 April 
USAID addressed a letter to all USAID contractors and 
grantees, stating that “no contact is allowed with PA 
officials under the authority of the Prime Minister or any 
other minister. Contact with all officials in these ministries, 
including working-level employees, is prohibited”.181 
On similar grounds, the Amman-based Arab Bank froze 
the PA’s Single Treasury Account, which had been 
considered a key achievement of Palestinian fiscal reform 
and through which the government collected and disbursed 
its revenues. The few Arab states which agreed to 
contribute to the PA have deposited their funds with the 
Arab League in Cairo, which itself faces the same 
debilitating legal concerns vis-à-vis the U.S. in transferring 
funds and delivering payments. The precise figures 
for Arab aid are shrouded in contradiction. Hamas 
 
 
explaining that if he was he would no longer be able to speak with 
him”. Crisis Group interview, Quartet official, March 2006. 
Similarly Palestinian bankers stated that U.S. government 
decisions had forced him to suspend foreign transactions for PA 
employees. “No American has told me not to transfer the funds 
to a PA employee’s account. But the banks know that if OFAC 
(the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control) learns of 
this we’d be in bad shape. They could terminate our dollar 
account in New York, and we’d lose access to our funds. Not 
even the Arab-Islamic bank is ready to pay the consequences”. 
Crisis Group interview, Palestinian banker, Ramallah, May 2006. 
The EU restrictions are more ambiguous. While the European 
Commission suspended 34 contracts focussed on PA capacity-
building, it maintained a wide array of projects and resumed 
contact with PA ministries and municipalities, including those 
run by Hamas mayors. Crisis Group interviews, EU aid officials, 
PA Planning Ministry officials, European aid workers, May 2006. 
179 Crisis Group telephone interview, June 2006. 
180 “Recent OFAC Actions”, Office of Foreign Assets Control, at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20060412.
shtml.  
181 USAID letter to contractors and grantees, 26 April 2006, 
Notice No 20006-WBG-17, at www.usaid.gov. “‘Contact’ means 
any meeting, telephone conversation, or other communication, 
whether oral or written”. Contact with “any private Palestinian, 
and mayors, deputy mayors, village council members, and 
officials under their authority”, is permitted only if they “are 
not affiliated” with a proscribed organisation. 
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representatives in exile who before the elections managed 
the movement’s finances claim Arab banks have frozen 
some $347 million in donations from Arab states and 
private benefactors, including $90 million in Jordan.182  
While Arab states acted out of fear of sanctions, they also 
had policy considerations of their own which made them 
wary of Hamas’s role as the first Islamist movement to 
assume governmental control through – more troubling 
still – democratic means. Consequently, Arab governments 
sought to bolster the Abbas presidency at the expense 
of the government and even assist in Fatah’s putative 
resurrection. “People are beginning to realise that a bad 
Fatah is better than a good Hamas. They don’t want to 
see Hamas ruin the achievements of the past twelve 
years”.183 Besides a reluctance to assist the government,184 
actions ranged from Lebanon’s decision to resume 
diplomatic relations with the PLO after a 24-year hiatus 
– a development from which Hamas was by definition 
excluded and which it therefore opposed – to Jordan’s 
allegation that Hamas was smuggling weapons into the 
Kingdom and surveying strategic sites in several Jordanian 
cities for future attacks,185 and Egypt’s private assurances 
to EU and U.S. officials that it too wished to see Hamas 
fail.186 
Far more damaging than anything the EU, Arab states or 
the U.S. could do, Israel – which possesses the power 
virtually to turn the Palestinian economy on and off at 
will – implemented a series of steps to pressure the PA. 
As described in an EU position paper:  
 
 
182 Usama Hamdan, cited in “Hamas not interested in ‘secret 
ways’ to transfer funds”, Associated Press, 5 May 2006.  
183 Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat, May 2006. 
184 At a time of record high oil prices, Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
together committed only $70 million – which, for reasons 
described above, has not reached the PA treasury.  
185 BBC News, 19 April 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/4922076.stm. Jordanian officials claimed to 
have incontrovertible evidence of Hamas’s activities, though 
Palestinians were equally fervent in their denials. Crisis Group 
interviews, Jordanian and Palestinian officials, Amman, 
Ramallah, March-May 2006.  
186 Egyptian officials denied that this was the case. Crisis Group 
interviews, April 2006. But more than one EU representative 
made the claim. Crisis Group interviews, EU officials, Brussels, 
March 2006. At a more symbolic level, Palestinian Interior 
Minister Siam reportedly was harassed at Egyptian military 
checkpoints and denied privileges normally accorded persons 
of his rank while transiting from Rafah to Cairo en route to 
Damascus. Al-Quds al-Arabi, 24 May 2006. An Egyptian echo 
of Jordan’s concerns that Hamas domination could lead to the 
export of Islamist violence could also be discerned in an official 
statement that claimed the perpetrators of attacks on the Sinai 
coast had been trained in and financed from Gaza. Egyptian 
interior ministry statement, Associated Press, 23 May 2006.  
The looming crisis is not the result of suspension 
of [donor] aid – nor will the crisis be averted by a 
resumption of direct aid. The key underlying factor 
is the continued freeze in Israeli transfers of PA 
fiscal revenue and the strict Israeli policy on 
closures and other restrictions.…The latest tightening 
of this policy has had a dramatic effect on the 
banking sector with a shortage of hard currency in 
the Palestinian Territories and difficulties to transfer 
money into Palestinian banks.187 
Israel’s policy in this regard appears conflicted. On the 
one hand, the primary goal appears to be to enfeeble and 
pressure the new government, to the extent that it will fall. 
On the other hand, there is great awareness – indeed, far 
more than in the U.S. – of the potentially calamitous 
consequences of a humanitarian crisis or PA collapse, 
either of which could lead to a resumption of full-scale 
violence, to Israel’s forced assumption of responsibility 
over ungoverned territories or to it suffering great damage 
in international public opinion. And so, while publicly 
dismissing warnings of impending crisis or claiming that 
the PA could survive up to four years at current income 
levels,188 Israeli officials have maintained some contacts 
with the PA where Israel’s national security is affected, 
have stated that Israel would send some humanitarian 
assistance of its own189 and on occasion encouraged 
the U.S. to alleviate its restrictions.190  
 
 
187 “EC Assistance to the Palestinians”, European Commission 
draft position paper dated 27 April 2006. The views expressed 
were unanimously shared by other donors interviewed by Crisis 
Group, and similar statements have been issued by the World 
Bank.  
188 Crisis Group interview, Israeli official, Jerusalem, April 
2006.  
189 Though, as Palestinians quickly pointed out, this was being 
done with the withheld tax revenues money that belonged to the 
PA in the first place. Crisis Group interviews, PLO diplomats, 
Washington, May 2006.  
190 “We are caught in a bind. We don’t want to be accused of 
undermining Washington’s anti-terrorism policy, with which we 
generally agree, but we also realize that some of their policies 
go too far. There are things that need to be done with the PA 
because they serve our interests, and we try to get that message 
across”. Crisis Group interview, Israeli diplomat, Washington, 
May 2006. In general “Israel’s policy towards the PA is closer 
to that of the EU than the U.S”. Crisis Group interview, Asher 
Susser, former government adviser, Tel Aviv University, May 
2006. The contradictions were perhaps most stark in the 
decisions of Israel’s banking sector, which since 1967 has, with 
government encouragement and support, ensured a stable supply 
of Israeli currency to the occupied territories to promote it 
as the prime legal tender. After the January 2006 Palestinian 
election, some Israeli officials began pressing banks to sever 
ties with Palestinian counterparts. Several, no doubt also not 
wishing to fall afoul of U.S. Treasury regulations, gave notice 
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Thus, health ministry officials have met with their 
Palestinian counterparts to discuss measures to contain 
the spread of avian flu.191 With limited exceptions, utility 
companies have continued to supply the West Bank and 
Gaza, not least the offices of the Haniya administration, 
financed both by Palestinian customs revenues Israel 
collects and by the EU.192 Israeli officials explain they 
are also authorised to engage with Palestinian local, 
provincial, and national officials and civil servants who 
are not Hamas members, but only when vital interests 
are at stake.193 While regular meetings with Palestinian 
security forces have been suspended, limited contact 
continues.194  
Moreover, and as PA funds began to ebb, Israel encouraged 
international agencies to move in – a decision seen 
cynically by Palestinians as an attempt to ensure the 
international community is the main funder of both the 
occupation and the territories’ basic needs.195 In contrast 
to their previous attitude, Israeli officials actively court 
UN agencies,196 finance a UN institution in Gaza197 and, 
 
 
that they would within one to six months cease to perform the 
function of correspondent bank for Palestinian banks. Other 
Israeli officials, fearing a collapse of the Palestinian money 
supply, counselled caution. Crisis Group interviews, Israeli and 
Palestinian bankers, Amman, Tel Aviv and Ramallah, May 2006.  
191 Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Jerusalem, April 
2006. 
192 According to Israeli officials, the total cost of such Israeli 
goods and services to Palestinians in the occupied territories in 
March 2006 amounted to some $20 million of the $55 million 
collected on the PA’s behalf; and the remainder was placed 
in escrow. Crisis Group interviews, Israeli and European 
Commission officials, Jerusalem and Brussels, March and 
April 2006. 
193 Crisis Group interviews, Israeli civilian and military officials, 
Jerusalem, April 2006.  
194 Crisis group interview, Adam Avidan, Israeli civil 
administration spokesman, Jerusalem, April 2006. During times 
when Israel opened the Karni/al-Mintar crossing, Israeli and 
Palestinian security officials – the latter under Interior Ministry 
control – maintained constant radio contact. Crisis Group visit 
to the crossing, May 2006. In early June, however, an Abbas aide 
announced that this and other border crossings would be placed 
under control of the Presidential Guard. Haaretz, 5 June 2006.  
195 “We are looking for other addresses – international 
organisations, private sector, big companies and hospital 
managers. And now we have other addresses”. Crisis Group 
interview, Adam Avidan, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) civil 
administration spokesman, April 2006. See Israeli cabinet 
communiqué, 21 May 2006: “Israel will coordinate with the 
international community regarding humanitarian assistance for 
the needs of the Palestinian population, not via the Palestinian 
Authority establishment”.  
196 Crisis Group interview, senior UN official, March 2006. 
See also Ari Shavit, “A New Dawn”, Haaretz, 3 March 2006. 
197 “Israel Provides $25 Million to UNDP for Gaza”, UNDP 
Press Release, 22 December 2006. Israel also transferred $11 
together with the U.S. and others, back expansion of the 
long-criticised UNRWA.198 “We were always the devil 
incarnate in the Israeli government’s eyes; now we have 
become the angel of light”, said the country director of a 
UN agency in the occupied territories.199  
That said, the tremendous hardship Israeli policies cause 
should not be underestimated. Through May, revenue 
transfers were some $200 million in arrears; as World Bank 
and EU officials repeatedly point out, the tax revenues are 
the most important source of income for the PA budget, 
in terms of regularity and amount. Israeli banks were also 
pressed to sever ties with all banks operating in the 
Palestinian territories on the grounds that it would be too 
complicated to screen every transaction for links to terrorist 
entities. Most eventually complied.200 On the ground, the 
military’s matrix of checkpoints and barrier terminals 
continues to hamper both civilian and government activity. 
Citing security concerns, Israel has maintained its prolonged 
closure of Gaza’s main supply crossing at Karni/Mintar.201 
 
 
million from Palestinian customs revenues it withheld to the 
World Health Organisation for disbursement in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Crisis Group interview, Israeli foreign ministry 
official, Jerusalem, June 2006. 
198 Crisis Group interviews, Israeli and international officials, 
April 2006. In the past Israel had criticised UNRWA for 
employing members of Hamas, including current Interior 
Minister and former UNRWA teacher, Said Siam. See also 
Adam Entous, “Israel warms to UN body it long scorned”, 
Reuters, 31 March 2006.  
199 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, April 2006.  
200 Crisis Group interview, Israeli government officials and 
foreign finance officials, April and May 2006. Of the two largest 
Israeli banks with Palestinian ties, Bank Hapoalim on 4 April 
2006 gave Palestinian banks a month’s notice to remove assets, 
and on 17 May the Israel Discount Bank said that ties would be 
frozen within three to six months. An Israeli banker suggested 
the Bank of Israel and the Palestinian Monetary Authority would 
negotiate alternative arrangements before the deadline expired. 
Crisis Group interview, Israel Discount Bank official, Tel Aviv, 
May 2006. Assuming continued pressure on Israeli banks 
by both their government and the U.S. Treasury, however, 
Palestinians are increasingly discussing adoption of the Jordanian 
Dinar, which has remained in circulation since 1967, as the main 
currency in the occupied territories. 
201 The Israeli presence at Karni is protected by a veritable 
obstacle course of ditches and concrete barriers, as well as a series 
of checkpoints manned by the Palestinian Preventive Security 
Force, leading diplomats to argue that the prime motive for 
closure is political rather than security-related. Crisis Group 
interview, Western diplomat, Jerusalem, May 2006. Even after 
Israeli Defence Minister Amir Peretz ordered the crossings open 
for exports, traffic trickled out of Gaza. When the crossing was 
open in both directions, an average of twenty trucks per day 
exported goods from Gaza, far less than the 400 trucks Israel 
had agreed to allow by the end of 2006 in the U.S.-brokered 
Access and Movement Agreement of 15 November 2005. 
Crisis Group interview, UN official, Gaza, June 2006.  
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This affects Palestinian exports, not least the harvest of 
the greenhouses which donors had prominently purchased 
from Israel when it evacuated Gaza.202  
Overall, Israeli officials appear to want the Palestinian 
population to understand that electing its sworn enemies 
comes at a price. In the words of prime ministerial adviser 
Dov Weisglass, “it’s like a meeting with a dietician. We 
have to make them much thinner, but not enough to die”.203  
B. A NATION UNDER SIEGE 
Palestinian planning and finance officials describe the 
current crisis as the most severe in the PA’s twelve-year 
history. When Israel withheld tax revenues during the 
recent uprising, the international community responded 
with substantial compensatory aid, banks used the unpaid 
revenues as collateral for loans, and the Palestinian diaspora 
helped with remittances. In June 2006, the PA is bereft 
of all these resources.  
In April 2006, shortly after the new government took 
office, the World Bank presented a number of economic 
scenarios for 2006-2008. Assuming no abrupt change 
relative to 2005, it forecast a continued albeit moderate 
deterioration in economic performance, unemployment, 
and poverty levels. Assuming reduced foreign aid flows, 
it predicted a more pronounced and rapid deterioration, 
and an even greater and more abrupt decline if foreign 
aid flows were maintained but Israel suspended revenue 
transfers and continued to impose trade and labour 
restrictions. Under a scenario of both Israeli curbs and 
reduction in foreign aid flows, it said unemployment 
would rise from 23 per cent to 40 per cent in 2006 and 47 
per cent in 2008; poverty would rise from 44 per cent to 74 
per cent (67 per cent in 2006); GDP would decline an 
additional 25 per cent (a full 55 per cent lower than 1999 
levels); investment levels would decline by some 70 per 
cent; average personal income would decrease by almost a 
 
 
202 According to the Office of the Quartet Special Envoy, export 
volumes during the first four months of 2006 averaged just 23 
truckloads per day, compared to the target level of 150 truckloads 
per day by 31 December 2005, crippling the harvest. It estimated 
revenue losses to Gaza’s agricultural sector at some $450,000 
per day during the peak season. Since the beginning of the year, 
the sector has lost more than $18 million in foregone revenues 
due to the closures at Karni. Office of the Quartet Special Envoy, 
“Periodic Report”, April 2006. Earnings were further depleted 
following attacks on the greenhouses by local clans claiming 
ownership of former settlement land. The Jerusalem Post, 14 
May 2006. 
203 Haaretz, 23 March 2006. Similarly, a senior UN official 
stated that the sentiment in Washington was that Palestinians 
should “survive, but not thrive”. Crisis Group interview, April 
2006.  
third; and private consumption would be slashed by a 
quarter.204  
On 7 May, the World Bank issued an urgent clarification: 
“Based on evolving [Israeli] and donor policies, these 
[above] projections now appear too rosy”.205 Noting that 
public sector salaries had last been paid in February on 
account of the “unprecedented” nature of the PA’s liquidity 
crisis and that “the recession has already begun”, with 
“signs of food and gasoline shortages” observed in Gaza, 
it cited “concern at the early emergence of a supply-
induced humanitarian crisis” and noted that those dependent 
on PA salaries…will suffer major income reductions – 
while the PA is unlikely to be able to provide basic 
services or maintain law and order”. “As a result of such 
dramatic fiscal compression”, the World Bank concluded, 
a humanitarian crisis, rising insecurity, and/or institutional 
dissolution “may occur in the coming months”.206 
Palestinian and Israeli officials, diplomats and development 
specialists interviewed by Crisis Group generally concurred 
that if present trends continued, the crisis would come to 
a head by mid-2006.207  
Given the PA’s increasingly critical role in sustaining the 
local economy since the onset of the uprising in 2000 
and the ensuing Israeli siege, the salary suspension that 
commenced in March 2006 has had a devastating effect, 
hitting not just employees and their dependents, but also 
those who depend on the activity they generate.  
The hardship is compounded by the almost total depletion 
of savings that helped ordinary Palestinians survive the 
first five years of conflict. In an economy traditionally 
lubricated by credit, banks are reining in mortgages, 
customers have reached the limits of their overdrafts 
at local supermarkets, and telephone companies are 
disconnecting customers defaulting on payments. In some 
cases children have been withdrawn from private schools 
because parents cannot afford the annual registration fee 
for the 2006-2007 academic year; in others pupils have 
 
 
204 “West Bank and Gaza Update”, The World Bank Group, 
April 2006, p. 7  
205 “Palestinian revenues continue to be withheld [by 
Israel]…Border restrictions are proving more stifling than in 
2005…[T]he suspension of donor disbursements to the PA by 
OECD donors is being implemented more rapidly than the 
Bank anticipated…[and] Commercial banks have been reminded 
of their potential legal liability under U.S. anti-terror legislation, 
leading them to withhold services to the PA; this is impeding 
the PA’s ability to receive transfers of funds from abroad (in 
particular, from Arab-League donors), and to operate an internal 
payments system”. “The Impending Palestinian Fiscal Crisis”, 
World Bank, pp. 1-2. 
206 Ibid, pp. 1-5. 
207 Crisis Group interviews, Amman, Gaza City, Jerusalem, 
Ramallah, Tel Aviv, March-May 2006. 
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been denied certificates until the outstanding balance for 
the current academic year is made good.  
Israel’s ban on Palestinian exports – which with few 
exceptions has prevailed since the beginning of 2006 – 
coupled with an inflow of imports means that much of 
the money still in circulation is paid to outside suppliers, 
leading to a balance of payments collapse. During the first 
five months of 2006 the stock exchange fell by over 40 
per cent,208 and real estate sales dwindled, while shops, 
particularly in the Gaza Strip, remained stocked in large 
part because ever fewer customers could afford to buy. 
With growing frequency, stores are choosing not to open 
at all.  
As employees prepare for their fourth month without 
salaries, defiance increasingly is tinged with despair. 
Applications for UNRWA food parcels are rising sharply 
and those for financial grants fourfold,209 in significant part 
because registered refugees who are government employees 
were previously ineligible for such assistance. A senior 
UNRWA official reports Palestinian staff began inquiring 
about jobs for relatives, “something I never experienced 
before”.210 The food aid needs of the non-refugee 
population – which has no access to UNRWA assistance 
– increased by an additional 14 per cent to cover 
over half this population group.211 By June, an influx of 
emergency supplies had alleviated much of the immediate 
medical and food crisis but, officials emphasised, only 
temporarily.212  
Having run down reserves, policemen and their spouses 
can be seen queuing at Gaza’s gold market to sell wedding 
bands and other jewellery, some continuing to the Suq 
Firas market lugging household appliances and even 
mobile telephones. Unpaid security personnel and 
militiamen scour the market for alternative employment, 
and crime, predictably, is on the rise. The Red Cross 
worries that unpaid prison wardens might abandon their 
posts or lack funds to feed inmates, leading to a mass 
breakout of criminals.213 Indeed the guards, themselves 
 
 
208 “There hasn’t been much capital flight. The problem is not 
that existing projects are being discontinued, but that new 
investments have been put on hold”. Crisis Group interview, 
Palestinian contractor, Ramallah, April 2006. 
209 Crisis Group interview, John Ging, UNRWA director, Gaza 
City, May 2006.  
210 Crisis Group interview, senior UNRWA official, March 
2006. 
211 Crisis Group interview, Kirstie Campbell, World Food 
Program (WFP) official, Jerusalem, June 2006. WFP said it 
was increasing food assistance by 25 per cent, from 480,000 
to 600,000 non-refugees. See http://www.wfp.org/english/? 
ModuleID=137&Key=2128.  
212 Crisis Group interview, UN officials, Gaza, June 2006. 
213 Crisis Group interview, ICRC official, Jerusalem, May 2006. 
lacking proper meals while on duty, are asking relatives 
of inmates to prepare food and bring it to the prisons so 
that prisoners do not starve.214 “No one throws tens of 
thousands of armed men onto the street, unless they want 
the destruction of the entity, as in Iraq”, concluded Raji 
Sourani, a leading Gaza human rights activist.215 
More ominously perhaps, drug companies have refused 
to supply the ministry of health until the PA clears its dues, 
and private hospitals, which relied on the ministry for at 
least a third of their income, have severed salary payments, 
prompting incremental strike action.216 At the same 
time, the ministry of civil affairs has stopped preparing 
paperwork for patients referred to hospitals in neighbouring 
states for treatment unavailable in the occupied territories. 
“The PA no longer has the funds to pay for such treatments 
so it would be superfluous to do so”.217 “Is the Palestinian 
health system going to collapse?”, Dr Yahya Shawar of 
the Palestinian Medical Association asked in mid-May. 
“Probably, yes”.218  
C. CAN A HUMANITARIAN COLLAPSE BE 
AVOIDED WITHOUT DEALING WITH THE 
PA? 
Seeking to avoid a humanitarian collapse without 
bankrolling the Hamas-dominated government, some 
Quartet members have been considering whether they 
could establish alternative delivery mechanisms that 
bypass the PA. In the U.S. in particular, the idea that a 
parallel NGO system could provide vital services was 
given serious thought.219 The notion, which reflected 
excessively poor understanding of how the Palestinian 
economy worked and of the PA’s central role, was quickly 
dismissed by experts, including NGOs working on the 
ground.220 As James Wolfensohn put it:  
 
 
214 Crisis Group interview, International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) official, Jerusalem, May 2006. 
215 Crisis Group interview, Gaza City, May 2006.  
216 Crisis Group interview, Khalid Sanwar, Director, Palestinian 
Red Crescent Society (PRCS), Gaza City, May 2006.  
217 Crisis Group interview, senior ministry of civil affairs 
official, Ramallah, May 2006.  
218 “Palestinian Association warns health system will 
Collapse”, Agence France-Presse, 17 May 2006. 
219 Crisis Group interviews with members of Administration 
and of Congress, February-March 2006. . 
220 In early May 2006, 36 international aid agencies issued a 
statement notifying donors that “the responsibilities of public 
sector institutions cannot be replaced by non-governmental 
agencies (NGOs) and the United Nations”. See www.aida-
jer.org. Other aid agencies also rejected funding “to dramatically 
scale up activities to counteract the effects of international 
isolation of the PA”. Crisis Group interview, aid worker, 
Jerusalem, May 2006. 
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Take schools. You have a million pupils. The notion 
that you can educate a million kids tomorrow 
through an alternative school system in tents 
without notebooks, without textbooks, without 
anything, seems whimsical. What are you going 
to do? Build new schools for a million kids? Find 
30,000 new teachers? The possibility of building 
an alternative mechanism does not exist. The 
impasse cries out for a resolution that involves 
dealing with the existing education system.221  
Claims by U.S. experts that “if Hamas managed to build 
its strength on the basis of service provision, secular NGOs 
funded by us should be able to do the same” were similarly 
rebutted.222 In the words of a UN official: 
The most effective NGO sector when it comes to 
service delivery is the Islamist one, and this stopped 
receiving Western funds even before the elections. 
Its scope was also exaggerated. But even if you 
believe the claims about it, it still has nowhere near 
the capacity required to tend to an entire population. 
So how can you get the secular NGOs, most of 
whom have until now specialised in issues like 
democracy and human rights, to provide education 
and medical care to the West Bank and Gaza Strip? 
Well, you can’t.223 
For somewhat different reasons, the same caveats apply 
to the UN itself. As U.S. and European diplomats began 
to consider alternative delivery mechanisms, the UN 
launched its own emergency appeal on 2 June, calling for 
an increase of emergency aid from $215 million to $380 
million, the lion’s share of the additional increment to be 
devoted to job creation schemes, primarily labour intensive 
infrastructure projects such as road-building, sewage 
maintenance and school-building. But UN officials warned 
such projects could further deplete PA capacity by attracting 
unpaid public sector workers to UN-sponsored projects.224  
When UNRWA was approached as a potential provider 
of services – on account of its long and extensive presence 
throughout the occupied territories and its role as the 
donor community surrogate when the PA was first 
established – it, too, expressed misgivings. The agency’s 
mandate in principle is restricted to the care of refugees 
(over 75 per cent of the Gaza Strip population and 
approximately 40 per cent of West Bank residents) and, 
more importantly:  
 
 
221 Crisis Group interview, James Wolfensohn, Jerusalem, 
March 2006. 
222 Crisis Group interview, Washington, March 2006. 
223 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 
224 Crisis Group interview, UN official, Jerusalem, June 2006. 
Our basic position is respect for the “sovereignty” 
of the PA, and we will therefore not respond to any 
donor request to assume PA functions. To do so 
we would need authorisation from the PA, which 
in the current situation means the authorisation of 
both the government and the presidency.225  
Nor would the agency, according to its staff, have the 
capacity to take over and run entire sectors, such as 
education or health. 
With donors and their implementing agents alike resistant 
to engineering the collapse of a national entity they had 
spent $10 billion nurturing, the U.S. appeared prepared to 
soften its position somewhat.226 It acquiesced in EU efforts, 
subject to Washington’s ultimate review,227 to devise not 
alternative delivery mechanisms but rather alternative 
funding mechanisms that could help ensure continuation 
of basic services without monetary transfers to the PA 
government. Various ideas have since been mooted.  
In late April, the EU produced a preliminary proposal for 
setting up an “international supervisory mechanism” in 
cooperation with major multilateral and bilateral donors.228 
Its purpose, the draft stated, would be “to pool donor 
funding to meet basic needs”, by directly reimbursing 
providers such as hospitals and suppliers. In order to 
avoid dealings with the government, it would use the PA 
presidency as an “interface between the international 
community and the Palestinian Authority”.229 Recognising 
the proposed mechanism would have only “limited 
impact…in the absence of tax transfers by Israel…the 
resumption [of such transfers] to specific earmarked areas” 
would be one of its “main aims”.230 
In a related development, a British draft in May pointed 
to the “precedent” of the Holst fund, which in the 1990s 
disbursed donor monies to the PA, and proposed a 
similar mechanism to finance a variety of activities – 
including “direct payment of salaries to the bank accounts 
 
 
225 The official additionally suggested UNRWA would not 
approach the PA in this respect, but would need to be 
approached by the Palestinians. Crisis Group interview, March 
2006. 
226 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006. 
227 Crisis Group interview, European development specialist, 
Jerusalem, May 2006. 
228 “EC assistance to the Palestinians”, op. cit. Furthermore, 
“It is highly unlikely NGOs would be capable of or willing to 
replace the role of the Palestinian Authority in providing 
basic services for the majority of the Palestinian population”.  
229 Ibid. “In concrete terms the donors would need to fully 
control all identification, tendering, procurement, contracting, 
payments, and auditing”.  
230 “EC assistance to the Palestinians”, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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of key workers” – without providing funds directly to the 
PA.231 By the end of that month these ideas coalesced 
into what Brussels designated a Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM).  
In its latest iteration, the TIM would consist of three 
separate instruments:  
 the Emergency Services Support Project (ESSP) 
previously utilised to fund non-salary recurrent PA 
social sector costs would be expanded to support 
both non-salary expenditures of social service 
providers, especially in the health sector, and, 
potentially, salary payments to such providers as 
well. While previously monies were paid to the 
PA Single Treasury Account, the program would 
be “moved” to the president’s office;232  
 the Interim Emergency Relief Contribution (IERC), 
solely funded by the European Commission, would 
continue to pay utility providers directly, based 
on details furnished by the presidency. This is 
estimated to cost $6 million per month; and 
 a third mechanism would directly disburse “social 
allowances” to “people in need and workers 
involved in the delivery of essential services”; 
cost estimates are between $25 million and $30 
million per month.233 Here, too, the PA presidency 
would be expected to play a central role, providing 
information obtained from PA agencies and taking 
responsibility for certifying the eligibility of 
recipients and the validity of expenditures. A 
management unit, established by the “lead donor”, 
would, among other functions, disburse and audit 
all payments. 
The last of these in particular was accompanied by 
considerable semantic acrobatics. According to a European 
Commission official, “payment of salaries has never been 
on the agenda. What has been agreed is payment of a 
social allowance to health and education workers”.234 A 
European diplomat dispensed with such nuance: “There’s 
not much point to the Temporary International Mechanism 
without giving money to the people who provide the 
services. As to what you call it and how you do it, there 
are numerous options”.235 Regarding these options, a 
 
 
231 “Financing basic services to the Palestinians outside PA 
systems”, op. cit., p. 2. 
232 Crisis Group interviews, EU diplomats, Jerusalem, May 
and June 2006.  
233 Crisis Group interview, European development specialist, 
Jerusalem, May 2006. “Temporary International Mechanism”, 
EU position paper, copy provided to Crisis Group, June 2006.  
234 Crisis Group interview, Brussels, May 2006. 
235 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, May 2006. A World Bank 
official pointed to a possible advantage to this proposal. As he 
development specialist mentioned vouchers, “targeted 
payments”, and other mechanisms that would meet the 
program’s objectives of “simplicity, preserving the current 
infrastructure, and doing something quickly”.236 While 
Europeans hope that other donors, including Arab states, 
will contribute to these mechanisms, “the test will be 
whether the Israelis release Palestinian money into the 
mechanism[s], which is the desired outcome”.237 
The Temporary International Mechanism, yet to be 
approved by the U.S., raises several issues. While clearly 
an improvement on past proposals, in particular in that it 
casts a far wider net, its emphasis on “essential social 
services” appears to neglect the importance of the security 
sector – a possible bow to Washington, which is strongly 
opposed to such assistance. As a European diplomat put 
it, financial requirements of the security sector “haven’t 
even been brought onto the agenda”.238 Among those 
expressing scepticism about attempts to discriminate 
between different public services is Wolfensohn: “All the 
things that are public service related have the potential 
after a short period of time to create a humanitarian crisis”, 
including police and civil defence forces that might be 
required at a school or hospital.239  
Whereas some question the feasibility of funding schools 
and hospitals while withholding support from agencies 
that provide support services, others doubt the wisdom 
of funding some but not all PA employees – particularly 
if those collecting salaries are civilians, and the security 
forces are left out.240 In the words of a World Bank official, 
 
 
explained, fiscal imbalances in the PA were so severe, even 
before the election-generated crisis, that sustaining salaries at 
existing levels was virtually impossible. Recasting them as 
social allowance could allow the PA to impose a salary cut by 
another name. Crisis Group interview, Washington, June 2006. 
Similarly, a Palestinian fund manager suggested that the 
“essential but long overdue” privatisation of social services could 
be facilitated by the donor boycott. Crisis Group interview, 
Ramallah, April 2006. 
236 Crisis Group interview, senior European development 
specialist, Jerusalem, May 2006. 
237 Crisis Group interview, European Commission official, 
Brussels, May 2006. 
238 Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Jerusalem, May 
2006. The proposal does provide that “arrangements will be 
designed in such a way that other donors can identify their 
preferred sectors”. “Temporary International Mechanism”, EU 
position paper, copy provided to Crisis Group. In theory, 
then, donors who do not face the same political constraints 
as Washington and Brussels could earmark monies for the 
security sector – one neither included nor excluded from the 
position paper’s contents. 
239 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 
240 Crisis Group interview, European diplomats, May 2006. 
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“I cannot imagine that paying some personnel and not 
others is going to go very far, especially if the unpaid 
ones have guns”.241  
Making distinctions between those under the presidency’s 
aegis and those under the government’s could further 
exacerbate the situation, leading to domestic clashes and 
spilling over into resentment of and action against the 
international community.242 A system that sought to fund 
all sectors so that the PA as an institution could stay alive 
is far preferable. 
A second major problem involves the role assigned to the 
presidency. As currently conceived, and as a means both 
to bolster Abbas and circumvent Hamas, the presidency 
is defined as the “interface” between donors and the PA 
administration, meaning it would provide necessary 
information and certify that expenditures were justified. 
Politically, this could put the president in the awkward 
position of being responsible for a program he does not 
control, attacked as complicit in a Western scheme and 
the target of popular criticism whenever payment lagged.243 
The goal may be to strengthen Abbas but the result could 
be the opposite. An Arab diplomat described this scenario 
as tantamount to giving the president the rope with which 
to hang himself.244  
Further, involvement of the presidency almost inevitably 
runs the risk of politicisation, as some would try to direct 
payments to more loyal sectors, most notably security 
forces under Abbas’s command, leading to greater internal 
tension. A UN official remarked: “Salaries have become 
a scarce commodity, the equivalent of diamonds in other 
conflict situations. They have become a stake in institutional 
and factional competition”.245 To allow one side control 
over this issue is a sure way to stoke the fires and increase 
scepticism about the mechanism. Again, it is one thing to 
strengthen Abbas’s stature as president of all Palestinians, 
quite another to bolster his role as leader of one of their 
factions. 
 
 
who account for 7 per cent of the PA workforce, would receive 
salaries. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, June 2006.  
241 Crisis Group interview, World Bank official, Washington, 
June 2006. 
242 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian analyst, June 2006. 
243 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006. Some of Abbas’s advisers concur. “Such plans would 
leave Hamas with political power without responsibility. Our 
agenda is to confront it with the complexities of governance”. 
Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, April 2006. 
244 Crisis Group interview, Algiers, June 2006. Abbas himself is 
said not to be oblivious to this concern, fearful that he would be 
held responsible for any humanitarian hardship. Crisis Group 
interview, presidential adviser, Ramallah, June 2006. 
245 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, June 2006. 
The alternative is not for the Hamas government to receive 
funds directly; for that, it would have to make significant 
moves in the direction of the international consensus as 
described below. Still, an alternative that is independent 
of Palestinian power struggles while at the same time 
enjoying a sufficient measure of credibility, such as UN 
agencies (e.g., UNDP or UNWRA) or the World Bank, 
would appear better suited for such a role. This would not 
be a panacea, of course. The UN and the World Bank 
could become the targets of resentment by those who were 
not paid, or insufficiently so; they would be thrust into a 
deeply political and violent struggle; and they would have 
to engage in uncomfortable anti-terrorism vetting on behalf 
of the Quartet. Nevertheless, this option is preferable to 
one that – in the absence of a Fatah/Hamas agreement – 
would dangerously exacerbate internal tensions. 
Such objections aside, the principal obstacle confronting 
the Temporary International Mechanism is obtaining U.S. 
approval. Washington is expected to balk at anything 
deemed likely to reduce pressure on the PA government 
and will closely scrutinise anything approximating salary 
payments, particularly to the security forces.246 It is said 
to prefer an entirely needs-based scheme that would not 
specifically provide payments to Palestinians engaged in 
service delivery. According to an informed observer:  
The Americans are dead set against anything 
resembling salaries. They can get their way because 
of their influence over the banks. They continue to 
prefer a general social allowance that would in one 
form or another be directly distributed to Palestinians, 
along the lines of vouchers or food stamps, without 
discrimination between PA or non-PA, to those 
who can demonstrate need.247 
The aim, in other words, is not to keep the PA alive, but 
rather Palestinian society afloat – a critical difference 
with potentially costly consequences for institutional 
sustainability. Humanitarian handouts are no substitute for 
either functioning institutions or a functioning economy. 
If individuals are not paid for their labour, it is hard to see 
why they would continue working at all. The outcome, 
again, if one considers the impact on security personnel, 
could be devastating. The U.S. has powerful leverage, as 
noted, due to the influence it exercises over banks that 
 
 
246 “A European diplomat said [U.S. opposition to 
TIM]…reinforced fears that the U.S. was intent on [Palestinian] 
regime change….The U.S. envoy to the Middle East, David 
Welch, said there was “no basis” for talks if they included 
payments to the security forces”. Anne Penketh, “Fears of 
‘regime change’ policy after U.S. cancels Palestinian pay 
talks”, The Independent, 9 June 2006. 
247 Crisis Group telephone interview, foreign correspondent, 
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would be engaged in transactions. The IMF, UN, and World 
Bank each have standing exemptions from the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) restrictions with regard to dealing with the PA, 
but individual banks do not. They will not transfer funds 
to or on behalf of the PA – including to the accounts of 
individual PA employees – without a written “letter of 
comfort” from Washington, or clarification of OFAC 
terms.248  
The Americans – and, reportedly, some of Abbas’s advisers 
as well – also are said to be increasingly determined to 
postpone the beginning of implementation until after the 
proposed referendum as a means of further weakening 
Hamas and turning the vote into a plebiscite over who 
can pay salaries.249 Politically, they argue, it would be 
better for the Palestinians to know the full consequences 
of Hamas’s posture, which early implementation of the 
TIM could dilute. Should this view prevail, or should the 
U.S stall until that time, it would delay implementation 
by at least several weeks.  
Whatever the ultimate mechanism, three further 
considerations should be kept in mind. First, even without 
U.S. delays, the mechanism is not expected to be 
operational before early July, by which time economic 
problems may well have reached breaking point. Second, 
with security deteriorating and fears that attacks on 
foreigners could be renewed, expatriates doubt their ability 
to audit any program properly.250 Third, there is the 
question of the funding levels involved: there has been 
no firm indication that the Europeans or others would 
be prepared to donate the kinds of sums required. As a 
Palestinian official put it: 
It’s empty rhetoric, and much too rosy. It’s a 
discussion about principles rather than details. 
Until now they’re talking about instruments, not 
funding levels. There are no figures involved yet. 
Additionally, no one is talking about infrastructure. 
USAID, the main donor for infrastructure, has 
 
 
248 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian banker, Ramallah, June 
2006. Some banks, including the Bank of Palestine, did make 
limited payments to PA employees in early June, a sign that 
fear of sanction by OFAC was tempered by the more immediate 
fear of gunmen on the ground.  
249 Crisis Group interview, presidential adviser, Ramallah, 
June 2006. 
250 Following a series of recent kidnapping incidents and arson 
attacks, the UN severely cut the international staff presence 
in the Gaza Strip to a symbolic-level presence. “Without 
international staff in headquarters, maintaining operations is 
a very real challenge”. Crisis Group interview, UN official, 
Gaza, May 2006. If perceived as the humanitarian fig-leaf of 
a Western sanctions policy, international staff warn they could 
become soft targets. 
stopped all projects, yet none of these proposed 
mechanisms would deal with our infrastructure 
needs.251 
There is no sign as yet, however, that the differences 
between the U.S. and the EU have been bridged. A Quartet 
conference call scheduled for 7 June was cancelled amid 
continuing disagreement;252 on 11 June a diplomat reported 
that “the Americans told the Europeans to go back to the 
drawing board”, because U.S. officials “don’t want the 
[European] Commission to pay even partial salaries or 
allowances”, including the health sector.253 Even if a 
mechanism is jointly agreed, the question will remain 
whether it will prevent an economic and therefore social 
and security breakdown, or rather simply postpone it.254  
For the moment, talk of a humanitarian crisis may be 
exaggerated or premature – although there have been 
periodic shortages, at times severe, of basic goods such 
as flour and fuel, and a number of dialysis patients in Gaza 
reportedly have died because hospitals lacked the funds 
and materials to properly treat them. As Crisis Group 
witnessed in Gaza, Palestinians have developed 
remarkable resilience and ability to cope with hardship 
while maintaining minimum services. But this cannot 
substitute for a long-term answer to the questions raised 
by Hamas’s victory. It is hard to imagine the PA surviving 
– or the international community agreeing to sustain it – 
on the basis of humanitarian hand-outs alone. Likewise, 
until political accommodations are found between Hamas 
and Fatah, between the PA and the Quartet and between 
the PA and Israel, the risks of renewed and aggravated 
violence will hover over the Israeli-Palestinian arena as 
a whole.  
 
 
251 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. 
252 Crisis Group interviews, UN, EU and U.S. officials, 
Jerusalem, June 2006. See also Penketh, “Fears of ‘Regime 
Change’ Policy”, op. cit. 
253 “Critics of the U.S. approach said it would undercut EU 
efforts to maintain key Palestinian institutions like the health 
and education ministries”. Adam Entous, “U.S., EU spar over 
Palestinian aid plan – diplomats”, Reuters, 11 June 2006. 
254 A UN official also pointed to longer-term implications. “All 
the talk about PA corruption and mismanagement has obfuscated 
the reality that at the mid and lower levels this is a genuinely 
professional civil service that has enjoyed real success in 
delivering services to the people. Do we really want to jeopardise 
everything that we’ve achieved in this respect? Have we thought 
about the consequences?” Crisis Group interview, Amman, 
April 2006. 
Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°54, 13 June 2006 Page 32 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD BE 
DONE? 
A. SUBVERTING HAMAS? 
Taking the lead in defining the international community’s 
objectives toward Hamas, the U.S. has claimed it wants to 
see it “change or fail”.255 But while change continues to 
be presented as the preferred option, there is little belief 
in it, and so most eyes are on failure. At its root, the 
conviction is based on the premise that if Hamas were 
allowed to consolidate its position and succeed in governing, 
it would decisively transform the Palestinian political 
landscape, allow radical Islamists to determine the future 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and embolden such movements 
elsewhere.256 A concern to the U.S. and Israel, it is no less 
a worry to Arab regimes fearful of their own Islamists257 
and, of course, to Fatah. 
The path contemplated is, through financial sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation, to provoke a popular domestic backlash 
against Hamas and – most likely through confrontation 
– pave the way for the return of Fatah. It also involves 
strengthening Fatah through a variety of means, including 
bolstering its military capability by providing technical 
and material assistance to those branches of the security 
sector under Abbas’s direct control.258  
 
 
255 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006.  
256 “The U.S. is disengaging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
it is less of a priority than its ‘global war on terror’. The Hamas 
government means that for the Americans the conflict is now 
part of their larger war and subordinated to it”. Crisis Group 
interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, Jerusalem, May 
2006. 
257 Crisis Group interviews with U.S. and Arab officials, April-
May 2006. Before assuming office, Hamas had reasoned that 
Arab and Islamic states would compensate for any shortfall in 
donor funding and diplomatic support. Crisis Group interviews, 
Ismail Haniya, Beach Refugee Camp, Gaza Strip, January 2006; 
Omar Abd-al-Raziq, PA finance minister, Ramallah, March 
2006. The Islamists were sorely disappointed. Neighbouring 
regimes were no more favourably disposed to Hamas than they 
were to their own Islamists and flinched at the prospect that 
Palestine might set a trend. Asked about his government’s 
attitude toward the PA, a Jordanian diplomat told Crisis Group, 
“if Hamas can pay salaries, they would stay in power for over 
40 years”. Crisis Group interview, May 2006.  
258 For example, “Western security officials in the Gaza Strip 
said members of one of Abbas’s elite bodyguard units had shown 
them newly issued anti-tank rockets concealed in backpacks. In 
the occupied West Bank city of Ramallah, where Abbas has his 
headquarters, the guard recently acquired four brand new U.S.-
made armoured vehicles worth an estimated $100,000 each”. 
Entous and Tamimi, “Hamas, Abbas rivalry spurs Palestinian 
But it is a course full of obstacles. Particularly if punitive 
measures fail to distinguish – whether in fact or perception 
– between the regime and its constituents, they are likely 
to generate greater solidarity with Hamas.259 This will be 
all the more so if Fatah’s restoration were seen to have 
been engineered with U.S. support.260 Moreover, as Fatah 
officials themselves acknowledge, their movement is not 
yet ready to pick up the challenge. It has postponed the 
necessary internal reforms and failed to address the issues 
– including its internal power struggles and lawless militias 
– that led it to its electoral defeat in the first place.261 As 
discussed above, it also is far from clear by what method 
Hamas would be forced to relinquish its power, there being 
no provision in the Basic Law for early elections.262  
While such constitutional niceties might well be ignored 
in the chaos that seems certain to accompany Palestinian 
regime change, there are even more serious considerations 
about long-term impact. Feeling cheated of its right to 
govern, Hamas would be unlikely to go quietly into the 
night or to acquiesce in subsequent elections. Some 
Palestinian analysts have evoked the possibility of a 
“strategic realignment”, with Hamas turning decisively 
toward Damascus and Tehran in order to resist a Fatah 
take-over.263 Even if, under this theory, the Islamists’ 
 
 
arms race”, op. cit. See also Amos Harel, “Defence official: 
arms transfer to help Abbas take on Hamas”, Haaretz, 27 
May 2005. 
259 On 23 May, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz told Israel’s 
parliament that in his view economic pressure would neither 
reduce popular support for Hamas nor expedite the PA 
government’s ouster, Haaretz, 24 May 2006. 
260 “To the extent that Fatah is seen as America’s choice, 
particularly in an environment when U.S. policy is explicitly 
hostile to the choices Palestinians themselves have made, Fatah’s 
rehabilitation in the public’s eye and also in terms of much 
needed internal reform becomes even less likely”. Geoffrey 
Aronson, “Financing the Palestinian Authority”, International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), 25 May 2006, pp. 21, 
29.  
261 Crisis Group interviews, May 2006. 
262 Crisis Group telephone interview, Jihad Harb, specialist on 
Palestinian constitutional issues, Palestinian Centre for Policy 
and Survey Research (PSR), June 2006. Abbas can dismiss 
the government and/or proclaim a state of emergency, but any 
alternative government would need to win a vote of confidence 
in the Hamas-dominated PLC (with the current one remaining 
in office until this is achieved), as would a state of emergency 
within 30 days of its proclamation. Any measures adopted under 
a state of emergency would also require parliamentary approval. 
Email communication from Nathan Brown, specialist in 
Palestinian constitutional issues, June 2006. 
263 Crisis Group interview, April 2006. According to another 
analyst, George Giacaman: “U.S. regional policy is very clear, 
to separate Lebanon from Syria, Syria from Iran, Hizbollah 
from Syria and Iran, and the Palestinians from all of the above. 
Iran’s policy is exactly the opposite. Ahmadi-Nejad’s statements 
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popular support will have dropped significantly before any 
showdown and this scenario is accompanied (as often 
suggested) by a comprehensive Fatah crackdown against 
Hamas, it is hard to imagine the Islamists collapsing to 
the point where they no longer could mount a dangerous 
challenge, either disrupting elections or finding other ways 
to discredit them.  
Having reached the conclusion that its experiment with 
the mainstream had failed and political integration was 
no longer a viable option, Hamas almost certainly would 
revert to the methods of the past. In once again resorting 
to violence, it would be likely to direct its fire against 
not only Israel but also its Fatah rivals. 
The 9 June renunciation of the unilateral ceasefire by 
Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, demonstrates 
just how perilous this strategy can be. Bloody and tragic 
as the previous 24 hours undoubtedly were, from 
Hamas’s perspective it was only one of numerous Israeli 
provocations during the past sixteen months. Yet within 
hours, the Islamists were insisting they would continue 
shelling the southern Israeli town of Sderot until it was 
evacuated by its residents, while Israeli press reports 
indicated Defence Minister Peretz rejected IDF 
recommendations for a massive incursion into the Gaza 
Strip and the assassination of Hamas political leaders.264 
The heightened tensions within the Palestinian political 
arena and suffocating international pressure on the PA 
government appear to have made the alternative of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict considerably more appealing to the 
Islamists than it did on the eve of their assumption of 
office. 
As mentioned above, this option also could prove fatal 
to the PA. According to Geoffrey Aronson, a specialist 
on Palestinian affairs:  
A Hamas decision that the value of participation in 
democratic elections and subsequent administration 
of the institutions of Palestinian self-rule have been 
undermined by external forces will have implications 
not simply for the composition of the next PA 
government, but whether there will be a government 
at all. The Hamas leadership has made it clear that 
the organisation will not permit the reconstitution 
of the PA – via elections or through any other 
 
 
about the holocaust and eliminating Israel need to be read 
politically. It was his attempt to link Iran with the Palestinians 
through Hizbollah and Syria. If Washington wants Iran to be 
detached from the Palestinians the price is a two-state solution 
somewhere along the lines of Taba”. Crisis Group interview, 
Ramallah, February 2006. 
264 Nonetheless, according to Peretz, “no organization, no 
status will serve as cover for any source that is involved in 
planning or carrying out shooting”. Haaretz, 12 June 2006. 
vehicle – if it is forced to fail. In such an environment 
it believes that it will emerge as the only Palestinian 
organisation capable of mobilising popular support. 
In this sense, the Hamas leadership, while preferring 
to work through established institutions it now 
leads, is fully prepared to profit from its ability to 
mobilise popular support in their absence.265  
Chaos in Palestine could well open the field to more 
militant groups. With the prospect that neither Hamas nor 
Fatah would be able to establish control in the wake of 
PA collapse, security officials from across the political 
spectrum expressed concern that al-Qaeda and other radical 
groups could exploit the political vacuum.266 On a wall 
opposite the main mosque in Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 
home to several senior Hamas cadres, graffiti proclaimed 
that: “Democracy is apostasy with the blessing of Islamic 
preachers”. While the Haniya government was 
unambiguous in its rejection of al-Qaeda’s ideology,267 
it dangled the threat in an attempt to modify the West’s 
approach. “People now see a new U.S. crusade pushing 
us to a clash of civilisations. We are against this, but the 
alternative to us is al-Qaeda”.268  
In short, this option suffers from a serious disconnect 
between ends and means and an apparent obliviousness 
to longer-term implications. If it is starved of resources, 
confronted by an increasingly hostile population and 
unable to realise its agenda, Hamas might well fail. But 
with widespread violence and chaos and a collapse in 
Palestinian institutions and a question-mark dangling over 
the legitimacy of any successor regime, its failure would 
be hard to chalk up as anybody’s success. 
 
 
265 Aronson, “Financing the Palestinian Authority”, op. cit. 
Additionally, “If the United States reacts to the first electoral 
defeat of an Arab government by overturning the results, the 
message will reverberate around the region”. Brown, “Living 
with Palestinian Democracy”, op. cit., p. 3. 
266 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas, Fatah and international 
security officials, Gaza Strip, May 2006. Al-Qaeda’s operations 
in Jordan and Sinai have exacerbated concern that the radical 
Islamist network is at the gates. Among the Israeli General Staff, 
journalists have also noted “fears that the collapse of the Hamas 
government would generate chaos and thrust Gaza into the hands 
of world Jihad”. Amir Oren, “Taking the offensive”, Haaretz, 2 
June 2006. 
267 “Our sole conflict is with the occupation. We are not ready 
for a war with the EU and the U.S. We want their support, not 
their enmity”. Crisis Group interview, Abu Hilal, Gaza, May 
2006.  
268 Crisis Group interview, Salah Bardawil, Hamas PLC 
member and spokesperson of the parliamentary faction, Khan 
Yunis, May 2006. 
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B. STRENGTHENING ABBAS? 
Under the growing realisation that “Hamas cannot be 
defeated with nothing”269 and that Fatah currently cannot 
present an appealing alternative to the public, a softer 
option is also being considered. The objective is to find 
ways to strengthen Abbas, thereby circumventing the 
government and persuading Palestinians that Hamas is 
the real obstacle to progress.  
Empowerment of the president could have several 
components. As outlined above, he could be successful 
in raising funds the government could not, placing him 
in the position of having averted an all-out humanitarian 
crisis. Rejecting a more confrontational approach, a 
Palestinian presidential adviser remarked:  
Abbas can’t be a spoiler if he wants to be effective. 
A shadow government would be the stupidest 
possible move, because it will perpetuate the image 
of a power-hungry Fatah. What Abbas can and 
should do is fundraise, for example from the Arab 
states, and when it becomes clear money is coming 
in because of him and despite the government he 
will appear as a saviour and statesman.270 
Politically, this strategy could entail the opening of an 
Abbas/Olmert channel. At its most modest, it could yield 
changes on the ground, the removal of certain checkpoints, 
the relaxation of harsh security measures, the handing over 
of withheld tax revenues or the release of Palestinian 
prisoners. At its most ambitious, it could give rise to 
coordination of the next stages of Israel’s territorial 
withdrawal or, most dramatically, agreement on the basic 
parameters of a final status accord to be presented to a 
popular referendum. This option has greatest resonance 
among some of the president’s advisers, even as they 
concede it is by far the least likely. As they see it, if the 
goal is to build up Abbas, focus should shift from the 
arena where he faces the most severe constraints (security) 
to the arena where he faces the least (his political agenda).  
Given the countervailing power of Hamas and the chaos 
in his own forces, Abbas may not be able to deliver on 
security; indeed, even before the elections, he had fallen 
rather short. However, as PLO chairman, he could obtain 
broad public consent through a referendum on a framework 
agreement that built on the Clinton Parameters, Taba 
negotiations, and Geneva Accords.271 But even the less 
 
 
269 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006. 
270 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, April 2006. 
271 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
May 2006. This idea was presented prior to Abbas’s 25 May 
ultimatum to Hamas. His adoption of the Prisoners’ Initiative 
ambitious outcomes could revive both faith in negotiations 
and support for those who can engage in them.  
There are advantages to this overall approach, and it has 
much to recommend it compared to efforts to provoke a 
quick confrontation with Hamas. Enhancing Abbas’s 
stature through positive change is certainly preferable 
to diminishing Hamas’s through negative ones. Should 
progress in fact occur, Hamas would be placed in the 
difficult position of either passive bystander – thereby 
conveying an impression of impotence – or active saboteur 
– thereby clearly standing in the way of Palestinian 
progress.  
Although it may not have fully endorsed this strategy 
in all its components, the U.S. signalled during Prime 
Minister Olmert’s May visit to Washington that it saw 
clear benefits to a negotiating track. President Bush is 
said to have conveyed to his guest in no uncertain terms 
the importance of a genuine effort to negotiate with Abbas 
before resorting to a unilateral approach.272  
Deeply sceptical of any attempt to jump-start final status 
talks – “that would be irresponsible now, for failure would 
set us back irreversibly”273 – U.S. officials are instead 
exploring whether some negotiations could produce 
material changes on the ground or whether Olmert’s 
realignment plan could be repackaged through Israeli-
Palestinian coordination to address some Palestinian 
concerns. This might be done by eliciting Israeli assurances 
to take no further prejudicial steps in Jerusalem and by 
presenting partial withdrawal as a step towards, rather than 
a substitute for, a comprehensive solution to the conflict. 
A meeting between Abbas and Olmert, expected in the 
near future, could be the first step toward clarifying such 
issues.  
In Israel as well, there is interest for such a strategy, 
principally though not only expressed by the Labour Party, 
and more specifically its leader and current defence 
minister, Amir Peretz. An advocate of a negotiated 
permanent settlement, Peretz has manifested his preference 
for a strategy of bolstering Abbas, while coming out against 
broad-brush sanctions that could backfire.274  
 
 
may reflect frustration that his earlier idea had not encountered 
American or Israeli support. 
272 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, Washington, May 
2006. 
273 Ibid. 
274 In a lengthy interview before the recent Israeli election, Peretz 
stated: “The optimal scenario is massive aid from humanitarian 
organizations to the moderate Palestinian forces so that within 
two years Abbas can dissolve the parliament after Fatah cleans 
up its corruption. If that happens, the results of those elections 
will be totally different. On the other hand, if we starve the 
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Still, this second strategy involves important risks and, 
given the factional rivalries on the ground, would present 
many of the same pitfalls as the first. In essence, if Hamas 
leaders were to see it as a more roundabout way of side-
stepping and ultimately replacing them, they would likely 
seek to thwart it. Although they might be wary of appearing 
to stand against material or political advancement, they 
too possess indirect ways of reaching their goals. Insofar 
as Abbas’s empowerment was linked to the U.S. or Israel, 
Hamas’s efforts to discredit him might well register with 
the public. The Islamists also could promote an escalation 
in attacks against Israel that did not bear their immediate 
fingerprints by giving a greener light to other militant 
groups, thereby torpedoing any chance of improved 
bilateral relations and turning this from a Fatah/Hamas 
to a Palestinian/Israeli struggle.  
Then there is, of course, the risk that negotiations raise 
expectations which, if dashed – as so often in the past – 
would inflict a serious blow on Abbas and the strategy he 
embodies. “There is a price to calling for negotiations”, 
an Abbas adviser said, “which is that if we cannot obtain 
what Palestinians see as the minimum, Hamas will be 
vindicated and we will be history”.275 
C. A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
Over the past several years, the Israeli-Palestinian landscape 
has undergone mutations so profound as to make it barely 
recognisable. The two sides’ supposed endorsement of 
the Roadmap notwithstanding, there no longer exists a 
shared framework for their relationship. In Israel, belief 
that the status quo is untenable combined with conviction 
that negotiations over a final settlement are not viable has 
given rise both to unilateralism and to a new party that 
embodies it. In Palestine, Fatah has lost its hegemonic 
status, Hamas’s ascent challenges some of the core 
political assumptions that have guided the national 
movement since the late 1980s, and rivalry between the 
two, coming on the heels of five years of a costly conflict 
with Israel, threatens to descend into chaos and civil war.  
The international community, frustrated that so much 
economic and political investment over more than a 
decade has yielded so little, questions the validity of its 
continued involvement and is more concerned today about 
containing the conflict than resolving it. Hamas’s electoral 
victory has, of course, only exacerbated such feelings, 
putting in question the wisdom of continued financial 
assistance and diplomatic activity and encouraging 
 
 
Palestinians, we’ll get the opposite result”. Ari Shavit, “A new 
dawn”, Haaretz, 3 March 2006.  
275 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian presidential adviser, 
June 2006. 
international actors to interfere in domestic Palestinian 
politics. 
Yet, beyond ritual incantations of the increasingly 
imperceptible objective of a two-state solution, very little 
effort appears to have gone into defining realistic strategic 
objectives in this new context, devising a way to get there, 
or assessing the probable longer-term consequences of 
current policy choices. Instead, policy options debated in 
the U.S., Israel and much of Europe cover only the narrow 
spectrum from hard to softer attempts to weaken the 
Hamas-led government and ultimately facilitate its ouster 
from power. All that helps obscure that obstacles to Israeli-
Palestinian relations are not exclusively, or perhaps even 
essentially, due to Hamas’s victory; that there have been 
no genuine negotiations since 2001, including during the 
year Abbas reigned and Fatah ruled; and that the elections 
were promoted by Abbas precisely to prevent growing 
fissures among Palestinians and to forge a more consensual 
strategy. In other words, Hamas’s rise to power is far 
more a symptom than the cause of the Israeli-Palestinian 
crisis, and removing Hamas is unlikely to resolve it. 
What is needed today is a more sophisticated, nuanced 
approach that sets itself the following priority objectives:  
 avoiding a resumption of full-scale Israeli-
Palestinian hostilities by achieving a sustainable and 
reciprocal truce;  
 averting intra-Palestinian violence and a PA 
collapse; and  
 preventing measures that jeopardise the possibility 
of a two-state solution, and, ideally, setting the 
stage for a resumption of negotiations.  
Since the elections, Crisis Group has argued that the 
current approach of isolating Hamas and depriving its 
government of funds unless it accepts the three Quartet 
conditions runs counter to all these goals.276 What is more, 
the interplay of international pressure and interference in 
Palestinian affairs on the one hand and growing Hamas/ 
Fatah tensions on the other has brought the situation 
frighteningly close to civil war.  
The parties need now to concentrate on three 
interconnected arenas: relations among Palestinians, 
relations between the PA and the international community, 
and relations between the PA and Israel. 
 
 
276 See, for example, Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller, 
“For Israel and Hamas, a case for accommodation”, The 
Washington Post, 15 May 2006; Robert Malley, “Avoiding 
Failure with Hamas”, International Herald Tribune, 10 April 
2006; Robert Malley, “Making the best of Hamas’s victory”, 
Baltimore Sun, 19 February 2006. 
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A Palestinian/Palestinian Accommodation 
As this report has sought to make clear, the single most 
urgent issue today is for Palestinians to overcome their 
differences peacefully and achieve a strategic consensus. 
In the absence of an all-encompassing understanding, it 
is hard to contemplate favourable evolution on any other 
front. Abbas’s efforts to reach out to Israel will be at the 
mercy of Hamas’s firepower; any similar Hamas attempts 
to reach a modus vivendi with Israel based on parallel 
unilateral steps could be thwarted by Fatah-inspired 
violence; and civil strife would nullify any international 
effort to avert a humanitarian disaster. 
An inter-Palestinian agreement would need to tackle three 
issues: the national movement’s strategic objectives; the 
PLO’s role and composition; and the proper allocation 
of power between government and presidency. A 
reconstituted PLO that includes the Islamist organisations 
and reflects their proper weight is recognised by all 
constituent organisations as the sole legitimate Palestinian 
representative and negotiator, and is authorised to pursue 
policy on the basis of the Arab League Beirut Initiative 
or the Prisoners’ Initiative would address the first two. 
Resolving the Fatah-Hamas rivalry through revitalisation 
of the PLO would also deflate the growing constitutional 
crisis within the PA insofar as it would either produce a 
coalition government or more clearly define and enforce 
the respective roles of the PA and PLO – neglected terrain 
when Arafat and thereafter Fatah dominated both.  
Specifically, such an agreement would reconfirm the 
primarily domestic and administrative character of the 
PA, as against the political supremacy and national role 
of the PLO. If the parties also confirmed the Basic Law 
as the sole framework regulating the respective powers of 
the PA government and presidency and, as a confidence-
building measure, pledged not to introduce presidential 
decrees or parliamentary legislation that impinged 
upon presidential and cabinet authority without prior 
consultation, the importance of the PA presidency would 
likely diminish over time; in political matters the 
presidency would be superseded by the PLO chairman, 
with governance primarily within the purview of the 
government. In due course and consensus permitting, 
Palestinians might even consider abolishing one of the 
two PA posts and resurrecting it only when the PLO and 
its leadership were disbanded in the context of statehood.  
Another priority area is tacking the dual command 
structures competing for control of the security forces. 
Pending security sector legislation regularising the chain 
of command, political leaders should revive the National 
Security Council (NSC) under the president’s auspices, 
with the participation of the prime minister, interior 
minister and the heads of security agencies and the aim of 
framing a united national security policy and nurturing 
loyalty to national institutions. In particular, the NSC 
should consider: 
 the removal of all factional slogans and other 
insignia from security premises;  
 the formation of a non-partisan standing committee 
to enforce a ban on militia and private security 
activity by members of the security forces and the 
screening of the pay-roll for fictitious employment;  
 the merging of all auxiliary forces formed since 
the January 2006 election into existing units; and  
 the drafting of security sector legislation providing 
for the demobilisation of paramilitary forces, with 
members being either integrated into official security 
forces or pensioned out.  
The National Dialogue, which continues during 
preparations and debate surrounding the 26 July 
referendum, could provide an important platform in this 
respect; even Abbas’s notion of a referendum in principle 
could serve to break the impasse by giving Hamas an 
honourable way to change the government’s position. 
To date, however, reaching a genuine consensus seems 
the least of either side’s concerns. Instead, both appear more 
intent on posturing than on resolving policy differences, 
on weakening their counterparts than on forging common 
positions.  
The Prisoners’ Initiative, drafted in painstaking negotiations 
by leaders confident they and their rivals were working 
towards a common purpose, offers an instructive example. 
While Abbas’s aversion to an open-ended and therefore 
inconclusive dialogue in the context of escalating crisis 
is entirely understandable, his linking of an ultimatum to 
a non-negotiable outcome has heightened suspicions that 
the exercise is not about achieving consensus but rather 
about winning a confrontation. There is thus a real danger 
that the referendum as currently envisaged will exacerbate 
those very tensions the Prisoners’ Initiative intended to 
address. In announcing a referendum date, Abbas has 
moved the process one step closer; still, in the weeks 
remaining prior to the 26 July vote, the parties should 
redouble their efforts to reach an agreement that would 
either render the referendum superfluous or turn it into a 
consensual exercise. 
For these efforts to have a chance of success, members of 
the international community would have to adopt a more 
hands-off approach, allowing Palestinians the necessary 
political space to resolve their differences. Should a 
coalition government be on the agenda, the U.S. in 
particular would need to refrain from pressuring Fatah 
and independent politicians not to join, as it did in the 
elections’ aftermath.  
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A Palestinian/International Community 
Accommodation 
Although inter-Palestinian differences have played a 
decisive part in the deteriorating situation, the international 
attitude clearly has contributed. The economic boycott, 
lack of engagement with the government, and imposition 
of non-negotiable and non-prioritised conditions have 
promoted a sense of siege within Hamas, arguably 
fostering greater inflexibility among the Islamists.  
The EU’s funding mechanisms, once finalised and if 
endorsed by the U.S., might provide a temporary palliative 
– provided it is modified as advocated above to substitute 
UN agencies and/or the World Bank for the presidency as 
the interface with the PA administration and to expand 
its coverage to fund all basic services, the security sector 
included. If it is not so modified, it could do more to fuel 
tensions within the PA than quench them. In any event, it 
is not a satisfactory substitute for a long-term assistance 
policy. Instead, and in parallel with the achievement of a 
new consensual Palestinian position, the Quartet and other 
international actors should rethink the conditions they have 
placed on the PA government and focus on practical and 
meaningful benchmarks that, if met, would lead to a 
reassessment of the budgetary and political boycott.  
The principal benchmark ought to be the government’s 
good faith efforts to reinstate the truce and, with reciprocal 
Israeli steps, its ability to extend it to Islamic Jihad and 
others; it also should include the government’s ability to 
restore law and order in Gaza. Indeed, should it reach 
those goals, it will have achieved more than Fatah did and 
much of what is of critical importance to the international 
community. Politically, while recognition of Israel would 
be desirable, it should not be the immediate test. Neither 
Egypt nor Jordan provided such recognition at the outset of 
negotiations, and such Western-friendly Arab governments 
as Saudi Arabia and Morocco continue to withhold it; 
indeed, Fatah itself never explicitly accepted recognition. 
What should be requested, in its place, is acceptance of 
the Prisoners’ Initiative and the formation of a national 
unity government on its basis, recognition of the PLO’s 
1988 Algiers Program (proclaiming statehood within the 
occupied territories the national movement’s strategic goal), 
and/or endorsement of the 2002 Arab League Beirut 
Initiative; all three, through their endorsement of a two-
state solution, implicitly entail recognition of Israel.  
Adoption of the Arab League initiative may be the more 
likely, as Hamas may wish to link policy changes directly 
to Arab leaders and collect dues from them, rather than 
conducting itself like a junior player through the agency 
of rival Palestinians. Other significant benchmarks include 
whether the PA allows contacts with Israeli counterparts 
to promote mutual security, delivery of services and 
commercial activity;277 begins to prune the pay-roll of 
fraud; and initiates efforts to remove arms from the streets, 
assert control over heavy weaponry and integrate or 
demobilise militiamen.  
As a means of encouraging these steps, the Quartet (or, 
if the U.S. were to object, the EU) and Arab countries 
should signal unambiguously that their implementation 
would trigger a positive reaction, in terms of both 
resuming pre-election PA funding levels and engaging 
in ministerial contacts with the government. So far, neither 
the Quartet nor any other leading international actor has 
issued a clear statement of what the Islamists could expect 
were they to meet the demands, either in full or in part,278 
strengthening the view within Hamas that it would 
be subjected to a never-ending list of requests without 
concomitant payoff.279  
An alternative approach would require some regular 
channel of communication short of high-level diplomatic 
contact; one idea would be for a UN-appointed mediator 
 
 
277 Prominent Hamas official Mahmoud Ramahi said he was 
willing to engage in “technical contacts” with Israeli officials. 
Stating he would refuse to meet with Israeli politicians who 
were not government officials since any such meeting would 
necessarily be political, he expressed no hesitation about 
meeting Israel’s defence minister if the purpose was to discuss 
arrangements that would ease daily life in the occupied 
territories. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, May 2006. For a 
similar statement from Haniya, see Danny Rubinstein, “Haniya 
tells Haaretz”, Haaretz, 23 May 2006. 
278 Speaking to Crisis Group, EU diplomats intimated that were 
Hamas to take the initiative by accepting the Beirut Initiative, 
“this will create divisions within Europe. Some will consider 
this significant enough to initiate a dialogue with the Palestinian 
government, while others will remain committed to Washington’s 
all or nothing approach”. Crisis Group interview, May 2006. 
A Jordanian commentator despaired at Hamas’s failure to take a 
step that all Arab governments – including Syria and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq – endorsed: “Shortly after the Palestinian elections 
I met with a Jordanian Islamist leader. I told him, ‘if you’re in 
contact with these people, tell them I advise them to quickly 
accept the Arab League initiative’. Why? Because it will make 
it all but impossible for Arab states to line up with Washington 
if Hamas has accepted their own initiative, and probably will 
affect the Quartet’s positions as well”. Crisis Group interview, 
Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanian political analyst and member of 
the Crisis Group Board, Amman, February 2006. However, it is 
one thing to assume the EU or others would react favourably; it 
is another for them to indicate it explicitly. 
279 Crisis Group interview, Hamas leader, March 2006. An 
Abbas adviser, highly critical of Hamas, nonetheless pointed 
out: “Don’t expect them to do a full striptease in a month. Give 
them time, but make clear there are limits. Don’t help them by 
punishing my people. And remember that if I were them, I would 
do nothing without a quid pro quo”. Crisis Group interview, 
Ramallah, March 2006. 
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to act as a go-between, gauging Hamas’s willingness to 
compromise and communicating what the Quartet would 
do in return.280 The success of this approach would not 
require direct U.S. participation; indeed, given its strict 
laws and constraining domestic environment, it is hard 
to imagine that anything short of full Hamas acceptance 
of the three conditions would lead to a significant policy 
change by Washington.281 But it would necessitate 
renunciation of the de facto tertiary boycott of the PA, 
including guarantees of non-retribution for foreign banks, 
other institutions and entities implementing programs for 
or handling funds received on behalf of those international 
organisations such as the UN and the World Bank that 
transfer funds to the PA, conduct business with it or 
contribute to its humanitarian institutions.  
In short, for as long as the PA government does not meet 
these benchmarks (but undertakes a good faith effort to 
impose a ceasefire), the European mechanism, with the 
modification proposed in this report, should be maintained. 
The EU would not have diplomatic contacts with the 
government (though the UN channel would operate), and 
funds would be disbursed through UN agencies and/or 
the World Bank. Should, however, the PA government 
accede to them and show good faith compliance, direct 
budgetary support coupled with diplomatic engagement 
ought to be forthcoming. 
A Palestinian Authority/Israeli Accommodation 
Avoiding an all-out resumption of violence between Israelis 
and Palestinians a prospect made all the more difficult by 
 
 
280 Unlike the EU or the U.S., the UN is not barred from having 
contacts with Hamas, which does not figure on its list of terrorist 
entities. Reports in March that the world body was limiting 
its contacts with Hamas were characterised as the result of 
an error by a junior staff member and followed by contacts at 
ministerial level encouraged by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
Crisis Group interview, senior UN official, Amman, March 
2006. Such political contacts are said to require prior coordination 
with Annan. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, May 2006.  
281 Indeed, by U.S. standards, the administration’s approach 
might well be characterized as moderate. In late May, the House 
of representatives voted 361-37 to adopt the Palestinian Anti-
Terrorist Act of 2006 (H.R. 4681) which would, inter alia, sever 
all relations and contacts with the PA and prevent any individual 
affiliated with the PA from obtaining a U.S. visa; designate 
territory controlled by the PA a “terrorist sanctuary”; deduct 
the sum of all UN expenditures that in any way benefit the 
PA from U.S. contributions to the world body; instruct the U.S. 
representative to the World Bank to oppose projects in the 
occupied territories; prohibit Palestinian representation on U.S. 
territory; and expel the PLO mission to the United Nations. 
It would also “cut off aid to non-governmental groups working 
in the West Bank and Gaza except for health programs…and 
limit the President’s authority to waive the aid bans”.  
the 9 June killing of Abu Samhadana, 282 the subsequent 
shelling of a Gaza beachfront that killed six members of 
the Ghalia family283 and Hamas’s decision to renounce 
the ceasefire and launch numerous rockets into Israel – 
will necessitate a series of coordinated steps. The priority 
today is to stop the escalation, reinstate Hamas’s truce, 
and achieve a more comprehensive, reciprocal ceasefire 
that includes all Palestinian groups and Israel. 
Because direct PA/Israeli negotiations are unlikely in the 
short term, a series of security guarantees probably will 
need to be indirectly negotiated. On past performance, 
Egyptian mediation may be both necessary and desirable, 
though Quartet involvement (e.g., via a UN-appointed 
mediator) could prove more effective. Islamist leaders 
have proclaimed their willingness for quiet and “to prevent 
any operation against any civilian provided Israel 
reciprocates”.284 According to PA interior ministry 
spokesman Khalid Abu Hilal:  
We’re not like the previous government which 
claimed it could implement a ceasefire but couldn’t. 
We say we can, but won’t do it freely. We have the 
ability to prevent armed attacks, but we are not 
Israel’s employees. We won’t serve the occupation 
while they besiege us and attack us. The occupier 
should agree to a ceasefire.285 
A former senior Israeli intelligence officer noted: “We are 
not accepting this kind of regime. But as long as it avoids 
terrorism, our interest is in stability despite a Hamas 
regime”.286 The sentiment was echoed by a current security 
 
 
282 Abu Samhadana’s 9 June funeral was reported as the most 
heavily attended in the Gaza Strip since that of Hamas leader 
Abd-al-Aziz Rantisi in 2004. Thousands more participated in the 
Ghalia family’s funeral cortege the following day. Underlining 
the potential severity of these incidents, an Israeli foreign ministry 
official compared them to the traffic accident that set off the 
1987-1993 uprising and the January 2002 assassination of local 
Fatah militant Ra’id Karmi, which precipitated the movement’s 
first suicide bombings. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, 
June 2006. 
283 In a further series of strikes within the Gaza Strip later that 
same day, at least ten more Palestinians, including at least seven 
civilians, were killed and over 40, many of them children, 
wounded. With a total toll of some fourteen dead, it was one of 
the bloodiest days since the installation of the Hamas-led PA 
government. Haaretz, 9 June 2006. 
284 “Resistance is a right, but I’m ready to stop attacks on 
civilians”. Crisis Group interview, Bardawil, Khan Younis, May 
2006. He additionally proposed EU observers monitor the 
ceasefire.  
285 Crisis Group interview, Khalid Abu Hilal, PA interior 
ministry spokesman, Gaza City, May 2006. 
286 Crisis Group interview, Peri Golan, former head of the Shin 
Bet anti-terrorism department, Tel Aviv, February 2006. 
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official: “Their behaviour on the ground is what counts. 
If there’s no terror, that’s very important”.287 
Beyond that, the objective coincidence of interests between 
the two governments’ agendas presents intriguing 
possibilities. Neither the Hamas-led PA nor Israel wants 
to deal with the other; neither believes (at this point at 
least) in a long-term comprehensive agreement; both are 
primarily preoccupied with their own agenda (rebuilding 
and transforming the Palestinian entity for the former; 
implementing the realignment plan for the latter); and 
the two ideally would prefer quiet.  
Indeed, if Hamas’s government is to succeed in delivering 
services and restoring law and order, it needs Israel’s 
acquiescence: military operations would doom any attempt 
to achieve domestic calm; restrictions on movement, 
trade and money supply would compromise economic 
stability; and prolonged withholding of Palestinian 
tax revenues would scuttle efforts at budgetary solvency. 
Likewise, if Israel is to succeed in implementing its unilateral 
withdrawal, it needs a relatively calm environment lest 
public opinion and the political class sour on the plan 
amid accusations of “surrendering to terror”.288  
Moreover, and paradoxically, because Israel needs stability 
within the occupied territories and contact with the PA, it 
conceivably could end up leading the way toward a more 
pragmatic approach. A senior UN official half-jokingly 
stated: “we are counting on the Israelis to restrain the 
Americans from pursuing some of their more extreme 
proposals”.289 In short, “Israel can frustrate the Islamists’ 
project, but needs their cooperation if its own plan is to 
succeed; the Islamists can hinder Olmert’s objectives, 
but require his complicity if their own ambitions are to 
be realised”.290  
 
 
287 Crisis Group interview, Tel Aviv, February 2006.  
288 Crisis Group interview, Israeli foreign ministry official, 
Jerusalem, June 2006. 
289 Crisis Group interview, senior UN official, April 2006. 
Israeli diplomats claim they already have asked Washington to 
moderate some of its harshest measures to allow continuation 
of humanitarian project within the occupied territories whose 
interruption would be detrimental to Israeli interests. Israel has 
voiced particular concerns about the suspension of infrastructure 
projects leading to untreated sewage contaminating its territory, 
be it the beaches of Ashkelon or the coastal plains receiving 
run-off from the West Bank. A recent swarm of mosquitoes 
descending on the Jerusalem settlement of Ramot was blamed on 
untreated effluent from Ramallah. “Mosquitoes plague Ramot”, 
The Jerusalem Post, 6 June 2006. “This puts us in an awkward 
position. We don’t want the U.S. to accuse us of undercutting 
their anti-terrorism policy, but we also don’t want to see 
environmental degradation or health hazards that will spread to 
us!” Crisis Group interview, Israeli diplomat, Washington, May 
2006.  
290 Malley and Miller, “For Israel and Hamas”, op. cit.  
Assuming the PA implements measures to rein in militant 
groups and restore law and order, Israel should relax its 
most punishing restrictions: lifting checkpoints, allowing 
freer movement for people and goods and handing over 
withheld Palestinian tax revenues in accordance with 
existing agreements – all of which amount to revoking 
collective and punitive restrictions which have no legitimate 
security purpose. As further confidence-building measures, 
Israel could consider release from detention of all 
Palestinians who have not been charged with an offence, 
and the PA government could respond favourably to offers 
from Israeli politicians for talks. Further prisoner releases 
by Israel should follow.  
Politically, the end result could be a pair of “parallel 
unilateralisms”: each party could tacitly accept the 
other’s domestic priorities, clearing a space for internal 
development. In practice, this would entail the PA 
attending to domestic issues while taking credit for Israeli 
evacuation of additional West Bank territory, and Israel 
withdrawing from parts of the West Bank under cover of 
a Palestinian tahdi’a. Under this scenario, and assuming 
an internal Palestinian consensus is achieved, Abbas’s role 
would be to parley with the international community to 
ensure that the withdrawal does not adversely affect 
longer-term Palestinian interests.  
In particular, he would seek credible Quartet-backed 
assurances from Israel that there would be no further 
settlement expansion, especially in and around Jerusalem; 
that the controversial E-1 project would not be pursued;291 
and that whatever line is established by the withdrawal will 
not be accorded political and legal recognition, since 
permanent borders will require a comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian agreement. These assurances will be critical 
to ensure quiet on the Palestinian side during the period 
leading up to and including withdrawal.  
The Quartet should play an even more important role. While 
providing strong diplomatic backing to Israel’s withdrawal, 
it should at the same time take steps to reassure Palestinians 
about where the process is heading. In particular, it ought 
to put forward, with strong U.S. participation, a more 
detailed vision of what a final agreement would look like.  
Jerusalem/Amman/Brussels, 13 June 2006 
 
 
291 The E-1 project, involving a major extension of the settlement 
of Ma’ale Adumin between Jerusalem and Jericho, functionally 
bisects the West Bank and further isolates Arab neighbourhoods 
in East Jerusalem from other West Bank population centres. 
See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°44, The Jerusalem 
Powder Keg, 2 August 2005.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXCERPTS FROM PRISONERS’ INITIATIVE DOCUMENT 
 
 
The following eighteen points were presented on 18 May 2006 by its signatories, all prominent Palestinian prisoners, to the 
Palestinian leadership and people, in the occupied territories and exile, as the operative part of a document that it was hoped 
would be considered “as one whole package” and could “achieve unanimous endorsement and contribute to achieving a 
Palestinian national conciliation…” The translation below is from the Associated Press. 
1. The Palestinian people at home and in exile seek to liberate their land and realise their right of freedom, return and 
independence, and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish an independent state with 
Jerusalem as its capital on all the land occupied in 1967, guaranteeing the right of return for the refugees, 
liberating all the prisoners and detainees, drawing upon our people’s historic right in the land of our ancestors, the 
U.N. charter, international law, and what international legitimacy guarantees. 
2. Expediting the realisation of what was agreed upon in Cairo in March 2005 regarding developing and activating 
the role of the PLO, and the joining of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in this organisation as the legitimate and sole 
representative of the Palestinian people wherever they exist; and in line with development on the Palestinian front 
according to democratic bases and to strengthen the representation of the PLO, the legitimate and sole representative 
of our people, in a way that would enable it to carry out its responsibilities in leading our people at home and in exile, in 
mobilising them, defending their national, political, and human rights in all domains and functions, regional and 
international; the national interest constitutes that a new national council be formed before the end of 2006 in a way 
that guarantees the representation of all the forces, factions, national and Islamic parties, and groups everywhere, 
all sectors, institutions, and personalities on the basis of proportional representation, attendance, and effectiveness 
in the political, struggle, social, and popular domains, and in protecting the PLO as a wide frontal framework, a 
comprehensive national coalition, and a national framework that assembles all Palestinians at home and abroad as 
a higher political reference. 
3. The Palestinian people’s right to resistance and upholding the choice of resistance by all means, and concentrating 
the resistance in territories occupied in 1967, alongside political action and negotiations and diplomatic work, and 
continuing popular resistance against the occupation in all its forms, places and policies, and giving importance to 
expanding the participation of all sectors, fronts, groups and public in this popular resistance. 
4. Devising a Palestinian plan for comprehensive political action, unifying the Palestinian political discourse based 
on the Palestinian national consensus program, Arab legitimacy, international resolutions fair to our people, which 
are represented by the PLO, the PA – Its chief and government, national and Islamic factions, civil society groups, 
public figures – to be able to reactivate and develop and mobilise Arab, Islamic, and international political, financial, 
economic and humanitarian assistance to our people and national authority and in support of our people’s right to 
self-determination, freedom, return, independence, and confronting the Israeli plan to impose the Israeli solution 
on our people, and stand up to the unjust siege on us. 
5. Protecting and developing the Palestinian National Authority as the nucleus for the upcoming state, this authority 
that was founded by our people, and their struggle, sacrifices, blood and suffering of its children; higher national 
interest requires the respect of the temporary constitution of this authority, and the laws in effect, respecting the 
responsibilities and authorities of the elected president for the will of the Palestinian people in free, democratic and 
fair elections, and respecting the responsibilities and authorities of the government which was granted confidence 
by the parliament, and the importance and need of creative cooperation between the presidency and the government, 
and joint action, convening periodical meetings between them to settle any disputes with brotherly dialogue on the 
basis of the temporary constitution and the higher national interest, and the need to carry out a comprehensive reform 
for all national institutions, particularly the judiciary, and respecting the law on all levels, and implementing 
its decisions, and supporting and strengthening the rule of law. 
6. Forming a national coalition government in way that would guarantee the participation of all parliamentary blocs, 
particularly Fatah and Hamas, and the political forces who want to participate on the basis of this document and a 
common program to alleviate the Palestinian situation locally, on the Arab front, regionally and internationally; and 
facing the challenges with a strong national government that has the popular and political Palestinian support from 
all forces, as well as Arab and international support, and can carry out the reform program, combatting poverty, and 
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unemployment; and providing the best possible assistance to the sectors that endured the responsibilities of 
steadfastness, resistance, the uprising, and was the victim of the criminal Israeli aggression, particularly the families 
of martyrs, injured, and the owners of houses and properties destroyed by the occupation, as well as the unemployed 
and the graduates. 
7. Managing the negotiations is the authority of the PLO and president of the PA on the basis of upholding Palestinian 
national interests and realising them, provided that any fateful/decisive agreement be presented to the new PNC to 
ratify or be put up to public referendum if possible. 
8. Liberating the prisoners and detainees is a sacred national duty that must be carried out by all national and Islamic 
forces and factions, the PLO and the PA’s president and government and the PLC and all resistance formations. 
9. Efforts must be redoubled to support and look after refugees and defending their rights. A popular representative 
conference of the refugees must be convened, which would yield agencies that would follow up on reaffirming the 
right of return, upholding it, and calling on the international community to implement Resolution 194 calling for 
the right of refugees to return and compensation. 
10. Working to form a united resistance front called the “Palestinian resistance front” to lead and carry out the resistance 
against occupation and to unify and coordinate the resistance action and form a unified political reference for it. 
11. Upholding the democratic path, holding general and periodic free, democratic and fair elections according to the 
law, for the president and the legislature, and the regional and local councils; and respecting the principle of peaceful 
rotation of power; and pledging to protect the democratic Palestinian experience and democratic choice and their 
results; and respecting the rule of law, the necessary and public freedoms, freedom of the press, and equality between 
citizens in rights and duties without discrimination; and protecting the gains made by women, promoting and 
strengthening them. 
12. Rejecting and condemning the unjust siege on our people led by the United States and Israel, and calling on Arabs, 
publicly and officially to support the Palestinian people and the PLO and its PA; and calling on Arab governments 
to implement Arab summit resolutions, the political, financial, economic, and public ones that are in support of our 
Palestinian people, their steadfastness, and their national cause, and reaffirming that the PA is committed to Arab 
consensus and joint Arab action. 
13. Calling the Palestinian people to unity and cohesion and closing ranks, supporting the PLO, the PA’s president and 
government and supporting the steadfastness and resistance in the face of the aggression and siege, and rejecting 
the interference in internal Palestinian affairs. 
14. Rejecting all forms of disunity, division and what leads to strife (sedition), condemning the use of weapons regardless 
of the justifications to settle internal disputes, banning the use of weapons between the children of the same people 
and reaffirming the sacredness of the Palestinian blood; and committing to dialogue as the only means to resolve 
disputes, expressing opinions by all means, including opposing the authority and its decisions according to the law; 
and the right of peaceful protest, organising rallies and demonstrations and strikes provided they are peaceful, clear 
of weapons, and do not transgress on people and their property or public property. 
15. National interest requires searching for the best appropriate means to continue to engage our people and their political 
forces in Gaza in their new situation in the battle for freedom, return and independence, liberating the West Bank 
and Jerusalem in a way that forms a real force for the steadfastness and resistance of our people there. National 
interest requires a reevaluation of the most successful ways and means of struggle against the occupation. 
16. The need to reform and modernise the Palestinian security institution and its sectors to make it more able to carry 
out its role in defending the nation and citizens, facing up to the occupation and aggression, maintaining public order 
and security, implementing laws, ending chaos, public display of guns, confiscating weapons of chaos, which greatly 
harm the resistance and defame its image and threaten the unity of the Palestinian society; and the need to coordinate 
and organise the relation between the forces and resistance groups, and to organise and protect their weapons. 
17. Calling on the legislative council to continue to issue laws that regulate the work of the security institutions and 
their different branches, and to ensue a law that would ban political party membership (action) for those who are 
members of the security bodies, and committing to the elected political reference stipulated in the law.  
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18. Work to expand the role and presence of international solidarity committees and groups, lovers of peace, to support 
the steadfastness of our people and their just struggle against occupation and settlements, the racist separation wall 
politically and regionally, and for the implementation of the International Court of Justice decision to remove the 
wall and the settlements and their illegalities.  
Signed by:  
Marwan Barghouti, Fatah, Secretary General 
Shaikh Abd-al-Khaliq Natshe, Hamas, senior leadership 
Shaikh Bassam Saadi, Islamic Jihad 
Abd-al-Rahim Malluh, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Deputy Secretary General 
Mustafa Badarna, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 
Note: 1. Saadi expressed reservations on the item pertaining to the negotiations. 
 2. Natshe and Saadi on 11 June withdrew their signatures to protest Abbas’s “unacceptable abuse” of the 
document in the referendum announced for 26 July. 
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an 
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, 
with nearly 120 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy 
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
regular update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior 
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired 
by the former European Commissioner for External 
Relations Christopher Patten and Boeing’s Senior 
Vice-President, International Relations and former U.S. 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief 
Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is 
based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. 
The organisation currently operates fifteen field offices 
(in Amman, Belgrade, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, 
Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria, 
Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over 
50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four 
continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in 
Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole 
region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, 
Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti. 
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governmental departments and agencies 
currently provide funding: Australian Agency for 
International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, 
Canadian International Development Research Centre, 
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, European Union (European Commission), 
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New 
Zealand Agency for International Development, Republic 
of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
United Kingdom Department for International 
Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, Compton Foundation, Flora 
Family Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA 
Internacional, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William 
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, 
Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, Moriah Fund, Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela 
Omidyar Fund, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, 
Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller 
Foundation, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Sarlo 
Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund 
and Viva Trust. 
June 2006 
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org 
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The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilled 
at Birth, Middle East Briefing Nº14, 7 June 2004  
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian 
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